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This thesis analyzes the residential housing choice behavior from three 
different angles, based on the features of housing market. First, information is 
imperfect in housing market. Households have imperfect housing market 
information; and different housing buyers may have different market 
information levels. Housing search is a process in which households gather 
information about the attributes of each choice alternative. The difference in 
households’ information level plays a role in their housing choice. To study 
this role, I examine the varied behaviors between informed and uninformed 
households in housing market theoretically and empirically. In a housing 
search model, it is found that the informed households are more likely to 
secure a good deal in housing market. With the data from Tianjin city in 
China, hedonic estimation is implemented to quantify the impacts of 
information difference on housing search output. The results are consistent 
with the theoretical predictions. 
Second, households are heterogeneous in housing market. With heterogeneous 
characteristics, households have different levels of information, different 
ability to collect and assimilate information, different search costs, and 
different bargaining power, so they would be likely to perform differently in a 
housing search and to deliver different search outcome. This study defines 
search efficiency as the probability of a household to secure a good deal to 
measure its caliber in housing search. I address the factors determining the 
performance of a household in its housing search. I adopt a modified 
stochastic frontier approach to study the impact of households’ characteristics 
vii 
 
on their search efficiency using the data from Tianjin commercial housing 
market in China. The results show that the probability of securing a good deal 
is higher for a better informed household and households with lower income, 
less education, lower ranks in occupation. 
Third, households are always surrounded by neighbors, because their homes 
are in a neighborhood. Their economic choice can be affected by their 
neighbors, which researchers address as neighborhood effect. I study the 
housing location choice behavior with the consideration of neighborhood 
social interactions. I propose a collective choice model with different tastes of 
households to show that households’ destination neighborhood choice is 
impacted by their current neighbors. With the data from Tianjin China, the 
estimation results show that social interactions among the current neighbors 
significantly impact their destination neighborhood choice. The results also 
show that old, high educated and rich households relatively value social 
interactions more when they choose their destination neighborhoods. 
Overall, this dissertation enriches the literature on housing choice behavior by 
quantifying the impacts of information level, households’ characteristics, and 
neighborhood social interactions. It also provides some policy implications to 
the housing market in China. Housing market institution should be built to 
reduce the market friction and increase households’ welfare. During the urban 
redevelopment, more human factors should be considered by city planners, 
because it is not only constructing housing units, but also building 
communities, in which neighbors interact and further affect their economic 
choice behaviors.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background and Research Questions 
The dominant framework for micro economics to analyze markets is the 
standard neo-classical framework. In this framework, the goods are assumed 
to be homogeneous, which are also available to all the consumers without any 
friction, like the transaction cost and search cost. Consumers and producers in 
the market are assumed to be fully informed. The consumers are also taken as 
homogeneous, who have no difference in their taste and preference. 
Housing market is different from this neo-classical goods market in a few 
aspects. Firstly, housing units as the goods in this market are heterogeneous. 
Technically, it is not possible to find the two exactly same housing units in a 
housing market. The heterogeneity of housing units arises from a number of 
different factors. The heterogeneity exists explicitly because housing units are 
differentiated by their types, sizes, ages, and etc. There is also dimensional 
heterogeneity of housing units that they are located in different neighborhood 
environments and may be more or less accessible to the infrastructures around, 
employment centers or central business districts (CBD). 
Adopting Lancaster's (1966) approach, the housing unit should not be viewed 
as a homogeneous good, but as a complex commodity with a collection of 
attributes or characteristics including location attributes and neighborhood 
attributes as well as housing structure attributes, including housing type, 
housing size, housing age, and etc. 
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Secondly, consumers in the housing market are also as varied as the housing 
stock. They are primarily differentiated by income, demographic composition, 
and family life cycle. They are possibly aggregated into consumer groups, and 
their choice can be affected by their peers. The buyers from different groups 
exhibit different housing choice behaviors. The utility derived from a housing 
unit highly depends on the traits of a household. Thus, the decision to choose a 
housing unit is influenced by a household’s social and economic background. 
Thirdly, as a durable good, a housing unit is expensive; and housing 
consumption is the biggest composition of the consumption during the whole 
lifetime of a household. The National Income and Product Account (NIPA) 
statistics show that the housing consumptions of the US households were 
about 1.5 trillion dollars, which is 15.8% of the households’ budgets in 2009. 
So households have only done their housing transactions for a few times in 
their lifetime. The transaction in housing market is costly, and the transaction 
cost cannot be neglected. Besides stamp duty tax which is widely implemented 
in housing market of each country, other costs are also very high, e.g. agency 
fee.  
Fourthly, the properties of housing heterogeneity, locational fixity, durability 
and costly transaction imply that trade friction exists inherently in the housing 
market. Previous research on local housing market analysis emphasizes all 
kinds of market frictions which can hinder the housing choice of households. 
For example, Gyourko (1991) points out fiscal zoning restricts the types of 
home available in suburban communities in the US; Rosenthal et al. (1991) 
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show that credit rationing prevents liquidity-constrained households from 
attaining their long-term optimal housing choices in the US; Zheng, Fu and 
Liu (2006) find that the poor marketability of the previously state-provided 
homes, inadequate provision of housing finance, and spatial mismatch 
between job-market and housing-market prevent the spatial equilibrium from 
fully reflecting the location preferences of the urban residents in China. 
Lastly, imperfect information, as one of the important market imperfection, is 
especially worth to study, because it plagues the housing market. Households 
have imperfect housing market information when entering the market; and 
different home buyers may have different market information levels. It forces 
a buyer to undertake extensive housing search and spend high search cost 
before choosing a housing unit. 
The above mentioned housing market properties of heterogeneous housing 
units, heterogeneous households, imperfect information, high search cost and 
search frictions make the housing choice a complicated process. Quigley 
(1985) points out that the complex nature of a housing unit gives housing 
choice three distinguishing features: the bundle of services provided by a 
housing unit is extremely heterogeneous; a consumer faces a large bundle of 
housing unit alternatives and selects one and only one housing unit from the 
bundle each time; the choice involves the selection of a price as well as the 
other characteristics associated with the housing unit. 
On one hand, a home buyer makes his choice to maximize the utility. The 
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housing unit which he buys can bring him more utility as compared to any 
other unit. Therefore, a home buyer has to undertake an extensive housing 
search over different types of housing units as well as over locations in order 
to find the optimal housing unit he wants. Previous literature on housing 
choice considers households making decisions by weighting up each attribute, 
like accessibility to workplace, shopping, and schools etc., housing price, 
taxes, neighborhood amenities, availability of public services, dwelling 
characteristics, and so forth, and then picking the optimal housing unit (e.g. 
McFadden, 1978; and Quigley, 1985). 
On the other hand, imperfect information is pervasive in a residential housing 
market. The advertisement for the sale of housing units does not necessarily 
convey information essential for buyers. For example, the detailed information 
about the locational environment, especially some soft information, such as 
the characteristics of neighbors, and etc., is usually not reflected. Housing 
agency might not be sophisticated enough to provide all the detailed 
information of the housing unit and the neighborhood. To gather information 
of a housing unit, a personal visit is normally required for a home buyer. 
However, because of high search cost in terms of considerable time, money 
and effort, only a small sub-set of alternatives is selected and visited. To avoid 
the uncertainty and high search cost, when a home buyer finds a unit with a 
value higher than his expectation, he will accept it and stop the tiring and 
costly process of visiting all the alternative housing units. This process of 
residential housing choice is exactly a “search” process described in search 
theory. The kernel of this search process is that search costs and uncertainty 
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stop a home buyer comparing all the alternative choices before making 
decision. The housing unit that a household chooses might not be the optimal 
one. Previous studies on housing search have shown this process (e.g. 
Turnbull and Sirmans, 1993; Wheaton, 1990). 
Considering the features of housing market and the complicated housing 
choice decision making process, a lot of social factors have attracted interest 
in the study of housing choice behavior. Firstly, since information is imperfect 
in housing market, the information level of a home buyer is extremely 
important to influence his housing choice. The studies, which consider the 
information and output of housing search, starts from Turnbull and Sirmans 
(1993). In their search model, the price-taking home buyers search from seller 
to seller until the expected net gain from the entire search-purchase activity is 
maximized. The main prediction of the housing search model is that the 
informed home buyers have high probability to secure a good deal, i.e. paying 
less on average for an identical housing unit, because they know the housing 
market more accurately in the searching process. However, in the empirical 
test of this prediction, by using first-time (or out-of-town) and repeat (or in-
town) buyers to proxy the information level, Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) find 
positive but not significant results because of small sample. Watkins (1998) 
replicates their study using 544 sales transactions from Glasgow in the United 
Kingdom, and finds that there is no difference in price between intra-market 
movers and immigrants. However, Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004) use 
a large sample from Phoenix metropolitan area and find that non-Arizona 
residents pay a premium of about 5.5% in comparison with the within-Arizona 
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counterpart. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2012) identify the distance between the 
next housing unit and the previous address of households in a large number of 
single-family home transactions from Florida, and show that the distant buyers 
pay more for nearly identical housing units. So there is disagreement over 
whether the less informed buyers pay a price premium for information. 
Because information level of households cannot be measured directly, all the 
measures in research are proxies. Due to this limitation, it is necessary to have 
a more convincing test with more measures of information. 
Secondly, households are heterogeneous. In a housing search process, 
heterogeneous home buyers may obtain different outcomes of their search. 
The previous literature points out home buyers’ heterogeneous characteristics 
can influence their housing search performance through the channels of 
information level, search cost, and bargaining power. Literature on housing 
search (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2012; Lambson, Macqueen and Slade, 2004; 
Turnbull and Sirmans, 1993) shows that information level and search cost are 
the key issues in housing search process, impacting on housing price. 
Research on bargaining power finds that households’ characteristics influence 
bargaining power and thus affect property transaction prices (Colwell and 
Munneke, 2006; Harding, Knight and Sirmans, 2003; Harding, Rosenthal and 
Sirmans, 2003; Ling, Naranjo, and Petrova, 2013). 
Previous literature tries to quantify the impacts of home buyers’ heterogeneous 
characteristics on their performance in a housing search. Empirically, the 
duration and the number of search times are used to measure search efficiency 
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in Cronin (1982) and Anglin (1997). They find that various home buyers’ 
characteristics may influence the duration and search times. However, studies 
using these measures of search efficiency are limited by data availability, 
because it is typically difficult to find the housing search times undertaken by 
a home buyer. In addition, the outcome of a housing search, i.e., whether it is a 
good deal, is not considered in this stream of literature. If a home buyer spends 
less time on a housing market or visits fewer housing units, he might not be 
necessarily efficient, because he may not be able to secure a good deal. 
The other stream of literature uses the price premium to measure home buyers’ 
performance in housing search, and study the impacts of home buyers’ 
characteristics on price premium. The information literature on housing search 
compares the housing prices between informed and uninformed home buyers 
(Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2012; Lambson, Macqueen and Slade, 2004; Turnbull 
and Sirmans, 1993). The bargaining power literature compares the impacts of 
different bargaining powers between buyers and sellers on property transaction 
price (Colwell and Munneke, 2006; Harding, Knight and Sirmans, 2003; 
Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans, 2003; Ling, Naranjo, and Petrova, 2013). A 
detailed review of these streams of literature can be found in Chapter 2. 
Given the nature of housing search process, different performance of home 
buyers in housing search is sourced from their different reservation values as 
well as certain randomness (kind of luck to meet a housing unit with high 
value). A housing unit, which randomly comes to the market, if it is better than 
the reservation value, is accepted by the home buyer. Thus, higher reservation 
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value implies a higher probability to find a good deal in the housing market, 
i.e., the home buyer performs efficiently in the housing search. The previous 
literature has overlooked the stochastic nature of home buyers’ performance in 
housing search. This requires a further study to quantify home buyers’ 
performance in housing search, and the impact of households’ heterogeneous 
characteristics on it from another angle. 
Thirdly, households are always surrounded by neighbors, because their homes 
are in a neighborhood. Their choice behavior can be affected by their 
neighbors, which researchers address as “neighborhood effect” (or 
“neighborhood social interactions”) (Ioannides and Zabel, 2003). 
Social scientists have been interested in analyzing the impact of social context 
on the individual behaviors through the interactions which might also be 
called “peer influence”, “social influence”, “social interactions”, “herd 
behavior”, “neighborhood effect”, and the others (Manski, 2000). Generally, 
social interactions are particular forms of externalities, in which the actions of 
a reference group affect an individual’s preference (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 
2000). Ioannides and Zabel (2003) define neighborhood effect as social 
interactions originated in households’ residential place. 
The influence of social interactions on the economic behaviour can arise from 
several sources, including the endogenous interactions, the exogenous or 
contextual interactions and the correlated interactions. The endogenous 
interactions refer to the propensity of an individual to behave in some way 
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varies with the behaviour of the reference group; the contextual interactions 
refer to the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with 
exogenous characteristics of the group members; and the correlated 
interactions refer to individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly 
because they have similar but unobservable characteristics or face similar 
unobservable institutional environments (Manski, 1993). 
Residential location choice with social interactions has attracted interests in 
research. The studies about the impact of social interactions on location choice 
usually model the aggregate local demographic factor into RUM model. In this 
type of model, social interactions are embedded in individual decisions and 
location choice is a collective process (Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 2009; 
Brock and Durlauf, 2001, 2002, 2007; Follmer, 1974; Glaeser and 
Scheinkman, 2000; Ioannides and Zabel, 2003). The details of this stream of 
literature can be found in a comprehensive review in Section 2.6. The 
empirical work with the consideration of the collective location choice 
behavior has overall lagged behind the theoretical analyses, and they are from 
different viewpoints. Bayer and his co-authors estimate a sorting model in 
which the propensity of an individual to make location choice is a function of 
the characteristics of others making the same choice (Bayer, McMillan and 
Rueben, 2009; Bayer and Timmins, 2007). Ioannides and Zabel (2003, 2008) 
estimate a model of the continuous housing services demand that is influenced 
by the average of one’s neighbors’ housing demand. Kan (2007) estimates the 
impact of social capital on residential mobility behavior, with a direct measure 




To my best knowledge, there is limited empirical research studying on the 
impact of neighborhood effect on households’ next location choice, i.e., the 
current neighbors’ behaviors affect the households’ next location choice 
decision. In Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2009), the propensity of an 
individual to make a choice is affected by the characteristics of others making 
the same choice, i.e. households who move into the same neighborhood. 
Ioannides and Zabel (2008) estimate the demand for housing and 
neighborhood choice as a joint decision. Their estimation on the housing 
demand part is on the neighborhood effect, in which the current neighbors’ 
behavior affects the propensity of household’s housing demand. But their 
study on the neighborhood choice part is the same as the one in Bayer, 
McMillan and Rueben (2009), which focuses on the contextual interactions 
among those who make the same neighborhood choice decision. Research, 
which can fill in this literature gap by providing the empirical evidence on the 
impact of neighborhood effect in the current neighborhood on the next 
residential location choice, is required. 
Overall, due to the housing market properties of imperfect information, high 
search cost, search frictions, information level, heterogeneous housing units, 
heterogeneous households, and neighborhood social interactions, the housing 
choice behavior is a complicated process still without fully understand. To 
solve the above mentioned three problems, it should attract more close 
observations to study the housing choice behavior. Following the three strands 
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of literature which consider the social factors of information level and search 
cost, heterogeneous households’ characteristics, and neighborhood effect (or 
neighborhood social interactions), in the housing choice behavior, this 
dissertation tries to further understand the housing choice behavior from these 
three aspects. It constitutes three major objectives. 
(1) to scrutinize a household’s housing choice behavior from its housing 
search process with the consideration of location-dependent information, 
where location-dependent information refers to different information levels in 
different locations for the household; 
(2) to quantify the impacts of a household’s characteristics on the performance 
of its housing search; 
(3) to estimate the influence of neighborhood social interactions on a 
household’s housing location choice. 
To achieve the three objectives, three main research questions are answered in 
this dissertation, which are listed as follows. 
(1) Does a household’s location-dependent information affect its housing 
choice? 




(3) Do the current neighbors influence a household’s destination neighborhood 
choice? 
The first question is answered in Chapter 4. I analyze the role of information 
in housing choice theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, a housing 
search model is proposed, in which the households’ location-dependent 
information level is captured in the shift of housing surplus value. It is found 
that the informed households are more likely to secure a good deal. With the 
data from Tianjin city in China, more measures of households’ information 
level can be identified. Hedonic estimation is implemented to quantify the 
impacts of information difference on the housing search output. Specifically, 
the sub-questions I test are as follows: (1) Does a home buyer with 
information disadvantage pay more for a housing unit than his counterpart? (2) 
Does this information price premium depend on the distance between the next 
housing unit and the current housing unit, since housing information decays 
with this distance? The results show that the home buyers at information 
disadvantage need to pay 1%-2.3% more than the better informed home 
buyers, which are consistent with the theoretical prediction. The information 
price premium does depend on the distance between the next housing unit and 
the current housing unit. The answers to these questions allow having a further 
understanding in the role of information in housing choice, which also meet 
the first objective of this dissertation. 
The second question is answered in Chapter 5. I study the households’ 
heterogeneous characteristics into housing choice behavior, and quantify the 
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impact of households’ characteristics on their performance in searching a 
housing unit. Considering the stochastic nature of housing search 
performance, higher reservation value implies a higher probability to find a 
good deal in the housing market, i.e., the home buyer performs efficiently in 
the housing search. I define a search efficiency term to show the probability of 
securing a good deal, which serves to measure home buyers’ performance in 
housing search. 
Home buyers’ heterogeneous characteristics determine their reservation 
values, which in turn influence their performance of housing search. However, 
empirically, it is difficult to quantify home buyers’ housing search 
performance directly, since the reservation value is unobservable. With the 
concept of search efficiency, this work adopts a modified stochastic frontier 
approach1, which can help to overcome the difficulty without the necessity to 
identify the reservation value, because a frontier is set and home buyers try to 
find housing units with prices lower than the frontier. The larger the difference 
between the frontier and the observed transaction price, the more efficient a 
home buyer is in choosing a housing unit. 
I use the data from Tianjin commercial housing market in China to estimate 
the search efficiency of households in the housing market. The specific 
research questions are: (1) How do home buyers’ characteristics impact on 
their housing search efficiency? (2) What is the probability to secure a good 
deal for a home buyer with certain characteristics? This chapter tests whether 
                                                 
1
 Refer to Section 2.4 for an introduction of stochastic frontier model. 
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information level and bargaining power are two determinants of housing 
search efficiency. First, households with more information are more likely to 
secure a good deal from the perspective of housing search. I distinguish 
households into two groups with different information levels and find that the 
probability of securing a good deal is higher in the better informed group. 
Second, I also observe the impact of households’ demographic factors on their 
search efficiency in the housing market. The results show that households with 
lower income, less education, lower rank of occupation, and etc. have lower 
opportunity cost and are able to spend more time in a housing market. Thus, 
they are likely to perform more efficiently. The results of the probability to 
secure a good deal serve to quantify the impact of households’ characteristics 
on the search performance of housing choice, which meet the second objective 
of this dissertation. 
The third question is answered in Chapter 6. I study the neighborhood social 
interactions on the residential location choice. My study aims to fill in the 
literature gap by providing the empirical evidence of the impact of 
neighborhood social interactions in the current neighborhood on the next 
residential location choice. Specifically, the research questions are (1) Does a 
household’s current neighbors influence its destination neighborhood choice? 
(2) Which type of households can be influenced more by their current 
neighbors when they choose their destination neighborhood? I propose a 
collective choice model with different tastes of households to show that the 
destination neighborhood choice of households is impacted by their current 
neighbors. With the data from Tianjin China, the estimation results show that 
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social interactions among the current neighbors significantly impact 
households’ destination neighborhood choice. The results also report a 
significant different taste of different households. Specifically, old, high 
educated and rich households relatively value social interactions among the 
current neighbors more when they choose the destination neighborhood. The 
answers to these research questions show the influence of neighborhood social 
interactions on the housing location choice, which also meet the third 
objective of this dissertation. 
In general, by providing the analysis from the three aspects of the housing 
choice behavior, the three objectives of this dissertation are achieved. In the 
next section, I highlight the significance of this research. 
1.2 Significance 
The significance of my work is reflected mainly from two aspects. One aspect 
is how the potential findings in this dissertation can enrich the existing 
literature, and the other is the practical implications to the housing market in 
China, since the analysis is based on China housing market. 
While the real housing choice behavior is still not fully understood, this 
research tends to contribute to the existing literature from a few aspects. First, 
it highlights a housing search structure under imperfect housing market, which 
is neglected by neo-classic housing market literature. It adds the location-
dependent information to the housing search theory. Second, with a large 
sample and more measures of information level, the findings in this research 
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provide supportive empirical evidence to the argument that better informed 
households can secure a good deal. Third, this research builds on the 
stochastic frontier approach and generalizes it to allow the efficiency term to 
depend on households’ heterogeneous characteristics. It shows how the 
households’ characteristics affect the efficiency of housing choice through the 
channel of information level and bargaining power. This research contributes 
to the literature of housing search by adding the heterogeneity of households 
into the efficiency of housing choice. It also provides evidence to the 
bargaining power literature that households’ characteristics do have significant 
influence on the housing price. 
Last but not least, in the context of residential location choice literature, this 
research, emphasizing the role of social interactions, adds some new 
understanding on residential housing location choice behavior. Most of the 
previous literature on social interaction and housing choice focuses on the 
contextual interactions among those who make the same neighborhood choice. 
My study further points out another interaction factor among their current 
neighbors when households choose their destination neighborhoods. From this 
perspective, this research can refresh the existing knowledge of relationship 
between choice behavior and social interactions. This study also contributes to 
the neighborhood effect literature by providing evidence of neighborhood 
effect which influences households’ actual residential location choice 
behavior. 
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset from the fast transformed China 
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housing market. After the urban housing privatization reform in 1980s, 
commercial housing market has been gradually established in Chinese cities. 
The findings in this research have important policy implications. First, this 
research considers a housing search structure under imperfect housing market; 
and the different efficiency in housing choice arises from the information level 
and households’ characteristics. Understanding this choice decision making 
process is helpful to market institution design. Obviously, market with less 
friction can assist households to approach optimized utility more closely. That 
means high social welfare. Second, my findings also suggest that 
characteristics of households should be added to the housing price index 
model and correct the bias raised from the heterogeneity of housing buyers. 
Third, the results of this research imply that criterion of residential location 
choice is distinct among different social groups. This fact should not be 
ignored when making policy fairly effective for all households, or be 
strategically implemented for regulating a specific group. Last but not least, 
during the urban redevelopment, the human factors should be considered by 
the city planning policy makers. Because, once a household moves into a 
neighborhood, it is not only a home for it, but also a community where 
neighbors influence each other. 
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation  
This dissertation is organized as follows. 
Chapter 1 introduces the background and research questions, and significance 
of this research. 
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Chapter 2 reviews the related literature comprehensively. 
Chapter 3 introduces the background of Tianjin housing market and the 
housing transaction data. 
Chapter 4 examines the role of location-dependent information of a household 
in housing choice theoretically and empirically. 
Chapter 5 studies the determinants of search efficiency of a home buyer in his 
housing choice. 
Chapter 6 analyzes the impacts of neighborhood social interactions on a 
household’s destination neighborhood choice.  
Chapter 7 concludes this research and summarizes the main results, 
contributions, limitations, and future work.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This dissertation analyzes the residential housing choice behavior from three 
different angles. Correspondingly, the literature review includes three parts. 
First, information is imperfect in housing market, so the study on housing 
choice behavior should be from the aspect of search process. There is 
information asymmetry among different households. Information level should 
have an impact on the outcome of housing search. In this sense, literature on 
the housing search and information is important to my first part of the 
research, which is on the role of information in housing search. In Section 2.2, 
I review the literature of housing search and information. 
Second, households are heterogeneous in the housing market. The second part 
of my research considers this factor into housing choice behavior and address 
the factors determine the search efficiency of households in choosing a 
housing unit. In the micro level, the heterogeneous characteristics are 
intensively studied in the residential location choice literature. But they are 
relatively less studied in the determinants of the search efficiency of 
households. The heterogeneous characteristics of households can influence the 
housing search efficiency through some channels, like information level, 
search cost, and bargaining power, and etc. Previous research on these streams 
is also reviewed in Section 2.3. In the second part of my research, I adopt the 
stochastic frontier approach to study the impact of households’ characteristics 
on the search efficiency. Thus, some related literature on stochastic frontier 
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approach is reviewed in Section 2.4 including a brief introduction to the 
stochastic frontier approach. 
Third, households are always surrounded by neighbors, because their homes 
are in a neighborhood. Their economic choice can be affected by their 
neighbors, which researchers address as neighborhood effect (Ioannides and 
Zabel, 2003, 2008). In this part, I study the neighborhood effect on the 
residential location choice. Neighbor factors have been attracted the interests 
of researchers and modelled into the residential choice behavior of households 
from several different perspectives. Thus the following two streams of 
literature are essential to my research: the research on residential location 
choice, and the study on social interactions and neighborhood effect. Firstly, I 
review the theoretical and empirical research on residential location choice in 
Section 2.5. Secondly, I review the literature on social interactions and 
neighborhood effect in housing choice in Section 2.6. 
The remaining of this chapter is arranged as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature on housing search and information; Section 2.3 reviews the study on 
heterogeneous characteristics of households in housing choice; Section 2.4 
briefly introduces the stochastic frontier approach and also the related 
literature; Section 2.5 reviews the research on residential location choice; and 
Section 2.6 reviews the literature on social interactions and neighborhood 
effect; and finally Section 2.7 summarizes the limitations of each stream of 
literature and the gaps that I am trying to fill in this dissertation. 
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2.2 Housing Search and Information 
Previous literature on the housing choice (e.g. McFadden, 1978; and Quigley, 
1985) is based on the assumption of the absence of market imperfections in 
housing market. However, there are full of imperfections in housing market 
which can hinder the housing choice behavior of households2. This research 
focuses on one of the important market imperfections - imperfect information, 
because it plagues the housing market. In the contrast to the assumption in 
previous literature of housing choice, information in housing market is far 
from perfect. 
Economists initially model search process to explain the unemployment 
problem (Jovanovic, 1979; McCall, 1970). In macroeconomics, it is extended 
to the matching theory in which one or more types of searchers interact (see 
Diamond, 1984; and Pissarides, 2000). It is also applied to financial markets 
(Lagos and Rocheteau, 2007), and even marriage markets (Shimer and Smith, 
2000). 
Search has greater importance in housing markets than in any other economic 
markets because of the information asymmetry in housing market. Search 
theory is suitable for the market without perfect information. A stream of 
literature on search theories in housing market has emerged, starting with 
                                                 
2
 For example, Gyourko (1991) points out fiscal zoning restricts the types of home 
available in suburban communities in the US; Rosenthal et al. (1991) show that credit 
rationing prevents liquidity-constrained households from attaining their long-term 
optimal housing choices in the US; Zheng, Fu, and Liu (2006) find that the poor 
marketability of the previously state-provided homes, inadequate provision of 
housing finance, and spatial mismatch between job-market and housing-market 
prevent the spatial equilibrium from fully reflecting the location preferences of the 
urban residents in China. 
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Wheaton (1990). It mainly studies on vacancies, time on the market and 
housing price. Wheaton (1990) introduces a matching model which explains 
the structure vacancy in the housing market, which in turn determines the 
expected length of sale and the housing price. To explain the relationship of 
the housing price dispersion and the time on the market, Albrecht et al. (2007) 
develops a matching model in which both buyers and sellers experience, if 
they stay in the market long enough, a decline in the flow value of continuing 
to search. Albrecht et al. (2010) further considers a directed search focusing on 
the seller behavior of setting price in a search or matching model. Read (1993, 
1997) develop two search models of the rental market with rent-setting 
landlords. They provide insightful results regarding the role of imperfect 
information on the rent dispersion and the existence of vacancies. Also in the 
rental market, Breen et al. (2009) propose a dynamic matching model includes 
heterogeneous interacting individuals, which leads to the price dispersion and 
vacancies. 
Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) study the role of information level on the output 
of housing search in a buyer search model by shifting the distribution of 
housing value. They find better informed buyers end up paying less on 
average. Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) also provide the first empirical study on 
the impact of information on the output of housing search. Their data consist 
of 151 single-family home sales located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. They test 
whether first-time (or out-of-town) buyers pay more for comparable housing 
than repeat (or in-town) buyers since they know less on the market. They find 
positive but not significant results. Watkins (1998) replicates their study by 
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using 544 sales transactions from Glasgow in the United Kingdom, and finds 
that there is no difference in price between intra-market movers and 
immigrants. Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004) use a large sample of 
2,854 apartments in Phoenix metropolitan area and find that non-Arizona 
residents pay a premium of about 5.5% in comparison with the within-Arizona 
buyers. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2012) identify the distance between the next 
housing unit and the previous address of households in 6,666 single-family 
home transactions from Florida, and show that distant buyers pay more for 
nearly identical homes. There is disagreement in the empirical results. By 
using a richer dataset, this research provides more evidence of the impact of 
information on the housing search output. 
2.3 Heterogeneous Characteristics of Households in Housing 
Choice 
In the micro level, the heterogeneous characteristics are intensively studied in 
the residential location choice literature. Empirically, the RUM-based discrete 
choice models allow various households’ characteristics and location attributes 
and even psychological elements to be tested. Mainly, there are two clusters of 
factors intensively examined in residential location choice literature: social 
and demographic factors of households; and housing and neighborhood 
characteristics. The social and demographic factors of households have been 
well documented in the literature, such as household size, life cycle and 
education, occupation and income, as well as some psychological elements 
like risk aversion and social ties (Clark and Van Lierop, 1987; Kan, 2002, 
2003, 2007; Nijkamp, 1993). 
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But households’ characteristics are relatively less studied in the determinants 
of the efficiency of housing search, as previous research mainly takes the 
housing unit attributes as housing price determinants. The heterogeneous 
characteristics of households can influence the housing search efficiency 
through some channels, like information level, search cost, and bargaining 
power, and etc. The housing search literature based on information level is 
reviewed in the previous section. 
The literature on bargaining power considers the impact of households’ 
characteristics on their bargaining power. Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans 
(2003) propose a model including both seller and buyer attributes and estimate 
this model with the data from American Housing Survey. Their results suggest 
that households’ wealth, gender, and other demographic factors influence 
bargaining power. Basically, they find wealthy households and women have 
less bargaining power in the housing market. Harding, Knight and Sirmans 
(2003) discuss whether the bargaining power is significant on the marginal 
value of housing attributes or shift of hedonic price. They use housing 
transaction data in Baton Rouge, Louisiana from Multiple Listing Service and 
in Modesto, California provided by Metrolist Services Inc. of Sacramento, 
California. They find strong confirmation that bargaining power influences the 
negotiated price and alters attribute prices. Based on these studies, Colwell 
and Munneke (2006) explore the impact of buyer and seller characteristics on 
the transaction prices of office properties in Cook, Dupage, and Lake 
Counties, Illinois from 1995 and 1997. Their results reveal systematic 
differences in bargaining power and property class for certain groups of buyers 
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and sellers contained within the sample. Ling, Naranjo, and Petrova (2013) use 
the commercial real estate transaction data from 1997 to 2000 to examine the 
impact of the investors’ characteristics on the bargaining power and the 
negotiated prices. They find that real estate investment trusts (REITs) who are 
tax motivated, out-of-state, and not in distress, pay price premiums when 
acquiring properties due to weak bargaining power. 
2.4 Stochastic Frontier Approach 
When the search efficiency of housing choice is discussed, both the final 
transaction price and the optimal outcome are required to be considered in the 
model. On one hand, previous research on the search efficiency of housing 
choice is set up based on search model. In the empirical test, the duration and 
search times are used as the measurement of efficiency (Anglin, 1997; Cronin, 
1982). They find various households’ characteristics influence on the duration 
and search times. If a home buyer spends less time on a housing market or 
visits fewer housing units, he might not be necessarily efficient, because he 
may not be able to secure a good deal. If price is not considered in the study 
on the efficiency of housing search, the results could be one-sided. On the 
other hand, the empirical housing price study is usually based on hedonic price 
regression. Adding both the housing attributes and the households’ 
characteristics into the model might lead to a biased estimation. To overcome 
this problem, I implement a stochastic frontier model to test the impact of 
households’ characteristics on the search efficiency of housing choice. 
Stochastic frontier approach is firstly developed by Aigner, Lovell and 
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Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) to estimate the 
production function and analyze the efficiency of production. Conventional 
econometric production models treat producers as successful optimizers to 
estimate production. Under this classic framework, deviations from the 
maximum possible output, given a set of inputs, are attributed exclusively to 
random statistical noise. Stochastic frontier estimation is developed to 
incorporate a theory of producer behavior that explicitly incorporated the 
possibility of suboptimal performance in addition to random statistical noise. 
The efficient frontier under this context represents the maximum output that is 
possible for a given set of inputs and technology. Producers who are operating 
on this frontier are efficient, while those operating beneath this frontier are 
technically inefficient. Recently, this method is widely used to analyze the 
efficiency in a lot of domains, such as airport (Martín, Román, and Voltes-
Dorta, 2009; Scotti et. al., 2012), hospital (Besstremyannaya, 2011; Rosko and 
Ryan, 2011), hotel (Hu et. al., 2010), energy (Zhou, Ang and Zhou, 2012), and 
etc. 
The stochastic frontier model is also suitable for housing market, because the 
housing market is imperfect and there are frictions, like search costs, 
incomplete information, bargaining power, and etc. The details of the housing 
market properties are presented in Chapter 1. Under the assumption of perfect 
market condition, the conventional hedonic model assume that housing price 
represents the market clearing price, and the regression results should provide 
an unbiased estimation of the fair market value of each housing unit. However, 
because of the imperfection of housing market, the observed transaction price 
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does not necessarily represent the market equilibrium price. The stochastic 
frontier approach can be adopted to overcome this problem, because, unlike 
the conventional hedonic model which estimates at the least squares line, the 
stochastic frontier model is estimated at the Pareto frontier. In my application 
to hedonic pricing, the stochastic frontier represents the maximum price that 
the housing unit could be sold for, given its measurable characteristics. And 
the difference between the maximum price and the transaction price is defined 
as the search efficiency of the home buyer. 
Some recent literature also implements stochastic frontier approach in the 
housing research. Samaha and Kamakura (2008) take the perspectives of the 
seller and the buyer in uncovering the lowest price that seller should accept or 
the highest price the buyer should pay for the real estate property. In their 
study, they use the stochastic frontier approach with the consideration of 
geographical correlation. Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2010) find that the 
hedonic price function is biased since information is incomplete and they use 
the stochastic frontier model to correct the estimation of hedonic model. 
Carriazo, Ready and Shortle (2013) consider the impacts of air quality on 
housing price and use stochastic frontier model to mitigate omitted variable 
bias. All the research shows that a price frontier exists in housing market.  My 
research identifies the search efficiency of housing choice through the 
stochastic frontier approach. 
2.5 Residential Location Choice 
The initial work on this area can track back to the classical monocentric city 
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model of Alonso, Mills, and Muth (referred to as the AMM model thereafter) 
(Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1972; and Muth, 1969), residential location choice is 
studied in urban economics. In the AMM model, employment is concentrated 
in a central business district (CBD), and workers commute to that CBD from a 
residential area surrounding it. Household makes the tradeoff between the 
increasing costs of commuting to CBD and the decreasing unit prices of land 
that are associated with living further out from a central area of employment. 
Another mostly argued critique to the AMM model is the neglecting of 
amenities and public goods. This branch of literature is evolved from the 
central insight of Tiebout model (1956) and builds upon the analytical 
framework developed in Ellickson (1971). In this branch of models, residential 
locations differ according to their levels of local public good provision, tax 
rates, and local housing market conditions. Households care most about local 
public goods and vote with their feet to shop for the community which best 
satisfies their preferences (Epple, Gordon and Sieg, 2009; Wheaton, 1977). 
Discrete choice models based on the random utility maximization (RUM) 
approach are the popular approach to capture the features of location choice at 
the micro-level. It is pioneered by McFadden (1978), in which he develops a 
multinomial logit model (referred as the MNL model thereafter) to analyze the 
residential location choice, on the premise that households choose a particular 
location that maximizes their utility compared to other alternatives. The MNL 
model was derived by Luce (1959) from assumptions of Independence from 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which allows multinomial choice probabilities to 
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be inferred from binomial choice probabilities. But this IIA property is 
unsatisfactorily restrictive. Quigley (1985) develops a nested multinomial logit 
model of a limited number of alternatives to estimate choice of dwelling, 
neighborhood and public services. He develops a sequential choice order that 
the household considers public service first, followed by neighborhood, then 
by dwelling. The nested multinomial logit model is widely used in the 
residential location choice literature, especially for some joint decision of 
housing tenure, location and mobility. For example, using a nested logit 
model, Deng, Ross and Watcher (2003) estimate the joint decision of tenure 
and location choice in the US metropolitan areas. Multinomial probit model is 
also developed to overcome the IIA restriction. Börsch-Supan has pioneered 
the use of the multinomial probit model to estimate joint choice problems 
(Börsch-Supan, 1987; and Börsch-Supan and Pitkin 1988). This tradition is 
followed by Ioannides and Kan (1996). McFadden and Train (2000) establish 
a powerful mixed MNL model approximately representation of any regular 
discrete choice model, but less application in housing market is found. 
Empirically, the RUM-based discrete choice models allow various household 
attributes and location characteristics and even psychological elements to be 
tested. Mainly, there are two clusters of factors intensively examined in 
residential location choice literature: social and demographic factors of the 
household; and housing and neighborhood characteristics.  The social and 
demographic factors of the household have been well documented in the 
literature, such as household size, life cycle and education, occupation and 
income, as well as some psychological elements like risk aversion (Clark and 
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Van Lierop, 1987; Kan, 2002, 2003; Nijkamp, 1993). 
There is a wide range of housing and neighborhood characteristics tied to the 
residential location having been studied. Research in this field finds that the 
cost and the size of a housing unit, and the proximity to activity centers or 
employment centers are most influential factors on a location choice (see 
Straszhem, 1987), which are consistent with the predictions from the urban 
location choice theories. Echoing the Tiebout hypothesis (1956), a lot of 
research (Bayoh, Irwin and Haab, 2006; Nechyba and Strauss, 1997; Quigley, 
1985; and Reschovsky, 1979) finds that local public good levels matter for 
residential location choice. Racial composition is another determinant which 
attracts lots of research. Schelling (1971) hypothesizes racial differences in 
preferences for the neighborhood racial composition, and Clark (1992) and 
Ionnaides and Zabel (2003) empirically confirm this hypothesis. 
2.6 Social Interactions and Neighborhood Effect 
There are different explanations of social interactions and neighborhood effect 
in the literature. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000) define social interactions as 
particular forms of externalities, in which the actions of a reference group 
affect an individual’s preference. In Manski (2000), social interactions refer to 
interactions between the different characteristics and the behavior of some 
persons. One important component of social interactions is the impact of 
households’ place of residence. Ioannides and Zabel (2003) define 
neighborhood effect as social interactions originated in one’s residential place. 
The influence of social interactions on the economic behaviors has drawn 
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considerable attention in areas such as hiring in labor market (Calvó-
Armengol and Jackson, 2004; and Montgornery, 1991), productivity and 
innovation in growth theories (see Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2006), 
neighborhood effect in choice theories (Bayer and Timmins, 2007; Ioannides 
and Zabel, 2003, 2008; and Schelling, 1971, 1978), and etc. 
The influence of social interactions on the economic behaviour can arise from 
several sources, including the endogenous interactions, the exogenous or 
contextual interactions and the correlated interactions. The endogenous 
interactions refer to the propensity of an agent to behave in some way varies 
with the behaviour of the group; the contextual interactions refer to the 
propensity of an agent to behave in some way varies with exogenous 
characteristics of the group members; and the correlated interactions refer to 
agents in the same group tend to behave similarly because they have similar 
but unobservable individual characteristics or face similar institutional 
environments (Manski, 1993). 
The studies about the impact of social interactions on location choice usually 
model the aggregate local demographic factor into RUM model. Schelling’s 
(1971, 1978) work on racial segregation is possibly the first theoretical and 
empirical model of social interactions in location choice. He supposes that, 
when choosing a residential location, the utility households associate with 
each neighborhood may depend on the racial distribution of the persons who 
choose to reside there. 
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In this type of model, social interactions are embedded in individual decisions 
and location choice is a collective process. Follmer (1974) pioneers this 
framework by modeling an economy with locally dependent preferences to 
examine when randomness in individual preferences will affect the aggregate. 
Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2007) develop binary discrete choice model which 
incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individual to conform to the behavior 
of others in an environment of non-cooperative decision making. Later, they 
(Brock and Durlauf, 2002) generalize the model into multinomial choice 
models with neighborhood effect. Ioannides and Zabel (2003) develop a 
model of the continuous housing services demand that is influenced by the 
average of one’s neighbor’s housing demand. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000) 
propose a general model in the presence of social interactions, which while 
focus on conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria in social 
interactions models. This strand of literature on the impact of social 
interactions on the choice behavior focuses primarily on models where an 
individual’s propensity to make a choice is affected by the characteristics or 
decision of individuals in a reference group. Bayer, McMillan and Rueben 
(2009) present a general equilibrium framework for sorting of households 
which incorporates social interactions. They explore a source of potential 
instruments and emphasize problems associated with estimating models. 
However, their model studies the propensity of an individual to make a choice 
is a function of the characteristics of others making the same choice. 
Because of data availability, empirical work with consideration of collective 
housing choice behavior has overall lagged behind the theoretical analyses. 
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Bayer and Timmins (2007) propose an empirical strategy using IV to estimate 
the local spillover in a sorting model. In Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2009), 
they provide the empirical evidence by estimate the sorting model using 
Census microdata of nearly a quarter of a million households residing in the 
San Francisco Bay Area. Ioannides and Zabel (2003) define the demand for 
housing to include services emanating from structure. Under this definition, 
using the national sample of the American Housing Survey (AHS), they 
estimate a model of the continuous housing services demand that is influenced 
by the average of one’s neighbor’s housing demand. Later, Ioannides and 
Zabel (2008) extend their former work by estimating the demand for housing 
and neighborhood choice as a joint decision. The results for the neighborhood 
choice model indicate that individuals prefer to live near others like 
themselves. Survey data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in 
1980 provide a direct measure of social capital, which is defined as resources 
that stem form social ties. Based on this, Kan (2007) estimates the impact of 
social capital on residential mobility behavior. 
To my best knowledge, there is limited empirical research studying on the 
impact of neighborhood effect on the households’ next location choice, i.e., the 
current neighbors’ behaviors or characteristics affect the households’ own next 
location choice. In Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2009), the propensity of an 
individual to make a choice is affected by the characteristics of others making 
the same choice. Ioannides and Zabel (2008) estimate the demand for housing 
and neighborhood choice as a joint decision. Their estimation on the housing 
demand part is on the neighborhood effect, in which the current neighbors’ 
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behavior affects the propensity of household’s housing demand. But their 
study on the neighborhood choice part is the same as the one in Bayer, 
McMillan and Rueben (2009), which focuses on the contextual interactions 
among those who make the same neighborhood choice. My study aims to fill 
in this literature gap by providing the empirical evidence on the impact of 
neighborhood effect in the current neighborhood on the next residential 
location choice. 
2.7 Summary 
Housing market is far from the satisfaction of the conditions assumed in the 
conventional neo-classical framework. The previous literature has attempted 
to bring social factors into the study on the housing choice behavior from 
different aspects. The first one is from the aspect of imperfect information and 
housing search; the second is from the aspect of heterogeneous characteristics 
of households and their impact on the search performance; and the third is 
from the aspect of neighborhood social interactions in the residential location 
choice. However, there are still some limitations and gaps in each stream of 
literature. Firstly, there is contradiction over whether the less informed buyers 
pay a price premium for information. Secondly, previous research use time 
duration or price premium to measure the performance of housing search, and 
show that the heterogeneous characteristics of households can influence it  
through the channels of information level and search cost, and bargaining 
power. But whether it is a good deal is ignored in the literature with time 
duration as measurement; and the stochastic nature of search process is 
overlooked in both of the literature. Thirdly, in the previous literature, the 
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influence of neighborhood effect or social interactions on the residential 
location choice has been studied from different viewpoints. However, they all 
focus on the contextual interactions among those who make the same 
neighborhood choice, but the impact of the current neighbors is not 
considered. Neighbors’ choice can affect not only a household’s housing 
demand in terms of maintenance, renovation and etc. (Ioannides and Zabel, 
2003, 2008), but also its destination neighborhood choice. These limitations 





Chapter 3 Background of Tianjin Housing Market and Data  
This chapter includes two sections. In the first section, I introduce the 
background of Tianjin housing market and explain why it is a suitable test bed 
for my research topic. In the second section, I introduce the dataset which is 
from the Tianjin commercial housing transaction database and the housing 
provident fund (HPF) home loan lending database in 2007. 
3.1 Background of Tianjin Housing Market 
Tianjin is one of the four municipalities (zhixiashi) in China, along with 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing. Tianjin is a typical Chinese city. It locates in 
the north of China and is close to the capital, Beijing. In 2007, Tianjin is 
organized by eighteen districts and counties as shown in Figure 3-1. Most of 
the population is centralized in the six small central districts: Heping, 
Hongqiao, Hebei, Hedong, Hexi and Nankai. This region has very high 
population density, more than 1,500 per square kilometer. Five districts 
(Beichen, Dongli, Tanggu, Jinnan and Xiqing), surrounding the central region, 
are suburban or rural region with lower population density. Four districts 
(Baodi, Wuqing, Hangu and Dagang) and three counties (Ninghe, Jinghai and 
Jixian) have the lowest population density, and they are at the edge of Tianjin 
city. They are also rural regions. 
Housing market grows fast in Tianjin. In 2007, 14 million square meter 
residential properties are sold. It almost doubles the number in 2004. Housing 
price also increases dramatically. The average price of residential property per 
square meter is 5575 yuan in 2007, as shown by National Bureau of Statistics.  
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Figure 3-1 Population Distribution of Tianjin in 2007. 
 
Like most of the Chinese cities, Tianjin established a housing provident fund 
(HPF) in 1992. Since then, the HPF had attracted 32% of all employees in 
Tianjin by 2008. The members are mainly from state-owned enterprises, 
government organizations, and large private enterprises. Each member 
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contributes 11% (up to 15%) of their salary to the fund, with employers 
matching the same amount. The fund can be used as a home loan as well as for 
other housing-related expenses subject to a borrowing ceiling, with the HPF 
mortgage interest rate lower than bank mortgage interest rate. When a HPF 
loan is not sufficient for a borrower to purchase a housing unit, a hybrid 
mortgage loan that combines the maximum amount of the HPF home loan 
with a commercial bank-matching home loan is available to the borrower 
(Deng, 2008). 
Prior to 1998, as an industrial city, the jobs in Tianjin were concentrated in the 
state-owned enterprises and public sectors. New housing supplies were 
constructed and distributed by employers or the higher level of public 
authority with heavily subsidized rent (nearly zero rental cost), funded by the 
central government under a planning economic system. This is called the SOE 
(state-owned enterprise) housing supply system in Deng (2008). Employees 
had no freedom of housing choice, and their job and housing mobility were 
constrained. An employee’s housing unit was tied to his job. If he changed his 
job, he had to give up his housing unit. In fact, a severe housing shortage at 
the time often hindered an employee from taking a new job offer, especially 
from the private sector. However, the above-mentioned SOE urban 
communities gradually disappeared after the commercial housing market was 
developed in 1998. To improve housing conditions, the better-off employees 
who had saved enough for a down payment and had been able to access the 
HPF and bank for a home loan gradually moved into commercial housing 
market consisting of newly built apartments and privatized current SOE 
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apartments. This created a wave of intra-urban migration led by the 
commercial housing market development between 1998 and 2007 (Fu and 
Gabriel, 2012).  
Since the late 1980s, China has started to remove its centralized housing 
system. Commercial housing market has been gradually established in Chinese 
cities. China experienced fast economic growth and rapid urbanization during 
this period. The private urban housing market grew faster after the urban 
house privatization reform. A large number of housing units are completed in 
urban regions; and urban living condition of households is significantly 
improved. China also experienced a rapid urbanization with the boom of 
commercial housing market. The scale of city expanded with a large number 
of households immigrated into the city area from rural areas (Zhang and Song, 
2003). Tianjin, as a typical industrial city in China, also experienced a rapid 
urbanization during this period. A large number of households immigrated into 
the central region and purchased their housing units.  
The fast transformed housing market in Tianjin provides a natural test bed to 
study the housing choice behaviors from the aspects of information and 
housing search, heterogeneous households’ characteristics and search 
efficiency, and the neighborhood social interactions in residential location 
choice. First, Tianjin implemented a centralized housing policy in urban area 
before urban housing privatization reform. The urban housing is provided by 
government or SOE, and tied with the workplace of households’ members. 
Neighbors of households are all colleagues and they are very familiar with 
40 
 
each other. Households are easy to collect information in this neighborhood 
and the nearby region. The immigrated households from rural area have less 
information in urban housing market. China ran a strict households 
registration system (Hukou) before opening and reform policy in 1980s (Fu 
and Gabriel, 2012). The urban area and rural area were isolated for a long 
time. This system is released gradually and households from rural areas are 
allowed to buy housing units in the city regions recently. But households from 
rural area know less about the urban housing market in the city, because they 
do not have the first-hand experience and less chance to visit the urban area, as 
most of their relatives and friends are still in rural areas. This transformed 
housing market provides an opportunity to distinguish households with 
different information level since their background is different. Thus, it is 
suitable for the study on the role of information played in the housing choice 
decision making process. Besides, the households are heterogeneous in terms 
of age, income, and etc. So it also provides an opportunity to study on the 
impact of households’ heterogeneous characteristics on the search efficiency in 
housing choice. 
Second, under the 2007 Tianjin HPF regulations, each member can only obtain 
one home loan from the HPF in his lifetime, and the loan can only finance an 
owner-occupied commercial housing unit. Therefore, the home buyers are 
likely to be first-time commercial housing buyers for an owner-occupied 
purpose. Since the investment purpose is excluded, it is suitable to study on 
the residential location choice. 
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Third, before 1998, the typical type of urban community, which was often 
seen in Tianjin, was that employees working for an SOE or a public sector 
obtained their housing unit from their employers. The housing units were often 
located near the enterprise in multi-story apartment buildings, which were 
typically sub-standard. Their neighbours were their colleagues, and their 
children might be educated in the same local school, which was most likely 
owned by the enterprise as well. Some of the children might even find jobs in 
the same enterprise as adults. Thus, the strong interactions among households 
in their SOE neighborhoods provide the possibility to measure the 
neighborhood social interactions objectively. Overall, in the transition from 
the SOE urban housing system to the commercial housing market, the housing 
transaction dataset is suitable to study on the impact of neighborhood effect on 
households’ actual residential location choice behaviors. 
3.2 Data 
The data used in the empirical work are from the Tianjin commercial 
(equivalent to a private housing market in any advanced economy) housing 
transaction database merged with the housing provident fund (HPF) home loan 
lending database in 2007, which are provided by Tianjin Academy of Social 
Science in China (Tianjin_2007). The combined dataset includes totally 
40,279 commercial housing transactions in Tianjin in 2007. Table 3-1 shows 
the observations of housing transactions in each district of Tianjin. There are 
totally 16,467 housing transactions occurred in the six central districts in 
Tianjin city, and 23,812 transactions in the rural area. According to Tianjin 
Statistical Yearbook Year: 2009, the total number of housing transaction in 
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Tianjin in 2007 is around 100,000, and the average housing price is 5500 
RMB Yuan per square meter. The sample used in this work is the housing 
transactions with usages of HPF loans, which covers more than 40,000 
samples. Thus the sample is around 40% of the full sample. The average 
housing price in my sample is around 5196 RMB Yuan per square meter. 
Table 3-1 Observations of Housing Transactions in Each District of 
Tianjin. 
Region Obs. Percentage District Obs. Percentage 
   
Heping 1,174 2.91 
   
Hongqiao 1,550 3.85 
Central 16,467 40.88 Hebei 1,973 4.9 
   
Hedong 3,151 7.82 
   
Hexi 3,408 8.46 
  
  
Nankai 5,211 12.94 
   
Hangu 938 2.33 
   
Tanggu 5,432 13.49 
   
Dagang 2,212 5.49 
   
Beichen 2,198 5.46 
   
Dongli 1,286 3.19 
Rural 23,812 59.12 Jinnan 1,227 3.05 
   
Xiqing 3,546 8.8 
   
Wuqing 2,146 5.33 
   
Baodi 2,043 5.07 
   
Ninghe 398 0.99 
   
Jinghai 1,201 2.98 
  
  
Jixian 1,185 2.94 
Total 40,279 100   40,279 100 
 
The dataset also records a series of rich information on the attributes of 
housing units, the amenities around them, and the characteristics of 
households. The attributes of housing units include the housing price, size, 
type of building structure, which are masonry-concrete, reinforced concrete 
and others, and the sale type of the housing unit, which are resale and new 
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sale. The accessibility and amenities include the distance to central business 
region, and the number of shops, schools, hospitals and subway stations whose 
distances to the housing unit is less than 2 kilometres. 
In addition, the housing address and the current home address of the 
household, as well as the birth place and work place of the household’s head 
are recorded in the dataset, which are also tractable with geo-code. The 
address shows that most of the original housings are multi-story apartments or 
dormitories. And most of the new housing units are high-rise apartment and 
commercial buildings. This sample reflects the housing policy transition in 
China. Before the housing privatization reform, urban housing is usually 
provided by employers; households live in the low quality multi-story 
apartments. With the development of China housing market, commercial 
housing market is booming and employers do not provide housing any more. 
Households upgrade from the low quality urban housing to commercial 
housing gradually. 
The households’ characteristics include household income, and age, education 
background, and job of households’ head. The education background is 
graduate degree and above, university, polytechnic, high school, and below 
high school. The job is manager, government official, engineer, administration 
staff and others. Their household size is two or three persons due to the 
government’s long-run family planning policy. But it is not recorded in the 




Chapter 4 Information and Housing Choice 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I attempt to answer the first research question: Does a 
household’s location-dependent information affect its housing choice? 
Information is imperfect in housing market. Households have imperfect 
housing market information; and different housing buyers may have different 
market information levels. Under the imperfect information condition, housing 
search framework is more suitable for this study. It is a process in which home 
buyers gather information about the attributes of each choice alternative, and 
choose the housing unit with utility higher than the reservation value. 
Theoretically, the difference in households’ information level plays a 
significant role in their housing choice. To be specific, better informed home 
buyers should pay a relatively lower price for an identical housing unit 
compared to their counterparts. But there is disagreement in the results of the 
previous empirical study (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2012; Lambson, McQueen, 
and Slade, 2004; Turnbull and Sirmans, 1993; Watkins, 1998). (See Section 
1.1 in Chapter 1 for a description of the research problem and Section 2.2 in 
Chapter 2 for a detailed review of the literature). 
 To fill in this literature gap, I analyze the role of information in housing 
choice theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, this chapter extends the 
information level of a home buyer in Turnbull and Sirmans’ (1993) housing 
search model to a more realistic situation, in which a home buyer’s 
information is location-dependent. The value of a housing unit depends on 
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varieties of local factors, such as neighborhood amenities, quality of schools, 
crime rate, local supply and demand in housing market, future planning in the 
zone, and etc. The locals have the information on these factors through the 
first-hand experience, when they drive to work, do the shopping, or even jog 
around, and etc. They can also learn these factors when they interact with 
neighbors, visit friends or relatives nearby, read or watch local news 
intentionally or accidentally. They have more information where they live and 
relatively less with the increase in the distance to their home. Thus, a housing 
search model is proposed, in which the household’s location-dependent 
information level is captured in the shift of housing surplus value. It is found 
that the informed households are more likely to secure a good deal in housing 
market. 
Empirically, I make use of the dataset from Tianjin city in China, and more 
measures of households’ information level can be identified. Hedonic 
estimation is implemented to quantify the impacts of information difference on 
housing search output. Specifically, the sub-questions I am going to answer 
are as follows: (1) Does a home buyer with information disadvantage pay 
more for a housing unit than his counterpart? (2) Does this information price 
premium depend on the distance between the next housing unit and the current 
housing unit, since housing information decays with this distance? The results 
show that the home buyers at information disadvantage need to pay 1%-2.3% 
more than the better informed home buyers, which are consistent with the 
theoretical prediction. The information price premium does depend on the 
distance between the next housing unit and the current housing unit. 
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The remaining of this chapter is arranged as follows: Section 2 presents a 
theoretical model of housing search, and Section 3 discusses data. The 
empirical results are shown in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
4.2 A Housing Search Model 
This section presents a housing search model in the context of information 
asymmetry. It is built on the Turnbull and Sirmans’ (1993) housing search 
model, and extends the information level of a home buyer in their model to be 
location-dependent. I consider a housing market with heterogeneous housing 
units; and home buyers have different strength of information level in different 
locations. Sellers randomly appear in the housing market. Each seller sets a 
selling price (maybe not “asking price”) according to his understanding of the 
local housing market based on his information of the location. As a price taker, 
the home buyer searches from seller to seller to choose a housing unit, which 
includes the attributes as well as the price of the housing unit. A home buyer’s 
understanding of the housing market is also based on his own information, 
which is different from other buyers with different information level. In the 
model, this is reflected in a different distribution of surplus value of housing 
units. The home buyers’ location-dependent information level is captured in 
the shift of housing surplus value. In the housing market with imperfect 
information, buyers have to search to find a housing unit, and each search 
incurs a search cost. A buyer’s problem is to determine whether to accept a 
housing unit as well as the selling price set by the seller or to continue his 
search with an additional search cost. The model predicts that buyers’ 
information level impacts the output of housing search. 
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Given the preference and taste, a typical home buyer chooses a housing unit in 
a housing market. There are a large number of housing units {𝑥𝑖, 𝑝𝑖} in the 
housing market, where 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of the attributes of housing unit 𝑖; and 𝑝𝑖 
is the price of housing unit 𝑖. The indirect utility function of the home buyer 
for housing unit 𝑖  is 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑢(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑝𝑖                                                                                            (4.1) 
where 𝑢(∙) is the utility function of a home buyer staying in housing unit 𝑖 
with attributes 𝑥. The indirect utility 𝑣𝑖 of the housing unit is the difference 
between the amenity and the payment. It can be understood as the surplus 
value of the housing unit. With a given budget constraint, the home buyer 
prefers to housing units with high surplus value. In the housing market, the 
home buyer who can secure a housing unit with higher surplus value, i.e. he 
can secure a good deal, are more efficient. With a given set of housing units 
{𝑋, 𝑃} in the housing market, the surplus values of the housing units have a 
distribution 𝐺. The density function 𝑔(𝑣) of this distribution is strictly positive 
and differentiable. The probability of the home buyer to find a housing unit 
better than 𝑣 is 1 − 𝐺(𝑣). 
Information level plays an important role in this model. Previous literature 
(e.g. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2012; Lambson, McQueen and Slade, 2004; and 
Turnbull and Sirmans, 1993) uses out-of-town and in-town buyers to measure 
the information level and discovers the linkage between the information level 
and the housing price. The information level in their research is attached to 
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locations. This model defines that the information level of a home buyer varies 
among different locations. 
In this model, the housing units are distributed across a number of different 
locations. For simplicity, I assume all the locations locate in a straight line 
continuously from 𝑚 = 0  to 𝑚 = 𝐷 . I also assume that the highest 
information level of a home buyer locates in the location 𝑚 = 0, where is the 
current location of the home buyer, with a strength 𝑎; and the information 
level in other locations decreases with the distance to location 𝑚 = 0, with a 
slope 𝑏. So the level of information in the location 𝑚 is 
𝑠(𝑚) = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑚                                                                                            (4.2) 
where 𝑠(𝑚) is the information level that a household have in location 𝑚 ; 
𝑎(> 0) is the information level of a buyer at his current location, which can 
vary among different home buyers; 𝑚 denotes each location, which can also 
be understood as the distance to the current location; 𝑏(> 0)  is the slope 
indicating how fast the information level decays with the distance to the 
current location. This assumption shows two features of information level. 
Firstly, the strength of information level varies among different home buyers; 
secondly, the information level in each location of a home buyer is 
geographically correlated. 
In this model, informed home buyers know more about the location. Rather 
than to search housing units randomly, home buyers with more information 
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know the good deal in the location relatively more accurately. If a home buyer 
has high information level in a location, he understands the local housing 
market better. He can successfully avoid viewing some housing units with low 
or even negative surplus value, which implies the probability of the buyer to 
find a housing unit with high surplus value 𝑣 increases. In this model, the 
impact of information level on housing search is assumed to shift the 
distribution of surplus value. The probability of a home buyer with zero 
information level to find a housing unit better than 𝑣 is 1 − 𝐺(𝑣). If a home 
buyer has high information level 𝑠 in location 𝑚, the probability of finding a 
housing unit better than 𝑣 turns to be 1 − 𝐺(𝑣 − 𝑠). So the density function of 
housing units’ surplus value in location 𝑚 is 𝑔(𝑣 − 𝑠). 
For simplicity, I assume that housing units in certain location come to the 
market randomly with equal probability. That is, when home buyers do their 
searching, a housing unit from a random location appears in the searching 
sequence; and the surplus value of this housing unit is related to the 
information level at that location. Thus, the distribution of housing units’ 






𝑔(𝑣 − 𝑠(𝑚))𝑑𝑚                                                                      (4.3) 




[𝐺(𝑣 − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐷) − 𝐺(𝑣 − 𝑎)]                                                    (4.4) 
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Equation (4.4) shows the distribution of housing units for home buyers with 
the information level 𝑠(𝑚). It shows that the market environment of buyers is 
related to their information level, which in turn impacts the outcome of their 
housing choice. 
In this model, the housing choice is a typical search process. If no recall in the 
process, the problem of a home buyer is 
𝑣 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑣, ∫ 𝑣𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣 − 𝑐
+∞
−∞
}                                                                   (4.5) 
where the maximization is over two actions when the buyer finds one housing 
unit after each search: (1) accept the housing unit in this location and have a 
value 𝑣; (2) reject this housing unit, and draw a next housing unit with a new 
value 𝑣 from the distribution 𝑓(𝑣), meanwhile pay a search cost 𝑐. Following 
a stream of literature on labor economy (e.g. Jovanovic, 1979; and McCall, 
1970), this problem can be simplified as the problem of determination of 
reservation value. If the reservation value is 𝑣∗, it should satisfy 






− 𝑐                                                    (4.6) 
If a buyer finds a housing unit, whose surplus value is equal to or bigger than 
the reservation value, 𝑣 ≥ 𝑣∗, the buyer accepts this housing unit and stay in 
this location; otherwise he continues searching. In order to discuss what 
factors influence the reservation valuation for an individual buyer, the above 
equation can be written as  
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∫ (𝑣 − 𝑣∗)𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣
+∞
𝑣∗
= 𝑐                                                                             (4.7) 
Proposition 1.  Reservation value is related to search cost. Higher search cost 














> 0,  
𝜕𝑣∗
𝜕𝑐
< 0.                                         (END OF PROOF) 
Proposition 1 shows that buyers with high search cost set low reservation 
value. With a high search cost, a home buyer may waste more search cost 
when he turn down an offer and continue searching, but a good deal is not 
guaranteed in the next search. Thus, he tends to accept a housing unit with 
lower surplus value, because it is costly for him to continue searching. This 
proposition predicts that search cost is a barrier for home buyers to find an 
optimal housing unit. 
Proposition 2. Home buyers with higher information level in their current 










[𝑔(𝑣 − 𝑎) − 𝑔(𝑣 − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐷)]  
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From equation (4.7), I have 





















= ∫ (𝑣 − 𝑣∗)
1
𝑏𝐷
















If 𝑥 = 𝑣 + 𝑏𝐷 , then 
1
𝑏𝐷






∫ (𝑥 − 𝑏𝐷 −
+∞
𝑣∗
𝑣∗)𝑔(𝑥 − 𝑎)𝑑𝑥 =
1
𝑏𝐷
∫ (𝑥 − 𝑣∗)𝑔(𝑥 − 𝑎)𝑑𝑥
+∞
𝑣∗













                                            
𝜕𝑣∗
𝜕𝑎
> 0.                                      (END OF PROOF) 
Proposition 2 predicts that home buyers with higher information level in their 
current location prefers to set a higher reservation value. Since the higher 
information level of a buyer makes him more self-assured to find a good 
housing deal given that other factors remain the same, he tends to set higher 
reservation value than buyers with less information. The impacts of the 
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information level in the current location in this model are not limited in the 
current or any other specific location. Because the information level in the 
current location changes the reservation value of the buyer, he is still benefited 
from his information level wherever he stays, even though his next housing 
unit might not be in the same place of his current housing unit. This 
proposition shows the benefit of the information in buyer’s current location.  
Proposition 3. Given a reservation value 𝑣∗, a home buyer is more likely to 




< 0 , where 𝑃𝑚  is the probability of the home buyer to choose a 
housing unit in location 𝑚. 
Proof.  The probability of a buyer finding a housing unit in location 𝑚 is 
𝑃𝑚 = 1 − 𝐺(𝑣
∗ − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑚)  
𝜕𝑃𝑚
𝜕𝑚
< 0 , and information level decreases with 𝑚 , so 𝑃𝑚  increases with  
information level.                                                                  (END OF PROOF) 
Proposition 3 predicts that a homebuyer prefers to choose a housing unit in a 
location where he has more information. If the housing unit in each location 
comes to the market with equal probability, the housing unit from location 
where the buyer has higher information level is more likely to meet the 
requirement of his reservation value. So a home buyer is more likely to choose 
a housing unit in the location where he has more information. 
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Proposition 4. Home buyers with fast decay speed of information have higher 










𝑔(𝑣 − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐷) −
1
𝑏2𝐷
[𝐺(𝑣 − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐷) − 𝐺(𝑣 − 𝑎)]  
From equation (4.7), I have 
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{[(𝑣 − 𝑣∗)𝑏𝐷𝐺(𝑣 − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐷)]𝑣∗
+∞







{∫ 𝑏𝐷𝐺(𝑣 − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐷)𝑑𝑣
+∞
𝑣∗







{[(𝑣 − 𝑣∗)𝑏𝐷𝐺(𝑣 − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐷)]𝑣∗
+∞
+ ∫ (𝑣 + 𝑏𝐷 − 𝑣∗)𝐺(𝑣 − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐷)𝑑𝑣
𝑣∗
𝑣∗−𝑏𝐷
} > 0 
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                           ∫ 𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣
+∞
𝑣∗
> 0, so 
𝜕𝑣∗
𝜕𝑏
> 0.                  (END OF PROOF) 
Proposition 4 shows that home buyers with faster decay speed of information 
also tend to set higher reservation value. To secure a good deal, home buyers 
with the faster decay speed of information need to set a high reservation value 
to guarantee them to find a housing unit with high surplus value. According to 
Proposition 3, the probability of finding a housing unit with high surplus value 
is higher near the original location. Thus it also implies that home buyers with 
the faster decay speed of information would prefer a nearer location to their 
current one to make sure a good deal. Home buyers with the slow decay speed 
of information need have a relatively low reservation value, because they 
relatively less rely on the information advantage in the original locations, and 
can find a good deal in a location far away from the original location. 
To sum up, the housing search model shows that the information level plays an 
important role in housing search process. It is found that better informed home 
buyers have higher reservation, and thus, could result into a good deal on 
average. 
The indirect utility 𝑣𝑖 of the housing unit is the difference between the utility 
the housing unit brought to the buyer 𝑢(𝑥𝑖) and the housing price 𝑝𝑖. It can be 
understood as the surplus value of the housing unit 𝑖. In the housing market, 
sellers randomly appear in the housing market. Each seller sets a selling price 
according to his understanding of the local housing market based on his 
information of the location. As a price taker, the home buyer searches from 
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seller to seller to choose a housing unit, which includes the attributes as well 
as the price of the housing unit. If a home buyer can find a similar housing 
unit with characteristics of 𝑥𝑖 but lower price 𝑝𝑖 in the market, i.e. a housing 
unit with higher surplus value 𝑣𝑖, he can secure a good deal. The theoretical 
analysis focuses on the reservation surplus value 𝑣∗ . Because home buyers 
only choose housing units with 𝑣 higher than 𝑣∗, a higher 𝑣∗ implies a higher 
surplus value. The selling price is assumed unchanged during a buyer’s 
housing search process, so the higher reservation value of a buyer is 
necessarily and sufficiently associated with a lower transaction price for the 
buyer’s ideal housing unit in the housing market. Thus the empirical work can 
be done on the transaction price. 
4.3 Data 
The data used in the empirical work are from the 2007 Tianjin commercial 
housing transaction database merged with the housing provident fund (HPF) 
home loan lending database provided by Tianjin Academy of Social Science in 
China (Tianjin_2007). The details about the background of Tianjin housing 
market and the data can be found in Chapter 3. This research only considers 
the households bought a commercial housing unit in one of the six central 
districts in Tianjin city in 2007. 16,467 transactions are extracted from the 
database after screening out the observations with missing data.  
Based on the variables in the dataset, several measurements are identified in 
this study to capture the variation of information level among different home 
buyers. The definitions of these variables as well as the control variables are 
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presented in Table 4-1. And Table 4-2 gives the summary statistics of the 
variables. The dependent variable is the natural log of the housing transaction 
price. 
Table 4-1 List of Variables. 
Variable Definition 
Market Information Level 
RURAL_IMM =1, if a household emigrated from sub-urban areas 
to the central region; otherwise 0. 
RURAL_BIRTH =1, if the head of the household was born outside 
of the central region; otherwise 0. 
PRE_STAY =1, if a household still stays in the same district 
after moving; otherwise 0. 
MOVE_1 =1, if the distance between the next housing unit 
and the previous housing unit is less than 1 
kilometre; otherwise 0. 
MOVE_12 =1, if the distance between the next housing unit 
and the previous housing unit is more than 1 
kilometre and less than 2 kilometres; otherwise 0. 
Attributes of Housing Units 
LOG_HP the natural log of the housing transaction price 
(RMB Yuan) 
LOG_AREA the natural log of the size of the housing unit (m
2
) 
LOG_CBD the natural log of the distance between the housing 
unit and the closest central business region (km) 
SHOP the number of shops whose distance to the housing 
unit is less than 2 kilometres 
SCHOOL the number of schools whose distance to the 
housing unit is less than 2 kilometres 
HOSPITAL the number of hospitals whose distance to the 
housing unit is less than 2 kilometres 
SUBWAY the number of subway stations whose distance to 
the housing unit is less than 2 kilometres 
B_TYPE1; B_TYPE2 For masonry-concrete structure, B_TYPE1=0, 
B_TYPE2=0; for reinforced concrete structure, 
B_TYPE1=1, B_TYPE2=0; for others, 
B_TYPE1=0, B_TYPE2=1. 
SALE1; RESALE For completed housing transaction, SALE1=0, 
RESALE=0; for pre-sale transaction, SALE1=1, 





Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LOG_HP 13.21 0.50 11.16 14.98 
LOG_AREA 4.47 0.39 3.15 6.84 
LOG_CBD 0.90 0.55 0.00 2.40 
SHOP 1.20 1.34 0.00 5.00 
SCHOOL 2.26 1.97 0.00 7.00 
HOSPITAL 3.20 2.39 0.00 10.00 
SUBWAY 1.24 1.38 0.00 5.00 
Binary Variables Count Frequency (%) 
RURAL_IMM 1,885 11.45 
RURAL_BIRTH 1,730 10.51 
PRE_STAY 8,549 51.92 
MOVE_1 3,801 23.08 
MOVE_12 3,817 23.18 
B_TYPE1 8,485 51.53 
B_TYPE2 232 1.41 
SALE1 6,916 42 
RESALE 8,742 53.09 
NEW_SALE 7,725 46.91 
Total Obs. 16,467 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) The dataset is 
provided by Tianjin Academy of Social Science in China, and this study 
considers 16,467 households bought a commercial housing unit in one of the 
six central districts in Tianjin city in 2007. 
 
Market Information Level  
Ideally, if there is direct measure of information, the estimation would be 
perfect. But, information is unobservable, and all the measures of information 
in the literature are proxies (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2012; Lambson, 
McQueen and Slade 2004; and Turnbull and Sirmans, 1993). Five types of 
variables are used in this chapter to proxy the information level for targeted 
housing market of different home buyers. All these variables are defined by 
the historical location information of households. Generally, if a household is 
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more intensively connected to a market, he has more information in this 
region. 
Firstly, following the previous literature, I use whether the households 
previously live in the central city as the measures of information level, 
because home buyers that are new to the target area of the city may have less 
information than those who currently live in the area. Households emigrated 
from sub-urban or rural areas (outside of the six central districts) have 
different information from households who have been living in the central 
region. Households emigrated from outside regions know less about the local 
housing market. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2012), Lambson, McQueen and Slade 
(2004), and Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) address that home buyers out of the 
market pay more for real estate in both residential and commercial real estate, 
since they have less information of the market. A variable of RURAL_IMM is 
defined in this study to divide households who previously live in the central 
city or not. RURAL_IMM equates to one, indicating that the household 
immigrate to the central region from the sub-urban areas; otherwise zero. Out 
of total 16,467 households in the sample who buy housing units in the central 
region, 1,885 households emigrate from the sub-urban areas (see Table 4-2 and 
Table 4-3). On average, the households from the sub-urban areas pay a unit 
housing price of 6,741.52 RMB Yuan per square meter, while their counterpart 
pays a relatively lower unit housing price of 6,448.32 RMB Yuan per square 




Secondly, given the unique Hukou system, and the rapid urbanization with the 
rural-to-urban migration in China, some households living in city currently 
emigrated from rural areas. Most of their parents and relatives do not live in 
the city. They know less market information due to less social interactions 
within the city. So whether the households’ head were born outside of the 
central city serves as another proxy. One advantage of this sample is that the 
birth place of households’ heads can be traced by their registered place of 
identity. RURAL_BIRTH is defined in the sample; and it is one if the head of 
a household was born outside of the central region, most of who were born in 
the rural area of Tianjin. As shown in Table 4-2, 10.51%, or 1,730 households 
currently emigrated from outside of the central region. Table 4-3 also shows 
that on average, the households whose head was born outside of the central 
region pay a relatively higher unit housing price than their counterpart. 
Table 4-3 Descriptive Statistics of the Unit Housing Price for Different 
Groups of Household. 
Variable 
 
Unit Housing Price (RMB Yuan per sq.m.) 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RURAL_IMM 1885 6741.52 1743.05 2228.16 14754.84 
Others 14582 6448.32 1560.59 660.28 15741.00 
RURAL_BIRTH 1730 6722.58 1735.92 2228.16 14754.84 
Others 14737 6453.63 1564.24 660.28 15741.00 
PRE_STAY 8549 6188.60 1414.82 660.28 15741.00 
Others 7918 6798.53 1694.75 1828.90 14754.84 
MOVE_1 3801 6136.59 1428.92 660.28 15000.00 
Others 12666 6585.50 1614.94 1662.31 15741.00 
MOVE_12 3817 6393.66 1523.15 1662.31 15100.00 
Others 12650 6508.50 1602.61 660.28 15741.00 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) The dataset is 
provided by Tianjin Academy of Social Science in China, and this study 
considers 16,467 households bought a commercial housing unit in one of the 




Thirdly, market information level depends on the first-hand experience and 
interactions with households nearby in the region. Generally, households are 
more familiar with the region close to their home and information decays with 
the distance to the place they live. The value of a housing unit depends on 
varieties of local factors, such as neighborhood amenities, quality of schools, 
crime rate, local supply and demand in housing market, future planning in the 
zone, and etc. The locals have the information on these factors through the 
first-hand experience, when they drive to work, do the shopping, or even jog 
around, and etc. They can also learn these factors when they interact with 
neighbors, visit friends or relatives nearby, read or watch local news 
intentionally or accidentally. It is believed that they have more information 
where they live and relatively less with the distance to their home increases.  
To test whether the price premium depends on the distance to the current 
housing unit, three types of indicators are identified in this study. PRE_STAY 
presents whether households still stay in the same district after moving; 
MOVE_1 indicates whether the distance between the next housing unit and 
the previous housing unit is less than 1 kilometer; MOVE_12 shows whether 
the distance between the next housing unit and the previous housing unit is 
more than 1 kilometer and less than 2 kilometers. The descriptive statistics of 
MOVE_1 and MOVE_12 show that a large number of households continued 
to choose housing units close to their previous homes. The sample has 23.08% 
and 23.18% households whose next housing units locate close to their 
previous housing unit within 1 kilometer and between 1 and 2 kilometres, 
respectively. As shown in Table 4-3, on average, these three types of 
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households who move within the same district, within 1 kilometer, and 
between 1 and 2 kilometres, pay a relatively lower unit housing price than 
their counterparts, respectively. It might be due to their information advantage. 
This study uses these five measurements to proxy the information level of 
households, and shows their different behaviors in the housing market. 
Other Characteristics of Housing Units 
In the study, the attributes of housing units are required to estimate the output 
of housing search. To estimate the behavior of households in the housing 
market, the natural log of housing transaction price (LOG_HP) is used as the 
dependent variable in the hedonic model. For the control variables, the size of 
the housing unit (LOG_AREA) is firstly controlled. The distance to the central 
business region (LOG_CBD), and the number of shops (SHOP), schools 
(SCHOOL), hospitals (HOSTIPTAL) and subway stations (SUBWAY) whose 
distance to the housing unit is less than 2 kilometres are used to proxy the 
geographic variation and accessibility. B_TYPE1 and B_TYPE2 are used to 
identify the structure of buildings. They are masonry-concrete, reinforced 
concrete and others. The housing units in the sample are resale and new sale, 
in which the new sale includes complete sale and presale. SALE1 and 
RESALE are used to show the types of housing transaction. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
Following the previous research (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2012; Lambson, 
McQueen and Slade, 2004; and Turnbull and Sirmans, 1993), I adopt the 
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traditional hedonic model to test the two specific questions. First, does the 
buyer with information disadvantage pay more for a housing unit than his 
counterpart? Second, does this price premium decay with the distance between 
the next housing unit and the current housing unit, since housing information 
decays with this distance? The dependent variable is the natural log of housing 
transaction price (LOG_HP). The testing variables are the five dummies used 
to proxy the information level of households, which are RURAL_IMM, 
RURAL_BIRTH, PRE_STAY, MOVE_1, and MOVE_12, in each hedonic 
regression respectively. The control variables are LOG_AREA, LOG_CBD, 
SHOP, SCHOOL, HOSTIPTAL, SUBWAY, SALE1, RESALE, B_TYPE1, 
and B_TYPE2. The results are shown in Table 4-4.  
The control variables demonstrate high level of significance and robustness 
and the models are able to explain 88.4% of the housing price variation. The 
housing price is positively related to the size of the housing unit. Households 
prefer to living close to the central business district. Shops, schools and public 
transportation stations can add value to housing units close to them. But 
Chinese households dislike their housing units to be close to hospitals. The 
results also imply that households like new sale and reinforced concrete 
structure housing unit in the Tianjin housing market. All the signs of 
coefficients are consistent with the institution on the housing market. 
Column (2) to (6) use the proxies of information level of households to predict 
the price premium of information. The coefficients on the attributes of housing 
units in Column (2) to (6) are very close to the results in Column (1). These 
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estimations are robust and stable. Column (2) uses RURAL_IMM to test 
whether households moving from the rural area to the city central region pay 
more for the housing unit. The coefficient on RURAL_IMM is significantly 
positive. It implies that households emigrated from outside of central region 
have to pay a premium of 1.1% for having less information about the housing 
market in the central region. Column (3) considers the heads of households 
who were born outside of central region. The coefficient on RURAL_BIRTH 
is also significantly positive. It implies that households whose heads were born 
outside of central city also have to pay 1.2% more for a similar housing unit 
comparing to the counterpart. 
Column (4) to (6) use the living history as measurement of information level 
in the hedonic regressions. It shows the impacts of location variations of 
information level. The coefficients on PRE_STAY, MOVE_1 and MOVE_12 
are all significantly negative. If the households’ next housing units are close to 
their previous housing units, households are more likely to enjoy higher 
surplus because they know more information on their locations. Households 
who move within the same district can pay 2% less comparing to the other 
households who move across districts. Households who move within 1 





Table 4-4 Hedonic Model with Market Information Premium with Full 
Sample. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LOG_AREA 0.937*** 0.938*** 0.938*** 0.939*** 0.938*** 0.939*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LOG_CBD -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SHOP 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SCHOOL 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HOSPITAL -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SALE1 0.016** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
RESALE -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.198*** -0.198*** -0.198*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
B_TYPE1 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
B-TYPE2 0.022* 0.022* 0.022* 0.021* 0.021* 0.021* 
 




    
  
(0.004) 
    RURAL_BIRTH 
  
0.012*** 
   
   
(0.004) 
   PRE_STAY 
   
-0.020*** 
  
    
(0.003) 
  MOVE_1 
    
-0.018*** -0.023*** 
     
(0.003) (0.003) 
MOVE_12 
     
-0.018*** 
      
(0.003) 
CONSTANT 9.027*** 9.020*** 9.020*** 9.030*** 9.028*** 9.029*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
       Obs. 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 
R-squared 0.883 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) The dependent 
variable is LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, 




Housing information decays with the distance to the current living place, the 
premium from the information should also decay with the distance. To study 
this, I consider two groups of households. One group has the distance between 
the next housing unit and the current housing unit within 1 kilometer and the 
other has the moving distance between 1 kilometer and 2 kilometers. The 
results are shown in column (6). It is found that households moving within 1 
kilometer can pay 2.3% less for an identical house; while households moving 
between 1 kilometer and 2 kilometers can play 1.8% less. It supports my 
second hypothesis. 
I also divide the households into two groups according to their education level, 
to study whether the decay speed of information has an impact on buyers’ 
housing choice and price premium. Usually high educated home buyers rely 
more on information techniques like web searches. Information would decay 
at a lower speed in the group of households with high education levels. In this 
sample, the high education level is university or above, and the low education 
level is polytechnic or below. The regression results of high education group 
and low education group are shown in Table A-2 and Table A-3 in Appendix 
II. I also list the coefficients of the information level dummies in Table 4-5 to 
have a clear comparison. 
In the high education group, the coefficients on RURAL_IMM and 
RURAL_BIRTH are not significant and close to zero. It indicates that there is 
almost no difference between the rural migrants and their counterparts in the 
city. While in the low education group, the coefficients on RURAL_IMM and 
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RURAL_BIRTH are significantly positive. It indicates that in the low 
educated group, the less informed home buyers from the rural area have to pay 
more compared to their counterparts in the city. The coefficients on 
PRE_STAY, MOVE_1 and MOVE_12 are all significantly positive, but the 
coefficients for the high educated group are relatively smaller than those for 
the low educated group. The results show that the information advantage in 
the original location has relatively smaller impact in the high educated group 
than the low educated group. Possible reason is that usually high educated 
home buyers rely more on information techniques like web searches. Thus, the 
original accumulated local information due to their living history has less 
impact in the high educated home buyers. 
Table 4-5 Information Premiums with Full Sample and Subsamples of 
High Education Group and Low Education Group. 
VARIABLES Full Sample High Education Low Education 
RURAL_IMM 0.011*** 0.006 0.015** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
RURAL_BIRTH 0.012*** 0.002 0.022*** 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
PRE_STAY -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.023*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
MOVE_1 -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
MOVE_12 -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Notes: (1) All variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) The dependent variable is 
LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
Since the high educated home buyers relatively less rely on the information 
advantage in the original locations, they can find a good deal in a location far 
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away from the original location. There will be relatively less home buyers 
move nearer to their original home in the high educated group than in the low 
educated group, because they don’t rely on the original accumulated local 
information as much as the low educated home buyers. Thus, I also draw the 
kernel density function of the moving distance of the high educated group and 
the low educated group, which is shown in Figure 4-1. The density near to the 
original location of the high educated group is much lower than that of the low 
educated group, which supports the argument that the high educated home 
buyers relatively less depend on the information advantage in the original 
locations, and manage to find a good deal in other locations. 
 
 























Overall, the detailed research questions are answered with the empirical 
results. A home buyer with information disadvantage pays more for a housing 
unit than his counterpart. This information price premium depends on the 
distance between the next housing unit and the current housing unit, since 
housing information decays with this distance. The decay speed of information 
also impacts on the price premium and location choice. 
4.5 Robustness Test 
I consider subsamples of resale and new sale housing units as a robustness 
test. The detailed regression results are shown in Table A-4 and Table A-5 in 
Appendix II. I also list the coefficients of the information level dummies in 
Table 4-6 to have a clear comparison. In both the resale housing market and 
the new sale housing market, the less informed households still need to pay a 
price premium. But in the resale housing market, the home buyers manage to 
pay a relatively smaller premium than those in the new sale housing market. 
Possible reason could be related to the housing agent. In the China housing 
market, buyers usually hire housing agents to buy second-hand housing units 
in the resale market, but usually they buy a new sale housing unit directly 
from developers. If a housing agent with more information about the housing 
market could help to secure a good deal, the resale subsample should have a 





Table 4-6 Information Premiums with Full Sample and Subsamples of 
Resale Group and New Sale Group. 
VARIABLES Full Sample Resale New Sale 
RURAL_IMM 0.011*** 0.008 0.011* 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
RURAL_BIRTH 0.012*** 0.010* 0.012* 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
PRE_STAY -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
MOVE_1 -0.023*** -0.018*** -0.024*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
MOVE_12 -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Notes: (1) All variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) The dependent variable is 
LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
Households are also familiar with their working places. The distance between 
the housing unit and the household head’s working places is also used as a 
proxy of information level in the local housing market. The variable, Distance 
to Workplace, is the distance between the housing unit and the household 
head’s working places. Distance to Workplace_1=1, if Distance to Workplace 
is less than 1 kilometre; otherwise 0. Distance to Workplace_12=1, if Distance 
to Workplace is more than 1 kilometre and less than 2 kilometres; otherwise 0. 
The coefficients on Distance to Workplace_1 and Distance to Workplace_12 
are negative, which indicate that home buyers who buy housing units near to 
their working places enjoy a price premium. The interaction term with 
education level is added. The variable EDU is a dummy variable to indicate 
the education level of the head of the household. EDU=1, if the education 
level is university or above, otherwise 0. The coefficients on the interaction 
term show that high educated home buyers enjoy a relatively smaller 
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information premium from near to the workplace. 
Table 4-7 Hedonic Model with Distance to Workplace as Measure of 
Market Information. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LOG_AREA 0.937*** 0.937*** 0.937*** 0.936*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LOG_CBD -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SHOP 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SCHOOL 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HOSPITAL -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SALE1 0.016** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
RESALE -0.200*** -0.199*** -0.200*** -0.200*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
B_TYPE1 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
B_TYPE2 0.022* 0.022* 0.022* 0.022* 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Distance to Workplace_1 -0.011 -0.012* -0.042*** -0.043*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
Distance to Workplace_1×EDU 
  
0.052*** 0.052*** 
   
(0.014) (0.014) 









Distance to Workplace_12×EDU 
   
0.033*** 
    
(0.008) 
CONSTANT 9.027*** 9.027*** 9.028*** 9.032*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
     Obs. 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 
R-squared 0.883 0.884 0.884 0.884 
Notes: (1) The variable, Distance to Workplace, is the distance between the housing unit and 
the household head’s working places. Distance to Workplace_1=1, if Distance to Workplace is 
less than 1 kilometre; otherwise 0. Distance to Workplace_12=1, if Distance to Workplace is 
more than 1 kilometre and less than 2 kilometres; otherwise 0. The variable EDU is a dummy 
variable to indicate the education level of the head of the household. EDU=1, if the education 
level is university or above, otherwise 0. All the other variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) 
The dependent variable is LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, ** 




4.6 Further Discussion 
I consider the impact of the number of home buyers within the same original 
neighborhood on the housing price. The neighborhood is defined based on the 
geographic information. Generally, the neighborhood is organized by the same 
block or real estate project. The interaction terms are included in the 
regression, which are No. of Buyer×MOVE_1 and No. of Buyer×MOVE_2, 
i.e. the interaction of number of home buyers within the same original 
neighborhood and the dummy variables indicating whether they move within 1 
km or  within 2 km. If there are plenty households living at a closer location 
competing for the target housing unit nearby, they might need to pay a higher 
price for the housing unit, thus the coefficients on them are expected to be 
positive. The regression results are shown in Table 4-8. The coefficients on 
MOVE_1 and MOVE_2 are significantly negative, which imply that home 
buyers who move in a nearer place could find a good deal. As expected, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms No. of Buyer×MOVE_1 and No. of 
Buyer×MOVE_2 are significantly positive. This result shows that the 







Table 4-8 Hedonic Model with the Competition among Home buyers. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
LOG_AREA 0.938*** 0.938*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
LOG_CBD -0.029*** -0.028*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
SHOP 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
SCHOOL 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
HOSPITAL -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
SALE1 0.015** 0.016** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
RESALE -0.198*** -0.197*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
B_TYPE1 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
B_TYPE2 0.021* 0.022* 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 


















CONSTANT 9.029*** 9.032*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) 
   Obs. 16,467 16,467 
R-squared 0.884 0.884 
Notes: (1) The variable, No. of Buyer, is the natural log of the number of 
home buyers who moved out from the same neighborhood. MOVE_2 is a 
dummy variable, MOVE_2=1, if the distance between the next housing unit and 
the previous housing unit is less than 2 kilometres; otherwise 0. All the other 
variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) The dependent variable is LOG_HP; (3) 






In this chapter, a housing search model is built, which can explain the housing 
choice behavior regarding to search cost and location-dependent information 
level. It predicts that households with strong information level have a high 
probability to secure a good deal in the housing market. Theoretically, this 
study extends Turnbull and Sirmans’ (1993) housing search model with a 
location-dependent information level of different households.  
With the housing transaction data from Tianjin, China, I use traditional 
hedonic model to conduct an empirical analysis on information level and 
housing choice performance. I assume that information level of the housing 
market is accumulated by a household living in a location, and have five 
different measures of information level. The results show that households 
emigrated from outside or were born outside pay more for their housing units; 
and households, who buy housing units in their current neighborhoods or close 
to their previous housing units, pay less for their housing units. I also find the 
premium from the information level decays with the distance to the current 
living place, because housing information decays. The decay speed of 
information has an impact on the housing price and the locations homebuyers 
choose. These results are consistent with my predictions in the model. 
Therefore, with a large sample and more measures of information level, the 
empirical findings in this research provide supportive evidence to the 
argument that better informed households can secure a good deal, which is 
also consistent with the theoretical literature. It fills in the literature gap that 
there is contradiction in the previous results of the impact of information level 
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on the housing price (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2012; Lambson, McQueen, and 
Slade, 2004; Turnbull and Sirmans, 1993; Watkins, 1998). 
The findings of different types of households pay different prices for an almost 
identical housing unit also has important policy implications to the Chinese 
housing market. If a housing market is efficient enough, there should not be a 
price difference between different groups. Though the commercial housing 
market has been booming for over 10 years in China, the relevant institution 
has been lagged behind. There are basically two channels for a household to 
buy a housing unit. One is to directly buy from the developer without a 
housing agent; and the other is to buy a resale housing unit with a housing 
agent. Except the advertisement from the developer, other detailed 
information, like neighborhood amenities, future plans about the 
neighborhood, etc., is not publically available. The second-hand housing unit 
is transacted through housing agency. However, there is limited information 
on their website. There is no public platform to share more information about 
housing units. The Chinese housing market is not efficient, because my results 
show a big difference in housing price for informed and uninformed groups of 
households. Institutions, like the multiple listing service (MLS) in US, should 
be built up to mitigate the price difference between different groups. 
In conclusion, the results show that better informed households manage to 
secure a good deal in their familiar places. But housing search does not only 
rely on information level, but also on the information process abilities, like the 
ability to gather and understand information, as well as bargaining power. 
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Even with the same information level, different households could have 
different ways to understand the information. They also have different tastes 
and different preferences. These factors could also give rise to a price 
difference in housing choice. What kinds of households are more efficient in 
securing a good deal? What factors determine the heterogeneity of price 
premium? 
Following the previous literature in housing search and information, this 
chapter adopts the traditional hedonic model with information dummies to 
estimate the price premium of information. Other characteristics of households 
are omitted in the regression, which may cause a biased estimation. In 
addition, given the stochastic nature of search process, better informed 
households have high probability to find a good deal, but not certainly. This is 
not considered in the empirical test in this chapter. In the next chapter, I use a 
stochastic frontier model to consider more characteristics of households in the 






Chapter 5 Search Efficiency and Housing Choice 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I attempt to answer the second research question: How do the 
characteristics of a household impact on the housing search performance? 
Households are heterogeneous in housing market. In a housing search process, 
heterogeneous home buyers may obtain different outcomes of their search. 
Previous literature tries to quantify the impacts of home buyers’ heterogeneous 
characteristics on their performance in a housing search. Since housing choice 
is a search process, home buyers’ heterogeneous characteristics determine 
their reservation values, which in turn influence their performance of housing 
search. However, empirically, it is difficult to quantify home buyers’ housing 
search performance directly, since the reservation value is unobservable. 
Empirically, the duration and the number of search times are used to measure 
the home buyers’ performance in the search efficiency literature and price 
premium is used in the information literature and bargaining power literature. 
Considering the stochastic nature of housing search performance, higher 
reservation value implies a higher probability to find a good deal in the 
housing market, i.e., the home buyer performs efficiently in the housing 
search. (See Section 1.1 in Chapter 1 for a description of the research problem 
and Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 in Chapter 2 for a detailed review of the 
literature). I define a search efficiency term to show the probability of securing 




With the concept of search efficiency, this work adopts a modified stochastic 
frontier approach, which can help to overcome the difficulty without the 
necessity to identify the reservation value, because a frontier is set and home 
buyers try to find housing units with prices lower than the frontier. The larger 
the difference between the frontier and the observed transaction price, the 
more efficient a home buyer is in choosing a housing unit. 
Stochastic frontier approach is firstly developed by Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) to estimate the 
production function and analyze the efficiency of production. Conventional 
econometric production models treat producers as successful optimizers to 
estimate production. Under this classic framework, deviations from the 
maximum possible output, given a set of inputs, are attributed exclusively to 
random statistical noise. Stochastic frontier estimation is developed to 
incorporate a theory of producer behavior that explicitly incorporated the 
possibility of suboptimal performance in addition to random statistical noise. 
The efficient frontier under this context represents the maximum output that is 
possible for a given set of inputs and technology. Producers who are operating 
on this frontier are efficient, while those operating beneath this frontier are 
technically inefficient.  
The stochastic frontier model is applicable to housing market, because housing 
market is imperfect with trade frictions incurring search costs, incomplete 
information, bargaining power, and etc. Under the assumption of perfect 
market condition, the conventional hedonic model assume that housing price 
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represents the market clearing price, and the regression results should provide 
an unbiased estimation of the fair market value of each housing unit. However, 
because of the imperfection of housing market, the observed transaction price 
does not necessarily represent the market equilibrium price. Unlike the 
conventional hedonic model which estimates at the least squares line, the 
stochastic frontier model is estimated at the Pareto frontier. It can be adopted 
to reduce the estimation biases (Samaha and Kamakura, 2008; Kumbhakar and 
Parmeter, 2010; Carriazo, Ready and Shortle, 2013)3. 
In this application, the stochastic frontier represents the maximum price that a 
housing unit could be sold for, given its measurable characteristics. An 
efficient home buyer can find a housing unit with a much lower price than the 
price frontier in the housing market; and the difference is modelled as a 
random efficient component. Following the method in Kumbhakar and 
Parmeter (2010), I also allow a random component with heterogeneous 
distribution among different home buyers, with the characteristics of home 
buyers as the explanatory variables of the efficient component distribution.  
This modified stochastic frontier model, which helps to estimate the search 
                                                 
3
Samaha and Kamakura (2008) take the perspectives of the seller and the buyer in 
uncovering the lowest price that seller should accept or the highest price the buyer 
should pay for the real estate property. In their study, they use the stochastic frontier 
approach with the consideration of geographical correlation. Kumbhakar and 
Parmeter (2010) develop a hedonic price model that incorporates the effects of 
incomplete information on both sides of the market and obtains estimates of the 
discrepancies between market prices and buyers’ maximum willingness to pay and 
sellers’ minimum willingness to accept. Their empirical study based on a data set 
constructed from the American Housing Survey, finds that incomplete information 
has a significant impact on housing prices. In their study, they allow the stochastic 
frontier model to account for the buyer and seller characteristics. Carriazo, Ready and 
Shortle (2013) consider the impacts of air quality on housing price and use stochastic 
frontier model to mitigate omitted variable bias. 
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efficiency in housing choice, has three contributions in analyzing the 
performance of housing search. First, the efficiency of households in a 
housing search is quantitatively defined as the probability of securing a good 
deal. It is captured by the varied standard deviation of random component in 
the stochastic frontier model. It can reflect the phenomenon that, in a housing 
search process, home buyers with more information and strong bargaining 
power are more likely, but not certainly, to secure a good deal. The probability 
to secure a good deal can be calculated based on the regression results. 
Second, it is a further development of the information literature on search 
performance, in which information is incorporated directly into the hedonic 
price function by adding a dummy variable of different groups of home buyers 
and the coefficient on this dummy is claimed as the price premium of the 
group of home buyers. In this work, the households’ characteristics determine 
their performance and in turn impact on the efficiency in securing a good deal. 
The model allows different households to have heterogeneous price premiums. 
Third, if the characteristics of households do influence their search 
performances in a housing market, the housing price is not decided on the 
margin of their utility function. The fundamental assumption of hedonic 
pricing model regarding to perfect market information, does not hold (Rosen, 
1974). The estimation based on hedonic model is biased. Including 
households’ characteristics in estimation, the information literature (Ihlanfeldt 
and Mayock, 2012; Lambson, Macqueen and Slade, 2004; Turnbull and 
Sirmans, 1993) and bargaining power literature (Harding, Knight and Sirmans, 
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2003; Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans, 2003) have put effort to overcome this 
bias. Under the housing search framework with market friction, this study 
provides another way to correct the bias of the traditional hedonic estimation. 
I use the data from Tianjin commercial housing market in China to estimate 
the search efficiency of households in the housing market. The specific 
research questions are: how do home buyers’ characteristics impact on their 
housing search efficiency? What is the probability to secure a good deal for a 
home buyer with certain characteristics? This chapter tests whether 
information level and bargaining power are two determinants of housing 
search efficiency. First, households with more information are more likely to 
secure a good deal from the perspective of housing search. I distinguish 
households into two groups with different information levels and find that the 
probability of securing a good deal is higher in the better informed group. 
Second, I observe the impact of households’ demographic factors on their 
search efficiency in the housing market. The results show that households with 
lower income, less education, lower rank of occupation, and etc. have lower 
opportunity cost and are able to spend more time in a housing market. Thus, 
they are likely to perform more efficiently. The results of the probability to 
secure a good deal serve to quantify the impact of households’ characteristics 
on the search performance of housing choice. 
The remaining of this chapter is arranged as follows: Section 2 presents the 
econometric implementation of the stochastic frontier approach. Section 3 
discusses the data. The estimated results are shown in Section 4. Section 5 
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shows the robustness test results. Section 6 concludes. 
5.2 Econometric Implementation 
The empirical model to quantify the impacts of households’ characteristics on 
the efficiency of housing search is under the stochastic frontier approach. The 
stochastic frontier method postulates that some observations fail to achieve the 
cost (production) frontier. That is, inefficiencies exist, and these random 
inefficiencies cannot be fully explained by measurable variables. Thus, a one-
sided error term, in addition to the traditional symmetric noise term, is 
incorporated in the model. In the context of my dissertation, different from the 
conventional housing choice model which does not consider a search process, 
housing choice is a typical search process with frictions. Therefore, 
households do not always purchase the housing units at the equilibrium market 
price. The choice criterion in the search model is to buy a housing unit if the 
surplus value is higher than the reservation value. But empirically, the 
reservation value is unobservable. Stochastic frontier approach can help to 
overcome this problem without the necessity to identify the reservation value, 
because a frontier is set and home buyers try to find housing units with prices 
lower than the frontier. The larger the difference between the frontier and the 
observed transaction price, the more efficient the household is in choosing a 
housing unit. 
Assume a housing unit value function 𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝑉(𝑋𝑖), where 𝑋𝑖  is a bunch of 
characteristics of housing unit 𝑖  ( 𝑖 = 1.  .  . 𝑛 ), and to the buyer, 𝑃𝑖
∗  is the 
maximum price (Pareto) frontier (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Samaha and 
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Kamakura, 2008).  𝑒−𝑢𝑖 is defined as an inefficient component, where 𝑢𝑖 is a 
nonnegative random variable. It is independently half-normally distributed 
over observations with a standard deviation 𝜎𝑢,𝑖. The transaction price can be 
written as  
  𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖
∗𝑒−𝑢𝑖 = 𝑉(𝑋𝑖)𝑒
−𝑢𝑖                                                                          (5.1) 
Thus the observed transaction price reaches the maximum housing price 𝑃𝑖
∗ 
only when 𝑢𝑖 = 0. Otherwise, it is lower than the maximum price. Thus, 𝑒
−𝑢𝑖 
serves as a measure of the shortfall, and  𝑢𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝑉(𝑋𝑖) − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖  provides the 
measure of efficiency of the household. The higher the efficient component 𝑢𝑖 
is, the more efficient the household is in finding his satisfied housing unit. 
If a household has lower search cost and performs more efficiently in housing 
search, it is more likely for him to find housing units which have lower prices 
than the maximum price 𝑃𝑖
∗ . It implies that the standard deviation 𝜎𝑢,𝑖  of 
random variable 𝑢𝑖  varies among different households. Households with 
higher 𝜎𝑢,𝑖  have higher probability to have higher 𝑢𝑖, which in turn results in a 
lower  𝑒−𝑢𝑖 in equation (5.1). Therefore, they are more likely to be efficient in 
housing search. To allow for the households’ heterogeneous characteristics 
influencing the efficiency in housing searching, I assume the standard 
deviation of the random term is a function of the households’ characteristics. 
To be specific, it is written as the following function.                          
𝜎𝑢,𝑖 = 𝑢(𝑌𝑗)                                                                                                   (5.2) 
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where 𝑌𝑗 is a vector of household’s characteristics for household 𝑗 who buys 
housing unit 𝑖. 
To estimate the empirical model, I take natural log of and linearize equation 
(5.1) and (5.2) as follows: 
ln 𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖                                                                          (5.3) 
where  
𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2 )                                                                                                (5.4) 
𝑢𝑖~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢,𝑖
2 )                                                                                             (5.5)     
ln 𝜎𝑢,𝑖
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑌𝑗                                                                                        (5.6) 
 
The coefficients 𝛼  caputure the impacts of households’ characteristics on 
housing search efficiency. In this research, some indicators which reflect 
market information level are included in equation (5.6) as 𝑌. The estimation 
results show the impacts of information on the housing search efficiency. 
Equation (5.3)-(5.6) can be estimated by maximizing its likelihood function, 
which is suggested by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). 𝑢𝑖 is half-normally 
distributed over observations with a standard deviation 𝜎𝑢,𝑖 . The density 









2 )                                                                         (5.7) 
The joint distribution of 𝑢𝑖  and 𝜐 is 









2)                              (5.8) 
If 𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖, the distribution of 𝜀𝑖 is 








−1)               (5.9) 
where 𝜎𝑖 = 𝜎𝑢,𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝜐
2, and  𝜆𝑖 = 𝜎𝑢,𝑖/𝜎𝜐.  
The coefficients ?̂?, ?̂?, 𝛽0̂, and 𝛼0̂  can be estimated from the following log-
likelihood function 
ln 𝐿(𝜀|𝜎, 𝜆) = 𝑛 ln(
√2
√𝜋
) + ∑ ln(
1
𝜎𝑖







𝑖=1    
                                                                                                                    (5.10) 
where 𝜀𝑖 = ln 𝑃𝑖 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖 . The coefficients ?̂?  and 𝛼0̂  on households 
characteristics can be used to calculate the probability for households to find a 





I use the housing transaction data from Tianjin China in 2007 to observe 
households’ efficiency of housing choice. The details of the data have been 
presented in Chapter 3. In this chapter, I consider the households who bought a 
commercial housing unit in one of the six central districts in Tianjin city in 
2007. 16,467 transactions are extracted from the database after screening out 
the observations with missing data. The natural log of the housing transaction 
price is the dependent variable and the same attributes of housing units are 
considered as the control variables as defined in Chapter 4. Based on the 
information literature (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2012; Lambson, McQueen, and 
Slade, 2004; Turnbull and Sirmans, 1993), information level could affect the 
efficiency. Thus I include the measurements of information level as defined in 
Chapter 4 as one type of households’ characteristics. They are shown in Table 
5-1. Besides, the households’ other characteristics are important factors to 
determine the efficiency of housing search, which are also shown in the table. 
The descriptive statistics of these variables are shown in Table 5-2. 
The households’ market information level is defined by their initial location 
and the next housing location as I discussed in Chapter 4. As shown in Table 
4-3, on average, households who previously live in the central region, whose 
head was born in the central region, who move within the same region, who 
move within 1 kilometer, or who move between 1 kilometer and 2 kilometers, 
pay a relatively lower unit housing price than their counterparts. Thus I 
include RURAL_IMM, RURAL_BIRTH, PRE_STAY, MOVE_1 and 
MOVE_12, as the measure of information level in the regression of the 
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efficiency term. RURAL_IMM identifies households who previously live in 
the central city or not. RURAL_BIRTH is one if the head of the household 
was born outside of the central region. PRE_STAY presents whether the 
household still stay in the same region after moving. MOVE_1 indicates 
whether the distance between the next housing unit and the previous housing 
unit is less than 1 kilometer. MOVE_12 shows whether the distance between 
the next housing unit and the previous housing unit is more than 1 kilometer 
and less than 2 kilometers. 
The attributes of housing units listed in Table 5-1 are used as control variables 
in the stochastic frontier model. They are the size of the housing unit 
(LOG_AREA) , the distance to central business region (LOG_CBD), and the 
number of shops (SHOP), schools (SCHOOL), hospitals (HOSTIPTAL) and 
subway stations (SUBWAY) whose distances to the next housing unit is less 
than 2 kilometers. B_TYPE1 and B_TYPE2 are used to identify the structure 
of buildings. They are masonry-concrete, reinforced concrete and others. The 
housing units in the sample are re-sale and new sale, in which the new sale 
includes complete sale and pre-sale. SALE1 and RESALE are used to show 
the types of housing transaction. The natural log of housing transaction price 





Table 5-1 List of Variables. 
Variable Definition 
Market Information Level 
RURAL_IMM =1, if a household emigrated from sub-urban areas to the 
central region; otherwise 0. 
RURAL_BIRTH =1, if the head of household was born outside of the central 
region; otherwise 0. 
PRE_STAY =1, if a household still stays in the same district after 
moving; otherwise 0. 
MOVE_1 =1, if the distance between the next housing unit and the 
previous housing unit is less than 1 kilometre; otherwise 0. 
MOVE_12 =1, if the distance between the next housing unit and the 
previous housing unit is more than 1 kilometre and less 
than 2 kilometres; otherwise 0. 
Attributes of Housing Units 
LOG_HP the natural log of the housing transaction price (RMB 
Yuan) 
LOG_AREA the natural log of the size of the housing unit (m2) 
LOG_CBD the natural log of the distance between housing unit and the 
closest central business region (km) 
SHOP the number of shops whose distance to the housing unit is 
less than 2 kilometres 
SCHOOL the number of schools whose distance to the housing unit is 
less than 2 kilometres 
HOSPITAL the number of hospitals whose distance to the housing unit 
is less than 2 kilometres 
SUBWAY the number of subway stations whose distance to the 
housing unit is less than 2 kilometres 
B_TYPE1; B_TYPE2 for masonry-concrete structure, B_TYPE1=0, 
B_TYPE2=0; for reinforced concrete structure, 
B_TYPE1=1, B_TYPE2=0; for others, B_TYPE1=0, 
B_TYPE2=1. 
SALE1; RESALE for completed housing transaction, SALE1=0, RESALE=0; 
for pre-sale transaction, SALE1=1, RESALE=0; for resale 
transaction, SALE1=0, RESALE=1. 
Characteristics of Households 
LOG_AGE the natural log of  the head's age of the household 
LOG_INC the natural log of the monthly income of the household 
(RMB Yuan per month) 
EDU_i, i=1, 2, 3, 4 if the education level of the head of the household is 
graduate degree or above, EDU_1=0, EDU_2=0, 
EDU_3=0, and EDU_4=0; if university, EDU_1=1, 
EDU_2=0, EDU_3=0, and EDU_4=0; if polytechnic, 
EDU_1=0, EDU_2=1, EDU_3=0, and EDU_4=0; if high 
school, EDU_1=0, EDU_2=0, EDU_3=1, and EDU_4=0; 
and if below high school, EDU_1=0, EDU_2=0, 
EDU_3=0, and EDU_4=1. 
JOB_i, i=1, 2, 3, 4 if the occupation of the head of the household is manager, 
JOB_1=0, JOB_2=0, JOB_3=0, and JOB_4=0; if 
government official,  JOB_1=1, JOB_2=0, JOB_3=0, and 
JOB_4=0; if engineer, JOB_1=0, JOB_2=1, JOB_3=0, and 
JOB_4=0; if administration staff, JOB_1=0, JOB_2=0, 
JOB_3=1, and JOB_4=0; and if others JOB_1=0, 
JOB_2=0, JOB_3=0, and JOB_4=1. 
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Table 5-2  Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LOG_HP 13.21 0.50 11.16 14.98 
LOG_AREA 4.47 0.39 3.15 6.84 
LOG_CBD 0.90 0.55 0.00 2.40 
SHOP 1.20 1.34 0.00 5.00 
SCHOOL 2.26 1.97 0.00 7.00 
HOSPITAL 3.20 2.39 0.00 10.00 
SUBWAY 1.24 1.38 0.00 5.00 
LOG_INC 8.55 0.55 7.02 10.31 
LOG_AGE 3.55 0.24 3.00 4.09 
Binary Variables Count Frequency (%) 
RURAL_IMM 1,885 11.45 
RURAL_BIRTH 1,730 10.51 
PRE_STAY 8,549 51.92 
MOVE_1 3,801 23.08 
MOVE_12 3,817 23.18 
B_TYPE1 8,485 51.53 
B_TYPE2 232 1.41 
SALE1 6,916 42 
RESALE 8,742 53.09 
NEW_SALE 7,725 46.91 
EDU_1 7,925 48 
EDU_2 4,125 25 
EDU_3 2,371 14.4 
EDU_4 516 3.13 
JOB_1 3,688 22.4 
JOB_2 2,932 17.81 
JOB_3 4,949 30.05 
JOB_4 1,285 7.8 
Total Obs. 16,467 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 5-1; (2) The dataset is 
provided by Tianjin Academy of Social Science in China, and this study 
considers 16,467 households bought a commercial housing unit in one of the 
six central districts in Tianjin city in 2007. 
 
According to the literature on bargaining power, households’ wealth, and other 
demographic factors influence their bargaining power (Colwell and Munneke, 
2006; Harding, Knight and Sirmans, 2003; Ling, Naranjo, and Petrova, 2013). 
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They could, in turn, affect their search efficiency. To estimate the impacts of 
households’ characteristics on their efficiency in housing choice, this study 
also includes a rich set of households’ characteristics.  Firstly, I consider the 
income of households. In the sample, the average family income is around 
5,200 RMB Yuan per month. It is higher than the number from National 
Bureau of Statistics of P.R. China4. Secondly, the data also provide the age of 
the head of the households. It is about 35 years old averagely among all the 
observations. 
The data also include the education background and the profession of the head 
of households. Four education dummies, EDU_1, EDU_2, EDU_3 and 
EDU_4, are defined to identify the education level of the head of the 
household. If the education level of the head of the household is graduate 
degree or above, EDU_1=0, EDU_2=0, EDU_3=0, and EDU_4=0; if 
university, EDU_1=1, EDU_2=0, EDU_3=0, and EDU_4=0; if polytechnic, 
EDU_1=0, EDU_2=1, EDU_3=0, and EDU_4=0; if high school, EDU_1=0, 
EDU_2=0, EDU_3=1, and EDU_4=0; and if below high school, EDU_1=0, 
EDU_2=0, EDU_3=0, and EDU_4=1. Four job dummies, JOB_1, JOB_2, 
JOB_3 and JOB_4 are used to define the occupation of the head of the 
household. If the occupation of the head of the household is manager, 
JOB_1=0, JOB_2=0, JOB_3=0, and JOB_4=0; if government official,  
JOB_1=1, JOB_2=0, JOB_3=0, and JOB_4=0; if engineer, JOB_1=0, 
JOB_2=1, JOB_3=0, and JOB_4=0; if administration staff, JOB_1=0, 
                                                 
4
 National Bureau of Statistics of P.R. China show the 2007 average workers’ income 
in Tianjin is 1,119 RMB Yuan per month and the average number of workers in each 




JOB_2=0, JOB_3=1, and JOB_4=0; and if others JOB_1=0, JOB_2=0, 
JOB_3=0, and JOB_4=1. These characteristics of households are considered 
to proxy the opportunity cost of households or bargaining power in housing 
search and impact their performance in the housing market. 
5.4 Empirical Results 
The stochastic frontier model as shown in equations (5.3)-(5.6) is estimated 
based on the housing transaction dataset in Tianjin city in 2007. 
Firstly, I only consider the impacts of market information level on the housing 
search efficiency. The results are shown in Table 5-3. The efficient component 
𝑢𝑖 in Table 5-3  is assumed to be a random variable from a nonnegative half 
normal distribution. It does not only include the coefficients on hedonic 
factors of housing units and the standard deviation of residuals, but also 
reports the coefficients in the standard deviation function of the efficient 





Table 5-3 Stochastic Frontier Model of Housing Choice. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LOG_AREA 0.942*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.942*** 0.943*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LOG_CBD -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SHOP 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SCHOOL 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HOSPITAL -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SALE1 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
RESALE -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.208*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
B_TYPE1 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
B-TYPE2 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CONSTANT 9.164*** 9.156*** 9.156*** 9.160*** 9.163*** 9.158*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
LNSIG2U       
CONSTANT -3.361*** -3.339*** -3.340*** -3.523*** -3.435*** -3.513*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.043) (0.038) (0.042) 
RURAL_IMM  -0.240***     
 
 (0.053)     
RURAL_BIRTH   -0.249***    
 
  (0.055)    
PRE_STAY    0.273***   
 
   (0.033)   
MOVE_1     0.249*** 0.324*** 
 
    (0.037) (0.039) 
MOVE_12      0.224*** 
 
     (0.040) 
LNSIG2V -4.152*** -4.152*** -4.152*** -4.149*** -4.148*** -4.146*** 
 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Obs. 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 
Wald Chi-sq 129731.77 129670.12 129684.63 129243.45 129177.13 129404.90 
Log likelihood 6118.35 6128.92 6128.89 6154.44 6141.54 6157.71 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 5-1; (2) The dependent variable is LOG_HP; 
(3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (5) All the Wald 
Chi statistics are significant at 1% level; (6) Software package: STATA. 
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Column (1) does not include the variation of households, so the standard 
deviation of efficient component is assumed to be constant. The coefficients 
on housing unit variables show the contributions of housing attributes to the 
housing price. Naturally, the housing price is positively related to the unit size. 
Households like to live near the central business district. They also prefer to 
choose housing units which have shops, schools and public transportation 
stations near them. It is also found that households like pre-sale and reinforced 
concrete structure housing unit in Tianjin housing market. But Chinese 
households dislike their housing units to be close to hospitals. All the signs of 
coefficients are consistent with the institution of the housing market. It is also 
consistent with the results from the hedonic regression as shown in Chapter 4. 
Column (2) to (6) use the proxy of market information level of households to 
predict the standard deviation of the efficient component. In the stochastic 
frontier model, the efficient component can be understood as the surplus value 
of housing utility subtracting its transaction price. Note that the efficient 
component in the model is a random variable. High standard deviation of 
random efficient component implies the household has a high probability to 
have high value of the efficient component 𝑢𝑖 , i.e. the household is more 
efficient to secure a good deal. In the context of this chapter, better informed 
households with the ability to secure a good deal are not directly observed in 
the sample, but they are more likely to stay in such a housing unit. I use the 
variation of households to proxy their information access ability, and test the 
impacts on their housing search efficiency. 
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Column (2) uses RURAL_IMM to predict the standard deviation of the 
efficient component. The coefficient on RURAL_IMM is significantly 
negative. It implies that households emigrated from outside of central region 
have low probability to buy a housing unit with more surplus.  Column (3) 
considers the heads of households who were born outside of the central region. 
The coefficient on RURAL_BIRTH is also significantly negative. It implies 
that households whose heads were born outside of the central city also have 
low probability to find a housing unit with high surplus. Households who 
emigrate from the rural area and whose heads were born in the rural area are 
relatively less efficient in securing a good deal. Column (4) to (6) use the 
living history as the measurement of information level in the regressions. The 
coefficients on PRE_STAY, MOVE_1 and MOVE_12 are all significantly 
positive. If households move to the place near their previous housing units, 
they know more information on their neighborhoods. Households are more 
likely to perform efficient in securing a good deal. The results in column (6) 
also reflect the decay of information with the distance to the current living 
place. The results are consistent with the hedonic regression in Chapter 4. 
Households moving within 1 kilometer are even more efficient than 
households who move between 1kilometer and 2 kilometer. The coefficients 
on the characteristics of housing units in Column (2) to (6) are very close to 
the results in Column (1). These estimations are robust and stable. 
Note that the efficiency of housing choice is defined as the probability to 
secure a good deal. Table 5-3 shows that households with high information 
level perform more efficient in the housing market. They have a higher 
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probability to secure a good deal. 
I also calculate the probability for heterogeneous households to find a good 
deal based on the estimation results in Table 5-3. Table 5-4 shows the 
probability of different groups of households who can secure a deal in the 
housing search with the housing price equal to or lower than 90%, 95% and 
99% of the maximum frontier price, respectively. Compared to their 
counterpart, rural immigrants have lower probability to secure a good deal. 
The probability for rural immigrants to find a housing unit with the price equal 
to or lower than 90% of the maximum price is 52.82%, but 57.59% for the 
counterpart. The probability for rural immigrants to find a housing unit with 
the price equal to or lower than 95% of the maximum price is 75.88%, while it 
is 78.54% for the counterpart. The probability for rural immigrants to find a 
housing unit with the price equal to or lower than 99% of the maximum price 
is 95.20%, but 95.74% for the counterpart. The group with the head of 
household was born in rural area has the similar performance in the housing 
market as the group of rural-to-urban immigrants. Compared to their 
counterparts, households who have previously stayed in the same region of the 
next housing unit, and who have moved within 1 kilometer or between 1 and 2 
kilometers, have higher probability to secure a housing unit with the price 
equal to or lower than 99% of the maximum price. Similar results are found 
for the housing price which is 95% and 90%. Among them, households who 
have moved within 1 kilometer have the highest probability to secure a good 
deal. In particular, the probability for them to find a housing unit with the 
price equal to or lower than 90%, 95% and 99% is 60.43%, 80.08%, and 
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96.06%, respectively. Note that the average housing unit price in my sample is 
around 550,000 RMB Yuan. If households can purchase a housing unit at 99% 
of the market price, it implies they can save 5,500 RMB Yuan at least. 
Table 5-4 Probability for Heterogeneous Households to Secure a Good 
Deal. 
  90% 95% 99% 
Rural_IMM 52.82% 75.88% 95.20% 
Others 57.59% 78.54% 95.74% 
Rural_Birth 52.61% 75.76% 95.18% 
Others 57.57% 78.53% 95.74% 
Pre_stay 59.26% 79.45% 95.93% 
Others 53.97% 76.53% 95.33% 
Move_1 60.43% 80.08% 96.06% 
Others 55.73% 77.51% 95.54% 
Move_12 58.53% 79.05% 95.85% 
Others 54.17% 76.64% 95.36% 
Notes: This table shows the probability of different groups of households who 
can find a deal in the housing search with the housing price equal to or lower 
than 90%, 95% and 99% of the maximum frontier price, respectively. 
 
Households’ other characteristics can impact the efficiency of housing choice 
either through the channel of information level, opportunity cost, and 
bargaining power. According to the literature on bargaining power, 
households’ characteristics have influence on their bargaining power. 
Generally, households with higher bargaining power perform more efficient in 
the housing market. I include the households’ characteristics, such as age, 
income, education and occupation in the regression of efficiency term to 
observe the impacts of households’ characteristics on their search efficiency in 
housing market. Table 5-5 shows the result. 
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Table 5-5 Stochastic Frontier Model of Housing Choice with 
Characteristics of Households. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOG_AREA 0.896*** 0.895*** 0.896*** 0.895*** 0.896*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LOG_CBD -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SHOP 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SCHOOL 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HOSPITAL -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SALE1 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
RESALE -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.205*** -0.205*** -0.205*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
B_TYPE1 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
B-TYPE2 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CONSTANT 9.350*** 9.351*** 9.350*** 9.354*** 9.350*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
LNSIG2U      
CONSTANT 3.867*** 3.868*** 3.689*** 3.889*** 3.740*** 
 (0.453) (0.454) (0.453) (0.461) (0.455) 
RURAL_IMM -0.219***     
 
(0.065)     
RURAL_BIRTH  -0.215***    
 
 (0.068)    
PRE_STAY   0.257***   
 
  (0.041)   
MOVE_1    0.248*** 0.310*** 
 
   (0.046) (0.049) 
MOVE_12     0.191*** 
 
    (0.050) 
LOG_INC -1.179*** -1.180*** -1.173*** -1.193*** -1.173*** 
 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) 
LOG_AGE 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.556*** 0.561*** 0.546*** 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.092) 
EDU_1 0.134 0.134 0.135 0.138 0.127 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.094) (0.091) 
EDU_2 0.322*** 0.322*** 0.321*** 0.328*** 0.312*** 
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 (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.100) (0.098) 
EDU_3 0.550*** 0.550*** 0.542*** 0.556*** 0.536*** 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.107) (0.105) 
EDU_4 0.443*** 0.444*** 0.450*** 0.460*** 0.444*** 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.137) (0.135) 
JOB_1 -0.020 -0.020 -0.026 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) 
JOB_2 0.101 0.101 0.103 0.108 0.102 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) 
JOB_3 0.153** 0.152** 0.144** 0.150** 0.144** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) 
JOB_4 0.142* 0.143* 0.137 0.148* 0.142* 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) 
LNSIG2V -3.999*** -3.998*** -3.999*** -3.991*** -3.997*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Obs. 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 
Wald Chi-sq 91000.94 90985.04 91577.55 91293.46 91290.02 
Log likelihood 6601.50 6600.84 6616.34 6610.67 6618.28 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 5-1; (2) The dependent 
variable is LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (5) All the Wald Chi statistics are significant at 1% level; 
(6) Software package: STATA. 
 
Table 5-5 shows that the indicators of market information level still have the 
same signs as shown in Table 5-3 after considering more factors. Market 
information is important for households to find a housing unit with higher 
surplus after controlling households’ other characteristics. Table 5-5 also 
shows that the coefficient on LOG_AGE is significantly positive in the 
estimation, which indicates that the older households have more social 
experience and information and tend to buy housing units with high surplus 
value. The coefficient on LOG_INC is significantly negative, which implies 
that households with higher income enjoy fewer premiums in housing market. 
It is possibly due to lack of motivation for high income households to take the 
trouble to search hard for a higher surplus housing unit. Counter-intuitively, 
this study finds that households with lower education are more likely to find a 
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good deal. However, it is consistent with the result in the research on the 
bargaining power. Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans (2003) find that 
households who have higher education have significant and negative 
bargaining coefficients. They explain that education level is likely to be 
strongly and positively correlated with unobserved wealth. Consistent with the 
presence of concave utility functions and diminishing marginal utility of 
wealth, wealthy individuals demand good housing units but prefer not to 
expend the time and energy needed to bargain aggressively to get the good 
deal. This is also the reason that lower educated households can find good deal 
in my research. Considering the occupations of households, households whose 
heads are administration staff are more efficient. 
I also calculate the probability for heterogeneous households to find a good 
deal based on the estimation results in Table 5-5. The probability of 
heterogeneous households who can secure a deal in the housing search with 
the housing price equal to or lower than 90%, 95% and 99% of the maximum 
frontier price is shown in Table 5-6, Table 5-7, and Table 5-8, respectively. 
The baseline probability is calculated based on households with mean value of 
LOG_INC=8.55, mean value of LOG_AGE=3.55, and all the dummies=0 
(The education level is graduate degree or above; and the occupation is 
manager). Info Level Dummy for Column (1) to (5) is RURAL_IMM, 
RURAL_BIRTH, PRE_STAY, MOVE_1, and MOVE_12, respectively, which 
is corresponding to Column (1) to (5) in Table 5-5. The probability 




Table 5-6 Probability for Heterogeneous Households to Secure a Good 
Deal with Housing Price Equal to or Lower Than 90% of the Maximum 
Frontier Price. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline 38.94% 38.76% 34.98% 36.10% 35.35% 
Info Level Dummy 33.69% 33.61% 41.09% 41.97% 39.91% 
LOG_INC 34.66% 34.45% 30.80% 31.44% 31.17% 
LOG_AGE 69.42% 69.31% 66.76% 67.56% 66.84% 
EDU_1 42.09% 41.91% 38.21% 39.39% 38.39% 
EDU_2 46.38% 46.21% 42.58% 43.82% 42.73% 
EDU_3 51.33% 51.17% 47.58% 48.91% 47.79% 
EDU_4 49.04% 48.90% 45.53% 46.80% 45.74% 
JOB_1 38.47% 38.29% 34.35% 35.60% 34.85% 
JOB_2 41.32% 41.14% 37.45% 38.68% 37.80% 
JOB_3 42.53% 42.33% 38.43% 39.68% 38.79% 
JOB_4 42.27% 42.12% 38.26% 39.63% 38.75% 
Notes: (1) This table shows the probability of households with different 
characteristics who can secure a deal in the housing search with the housing price 
equal to or lower than 90% of the maximum frontier price; (2) The baseline 
probability is calculated based on households with mean value of LOG_INC=8.55, 
mean value of LOG_AGE=3.55, and all the dummies=0; (3) Info Level Dummy for 
Column (1) to (5) is RURAL_IMM, RURAL_BIRTH, PRE_STAY, MOVE_1, and 
MOVE_12, respectively. 
Table 5-7 Probability for Heterogeneous Households to Secure a Good 
Deal with Housing Price Equal to or Lower Than 95% of the Maximum 
Frontier Price. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline 67.52% 67.41% 64.90% 65.65% 65.15% 
Info Level Dummy 64.02% 63.96% 68.89% 69.44% 68.14% 
LOG_INC 64.68% 64.54% 61.97% 62.43% 62.24% 
LOG_AGE 84.82% 84.76% 83.44% 83.86% 83.48% 
EDU_1 69.52% 69.41% 67.05% 67.81% 67.16% 
EDU_2 72.13% 72.03% 69.82% 70.59% 69.92% 
EDU_3 75.03% 74.94% 72.85% 73.63% 72.97% 
EDU_4 73.71% 73.62% 71.62% 72.39% 71.75% 
JOB_1 67.21% 67.10% 64.47% 65.32% 64.81% 
JOB_2 69.04% 68.93% 66.55% 67.35% 66.78% 
JOB_3 69.79% 69.67% 67.19% 67.99% 67.43% 
JOB_4 69.63% 69.54% 67.08% 67.96% 67.40% 
Notes: (1) This table shows the probability of households with different 
characteristics who can secure a deal in the housing search with the housing price 
equal to or lower than 95% of the maximum frontier price; (2) The baseline 
probability is calculated based on households with mean value of LOG_INC=8.55, 
mean value of LOG_AGE=3.55, and all the dummies=0; (3) Info Level Dummy for 




Table 5-8 Probability for Heterogeneous Households to Secure a Good 
Deal with Housing Price Equal to or Lower Than 99% of the Maximum 
Frontier Price. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline 93.46% 93.43% 92.89% 93.06% 92.95% 
Info Level Dummy 92.70% 92.69% 93.75% 93.86% 93.59% 
LOG_INC 92.85% 92.82% 92.25% 92.36% 92.31% 
LOG_AGE 97.01% 97.00% 96.73% 96.82% 96.74% 
EDU_1 93.88% 93.86% 93.36% 93.52% 93.38% 
EDU_2 94.43% 94.41% 93.94% 94.10% 93.96% 
EDU_3 95.03% 95.01% 94.58% 94.74% 94.60% 
EDU_4 94.75% 94.74% 94.32% 94.48% 94.35% 
JOB_1 93.39% 93.37% 92.80% 92.98% 92.87% 
JOB_2 93.78% 93.75% 93.25% 93.42% 93.30% 
JOB_3 93.94% 93.91% 93.39% 93.56% 93.44% 
JOB_4 93.90% 93.88% 93.36% 93.55% 93.43% 
Notes: (1) This table shows the probability of households with different 
characteristics who can secure a deal in the housing search with the housing price 
equal to or lower than 99% of the maximum frontier price; (2) The baseline 
probability is calculated based on households with mean value of LOG_INC=8.55, 
mean value of LOG_AGE=3.55, and all the dummies=0; (3) Info Level Dummy for 
Column (1) to (5) is RURAL_IMM, RURAL_BIRTH, PRE_STAY, MOVE_1, and 
MOVE_12, respectively. 
 
Table 5-6, Column (1) shows the probability for the baseline household, who 
is not rural immigrant, who has the mean income and age in the sample, and 
whose head’s education level is graduate degree and above, and the occupation 
is manager, to secure a housing unit with the price equal to or lower than 90% 
of the maximum price is 38.94%. The rural immigrants have lower probability 
of 33.69%, which is 5.25% (38.94%-33.69%) lower than the baseline 
household. Compared to the baseline household, if households have 1% 
increase in their income, the probability to secure a housing unit with the price 
equal to or lower than 90% of the maximum price decreases by 4.28% 
(38.94%-34.66%). If households’ head is 1% older than the mean age (i.e., 
around 3.5 years older than the baseline household with 35 years old), the 
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probability increases by 30.48% (69.42%-38.94%). Compared to the baseline 
household, whose head has education level of graduate degree or above, the 
households with relatively lower education level have a higher probability to 
secure a good deal. Especially, the households, whose head has education level 
of high school, have the probability of 51.33% to secure a housing unit with 
the price equal to or lower than 90% of the maximum price, which is 12.39% 
(51.33%-38.94%) higher than the baseline household. Compared to the 
baseline household, whose head is a manager, the households with other 
occupations, except government official, have a higher probability to secure a 
good deal. The households, whose heads are administration staff, have the 
probability of 42.53% to secure a good deal, which is 3.59% (42.53%-38.94%) 
higher than the baseline household.  
The results corresponding to “Info Level Dummy” in Table 5-6 Column (1) to 
(5) show similar results in Table 5-4. Compared to their counterpart, rural 
immigrants have 5.25% lower probability to secure a good deal with the 
housing price equal to or lower than 90% of the maximum price. The group 
with the head of the household was born in rural area has the similar 
performance in the housing market as the group of rural-to-urban immigrants, 
which also has 5.15% lower probability to secure a good deal. Households 
who have previously stayed in the same district of the next housing unit, and 
who have moved within 1 kilometer or between 1 and 2 kilometers, have 
higher probability to secure a good deal. They have the probability of 6.11%, 
5.87%, and 4.56%, respectively, higher than their counterparts. The results of 
the variation of other variables in Column (2) to (6) show a similar pattern to 
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the results in Column (1).   
As shown in Table 5-7 and Table 5-8, the probabilities of heterogeneous 
households who can secure a deal in the housing search with the housing price 
equal to or lower than 95% and 99% of the maximum frontier price show the 
similar trend as those who can secure a deal with housing price equal to or 
lower than 90% of the maximum frontier price. 
Overall, the empirical results imply that households with high information 
level perform more efficiently in the housing market, and they have around 
5% higher probability to secure a housing unit with the price equal to or lower 
than 90% of the maximum price. Households with lower opportunity cost, 
who are young, less educated and with low level occupation and low income, 
perform better and more efficiently in the housing market. This type of 
households is willing to spend more time on the housing search due to their 
lower opportunity cost. In addition, they are relatively not wealthy and thus 
bargain more aggressively. Hence, they are more likely to secure a good deal 
with around 4%-30% higher in the probability comparing to their counterparts. 
Thus the two detailed research questions are answered with the empirical 
results. 
5.5 Robustness Test 
I also do the robustness test for my model from two aspects. Firstly, I split my 
data into two subgroups. One is the group with all resale transactions. The 
results are shown in Table 5-9. The other includes new sale transactions. Table 
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5-10 reports the results. Each group has about half of the total observations.  
The coefficients on the housing unit attributes show the same sign with my 
full sample regression. 
Comparing the impacts of market information level on the efficiency of 
housing choice, they are less significant in the resale market than the new sale 
market. For the resale transactions, China households often choose a real 
estate agent to help them search next housing unit and it can help them to 
reduce the information difference between their counterparts and themselves. 
Thus, the less informed households perform relatively more efficiently in the 
resale market than in the new sale market. 
For the characteristics of households, income and age are significant to 
housing choice performance in both resale and new sale subgroups. 
Households with low education and low level occupation perform more 
efficiently than others in new sale subgroups. They are willing to bear more 
opportunity cost on housing search. With the help of housing agents, 
households in the resale housing market can mitigate their inefficiency due to 
weak bargaining power. Thus households with different education background 
and different occupations have similar efficiency in securing a good deal. But 
households who have the education background of graduate or above and 
households who are managers are still relatively less efficient. Possible 
reasons could be most of them are too busy and have high opportunity cost to 
do the housing search or bargain aggressively. 
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Table 5-9 Stochastic Frontier Model of Housing Choice with 
Characteristics of Households for Resale Subsample. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOG_AREA 0.952*** 0.952*** 0.953*** 0.952*** 0.953*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
LOG_CBD -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SHOP 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SCHOOL 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HOSPITAL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
B_TYPE1 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
B-TYPE2 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
CONSTANT 8.835*** 8.836*** 8.836*** 8.838*** 8.836*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
LNSIG2U      
CONSTANT 4.995*** 4.992*** 4.884*** 4.906*** 4.898*** 
 (0.926) (0.927) (0.914) (0.904) (0.910) 
RURAL_IMM -0.053     
 
(0.128)     
RURAL_BIRTH  -0.010    
 
 (0.131)    
PRE_STAY   0.280***   
 
  (0.082)   
MOVE_1    0.187** 0.242*** 
 
   (0.084) (0.092) 
MOVE_12     0.151 
 
    (0.097) 
LOG_INC -1.630*** -1.632*** -1.611*** -1.597*** -1.599*** 
 
(0.133) (0.134) (0.127) (0.126) (0.128) 
LOG_AGE 0.558*** 0.561*** 0.499*** 0.510*** 0.495*** 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.181) (0.181) (0.182) 
EDU_1 1.178*** 1.181*** 1.183*** 1.142*** 1.148*** 
 (0.399) (0.400) (0.392) (0.382) (0.385) 
EDU_2 1.769*** 1.771*** 1.770*** 1.732*** 1.734*** 
 (0.418) (0.419) (0.410) (0.400) (0.403) 
EDU_3 1.861*** 1.864*** 1.860*** 1.818*** 1.821*** 
 (0.426) (0.427) (0.418) (0.408) (0.411) 
EDU_4 1.691*** 1.695*** 1.669*** 1.655*** 1.653*** 
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 (0.439) (0.440) (0.431) (0.422) (0.425) 
JOB_1 0.256* 0.255* 0.262* 0.260* 0.268* 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.153) (0.152) (0.153) 
JOB_2 0.478*** 0.478*** 0.474*** 0.478*** 0.480*** 
 (0.164) (0.164) (0.163) (0.161) (0.163) 
JOB_3 0.387** 0.387** 0.388*** 0.392*** 0.396*** 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.150) (0.148) (0.150) 
JOB_4 0.535*** 0.535*** 0.531*** 0.532*** 0.541*** 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.177) (0.175) (0.177) 
LNSIG2V -3.950*** -3.950*** -3.955*** -3.957*** -3.955*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Obs. 8,742 8,742 8,742 8,742 8,742 
Wald Chi-sq 41282.85 41281.64 41489.32 41493.22 41415.89 
Log likelihood 4147.59 4147.50 4154.02 4150.09 4151.39 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 5-1; (2) The dependent 
variable is LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (5) All the Wald Chi statistics are significant at 1% level; 





Table 5-10 Stochastic Frontier Model of Housing Choice with 
Characteristics of Households for New Sale Subsample. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOG_AREA 0.831*** 0.831*** 0.832*** 0.829*** 0.832*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
LOG_CBD -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SHOP 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SCHOOL 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HOSPITAL -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SALE1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
B_TYPE1 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
B-TYPE2 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
CONSTANT 9.690*** 9.690*** 9.691*** 9.700*** 9.687*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
LNSIG2U      
CONSTANT 5.398*** 5.364*** 5.121*** 5.355*** 5.203*** 
 (0.570) (0.569) (0.564) (0.574) (0.570) 
RURAL_IMM -0.343***     
 
(0.078)     
RURAL_BIRTH  -0.372***    
 
 (0.083)    
PRE_STAY   0.295***   
 
  (0.049)   
MOVE_1    0.383*** 0.462*** 
 
   (0.062) (0.065) 
MOVE_12     0.255*** 
 
    (0.059) 
LOG_INC -1.165*** -1.164*** -1.141*** -1.167*** -1.150*** 
 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) 
LOG_AGE 0.377*** 0.385*** 0.351*** 0.363*** 0.343*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) 
EDU_1 -0.061 -0.059 -0.059 -0.079 -0.076 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
EDU_2 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.034 -0.033 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) 
EDU_3 0.424*** 0.424*** 0.411*** 0.406*** 0.407*** 
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 (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) 
EDU_4 0.382** 0.371** 0.429** 0.392** 0.410** 
 (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.186) (0.186) 
JOB_1 -0.021 -0.022 -0.019 -0.015 -0.009 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) 
JOB_2 -0.045 -0.046 -0.048 -0.048 -0.048 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) 
JOB_3 0.149** 0.150** 0.132** 0.134** 0.131** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) 
JOB_4 -0.080 -0.081 -0.078 -0.071 -0.073 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) 
LNSIG2V -4.158*** -4.158*** -4.164*** -4.150*** -4.155*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Obs. 7,725 7,725 7,725 7,725 7,725 
Wald Chi-sq 17722.17 17749.20 18006.06 17906.55 18014.84 
Log likelihood 2941.43 2942.01 2949.55 2950.88 2960.42 
Notes: (1) All variables are defined in Table 5-1; (2) The dependent variable is 
LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; (5) All the Wald Chi statistics are significant at 1% level; (6) Software 
package: STATA. 
 
Note that the actual distribution of the housing surplus value is unobservable. 
Both the regressions shown above assume the random efficient component is 
half normal distributed. As a robustness test, I also use the exponential 
distribution of the random efficient component to do the regression. Table 5-11 
and Table 5-12 show the results. Overall, the signs of all coefficients are the 
same as those in the regression with half normal distributed random efficient 
component. Households with more market information are more likely to 
purchase a housing unit with more surplus value. Households who have low 
income, who are young and low educated are more efficient in the housing 
market. The occupation dummies in Table 5-12 are not significant. It implies 
that occupation has relatively weaker impacts on search efficiency.  
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Table 5-11 Stochastic Frontier Model with Exponential Distributed 
Efficient Component. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOG_AREA 0.948*** 0.948*** 0.947*** 0.946*** 0.947*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LOG_CBD -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SHOP 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SCHOOL 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HOSPITAL -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SALE1 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
RESALE -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.217*** -0.218*** -0.217*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
B_TYPE1 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
B-TYPE2 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CONSTANT 9.097*** 9.097*** 9.100*** 9.103*** 9.099*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
LNSIG2U      
CONSTANT -4.536*** -4.537*** -4.758*** -4.639*** -4.743*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.044) (0.049) 
RURAL_IMM -0.309***     
 
(0.077)     
RURAL_BIRTH  -0.324***    
 
 (0.081)    
PRE_STAY   0.338***   
 
  (0.047)   
MOVE_1    0.268*** 0.369*** 
 
   (0.053) (0.056) 
MOVE_12     0.304*** 
 
    (0.057) 
LNSIG2V -4.059*** -4.059*** -4.059*** -4.057*** -4.057*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Obs. 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 
Wald Chi-sq 137484.15 137493.83 136798.73 136682.15 136889.44 
Log likelihood 6400.37 6400.53 6418.83 6404.96 6419.45 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 5-1; (2) The dependent 
variable is LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (5) All the Wald Chi statistics are significant at 1% level; 
(6) Software package: STATA. 
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Table 5-12 Stochastic Frontier Model with Exponential Distributed 
Efficient Component and Households’ Characteristics. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOG_AREA 0.912*** 0.912*** 0.912*** 0.911*** 0.912*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LOG_CBD -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SHOP 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SCHOOL 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HOSPITAL -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SALE1 0.012** 0.013** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
RESALE -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.214*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
B_TYPE1 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
B-TYPE2 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CONSTANT 9.257*** 9.257*** 9.258*** 9.261*** 9.257*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
LNSIG2U      
CONSTANT 3.495*** 3.490*** 3.281*** 3.463*** 3.325*** 
 (0.573) (0.573) (0.572) (0.576) (0.572) 
RURAL_IMM -0.285***     
 
(0.082)     
RURAL_BIRTH  -0.286***    
 
 (0.085)    
PRE_STAY   0.284***   
 
  (0.051)   
MOVE_1    0.226*** 0.305*** 
 
   (0.057) (0.061) 
MOVE_12     0.243*** 
 
    (0.062) 
LOG_INC -1.266*** -1.265*** -1.259*** -1.273*** -1.256*** 
 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) 
LOG_AGE 0.657*** 0.656*** 0.649*** 0.656*** 0.638*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
EDU_1 0.049 0.049 0.052 0.042 0.041 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.104) 
EDU_2 0.206* 0.205* 0.201* 0.195* 0.189* 
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 (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) (0.110) 
EDU_3 0.464*** 0.463*** 0.457*** 0.455*** 0.446*** 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.118) 
EDU_4 0.348** 0.347** 0.356** 0.348** 0.342** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.163) (0.162) 
JOB_1 -0.079 -0.079 -0.085 -0.080 -0.078 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
JOB_2 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.008 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
JOB_3 0.112 0.112 0.100 0.106 0.100 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
JOB_4 0.085 0.087 0.078 0.086 0.081 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
LNSIG2V -4.035*** -4.035*** -4.035*** -4.031*** -4.034*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Obs. 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 16,467 
Wald Chi-sq 93959.24 93898.22 94193.06 93539.73 94300.54 
Log likelihood 6755.98 6755.58 6765.57 6757.55 6765.26 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 5-1; (2) The dependent 
variable is LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (5) All the Wald Chi statistics are significant at 1% level; 
(6) Software package: STATA. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
With the frictions of imperfect information, search cost, and bargaining power 
in the housing market, the housing choice of a household is a search process. 
Home buyers with heterogeneous characteristics perform differently in the 
housing search. In this study, I propose to use the search efficiency to measure 
their performance, where the search efficiency is defined as the probability of 
securing a good deal. With the housing transaction data from Tianjin, China, I 
use a modified stochastic frontier model to conduct an empirical analysis on 
how the characteristics of households impact on their search efficiency in the 
housing market. I assume that the information level of a home buyer for a 
housing market is accumulated through living in the market. It is identified by 
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the historical location information of households. The empirical results show 
that households perform more efficiently in their familiar locations; and they 
have higher probability to secure a good deal. 
I also show that the opportunity cost and bargaining power of households 
influence the efficiency of housing search. Households who are young, less 
educated with low income and low level occupation are willing to spend more 
time and bargain more aggressively on the housing market due to low 
opportunity cost. They are more likely to secure a housing unit with relatively 
low price. The probability to secure a good deal corresponding to each 
characteristic of households is also calculated. Comparing to their 
counterparts, they can enjoy around 4%-30% higher probability in securing a 
housing unit with the price equal to or lower than 90% of the maximum price. 
This study enriches the literature on information level and bargaining power in 
housing search. First, with the modified stochastic frontier model, it can 
potentially correct the bias of hedonic price model with the omission of the 
impacts of buyers on the transactions (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2012; Lambson, 
McQueen, and Slade, 2004; Turnbull and Sirmans, 1993). Second, ignoring 
the stochastic nature of housing search, the previous literature on information 
level and search cost, and bargaining power all consider the premium as a fix 
value for all the households within the same group. In this research, the 
random component in stochastic frontier model is used to proxy the efficiency 
of housing search, which shows strong correlation with households’ 
characteristics. It reflects the stochastic nature of housing search process, and 
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the probability to secure a good deal for different households is calculated. 
This research contributes to the literature of housing search by adding the 
heterogeneity of households into the efficiency of housing choice. It also 
provides evidence to the bargaining power literature that households’ 
characteristics do have significant influence on the housing price. In this 
sense, it can add value to the research on housing price index. The observed 
housing price is randomly determined by the performance of households in 
housing market and this component cannot be explained by the estimation 
errors in the standard hedonic model. The characteristics of households are 
added to the pricing model and correct the bias raised from the heterogeneity 
of housing buyers. 
In Chapter 4, I study the impact of households’ information on housing choice. 
In Chapter 5, I consider households’ heterogeneous characteristics in the 
research of the efficiency of housing choice. The studies assume that the 
economic behaviors of households are independent and rational. The 
distinction of housing choice behaviors in my sample arises from the different 
backgrounds of households. In a simple term, households’ housing choice in a 
given set is a function of their characteristics as arguments. However, people 
interact with each other. The decision of individuals is not independent. It can 
be a collective behavior and bounded by the social interactions. Households 
are always surrounded by neighbors, because their homes are in a 
neighborhood. Their economic choice can be affected by their neighbors, 
which researchers address as neighborhood effect. In the following chapter, I 
115 
 
study the neighborhood social interactions on residential location choice.
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Chapter 6 Neighborhood Social Interactions and Housing 
Location Choice 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I study the third research question: Do the current neighbors 
influence a household’s destination neighborhood choice? Households are 
naturally aggregated into certain groups, as all of them have a current place to 
live when they choose to buy a housing unit in another place. Their housing 
choice behavior can be affected by their peers. Residential location choice 
with social interactions has attracted interests in research from different 
viewpoints (Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 2009; Bayer and Timmins, 2007; 
Ioannides and Zabel, 2008). (See Section 1.1 in Chapter 1 for a description of 
the research problem and Section 2.2 in Chapter 2 for a detailed review of the 
literature). They focus on the contextual interactions among those who make 
the same neighborhood choice, however the impact of the current neighbors is 
out of consideration. Not only the housing demand in terms of maintenance, 
renovation and etc. (Ioannides and Zabel, 2003, 2008), but also the destination 
neighborhood choice of a household, can be affected by its neighbors’ 
corresponding housing choice. My study aims to fill in this literature gap by 
providing the empirical evidence of the impact of social interactions in the 
current neighborhood on the next residential location choice. Specifically, the 
research questions are (1) Does a household’s current neighbors influence its 
destination neighborhood choice? (2) Which type of households can be 




I propose a collective choice model to show that the destination neighborhood 
choice of a home buyer is impacted by his current neighbors. This model 
assumes that households from the same neighborhoods know each other and 
they discuss their next housing choice decisions before they move out. Since 
the social interactions in a home buyer’s current neighborhood are valued by 
him, he considers the behaviors of his current neighbors when he chooses his 
destination neighborhood. So the housing choice is not independent among 
individual households, but a collective behavior. In the model, the social 
interactions are embedded into the choice of households and it is a collective 
model. 
I follow the methodology proposed by Bayer and Timmins (2005, 2007) to 
estimate the impacts of social interactions on neighborhood choice with the 
consideration of this collective behavior. An iterated conditional logit (c-logit) 
estimation is implemented to ensure the system converge to a fixed point 
where the real social interactions is equal to the model’s prediction. This 
methodology is first implemented by the recent paper of Fu and Liao (2013). It 
focuses on the education sorting among US metropolitan areas, using a large 
sample of Census micro data. The location choice of individuals by different 
education and age groups among US metropolitan areas is estimated based on 
this methodology that allows them to creatively exam both location wage 
premium and amenity premium instead of only wage premium and wage 
growth in the previous literature. The structural estimation framework allows 
to estimate the collective behaviors of neighbors at a fixed point of the 
economic system, and also to take care of the endogenous effect, contextual 
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effect and correlation effect of social interactions. 
The social interactions in the theoretical model are assumed to take place 
among neighbors who know each other. Given the centralized housing system 
in China, I also assume households who have lived in the same current 
neighborhood know each other. This assumption is consistent with the 
situation in the transition housing market in China. In my sample, most of the 
initial neighborhoods are the housing supplied by employers. Before the 
households move out in 2007, the households usually had lived there for a 
long time, and they are most probably colleagues and friends, due to the SOE 
housing system. However, empirically, it is still difficult to measure social 
interactions, because social interactions among households are unobservable 
to researchers. So the ratio of the number of households who move from the 
current neighborhood to the same destination neighborhood to the total 
number of households who move out from the current neighborhood in one 
year is used as the proxy of neighborhood social interactions. 
With the data from Tianjin China, I define neighborhoods based on geographic 
information and find that households do value their neighbors’ neighborhood 
choice decision, when they make their own decision. To identify which type of 
households can be influenced more by their current neighbors when they 
choose their destination neighborhood, the different characteristics of 
households are also included in my model, because different households value 
social interactions differently. In the empirical results, the preference of 
households with different age, income and education level are observed over 
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different attributes of neighborhood. Generally, households who are old, with 
high education level and high income are more likely to choose the same 
destination neighborhoods as their current neighbors. They highly value the 
social interactions comparing with other groups of households. 
My results also show that households have distinguished preference for other 
attributes of neighborhoods. Old, high educated households with high income 
prefer neighborhood with good amenity, and old, low educated households 
with low income pay attention to the accessibility of the neighborhood. Bayer 
and his co-authors (Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 2009; Bayer and Timmins, 
2007) address the characteristics of households as the driving force of sorting 
through the channel of exogenous or contextual interactions, i.e., the 
propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with exogenous 
characteristics of the group members. These findings in my research imply a 
sorting pattern of households distributed over different neighborhoods.  
Overall, the findings show the significant influence of neighborhood social 
interactions on the housing location choice decision, which meet the third 
objective of this dissertation, and provide another driving force of sorting, 
which I name as “friend sorting” – households have the propensity to move in 
a neighborhood where their friends have moved in. 
The remaining part of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the theoretical framework of the residential location choice concerning the 
neighborhood social interactions, and also the estimation method. Section 3 
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shows the data. The estimation results are presented in Section 4. And Section 
5 makes the conclusion. 
6.2 A Residential Sorting Model with Neighborhood Social 
Interactions 
6.2.1 Model 
This section lays out a residential sorting model with neighborhood social 
interactions to show the collective neighborhood choice behavior of 
households and discusses the empirical implementation. In this model, 
households do their residential neighborhood selection based on a series of 
exogenous attributes of the neighborhood; and meanwhile their behaviors also 
highly depend on their current neighbors’ behaviors. The details of this 
framework are elaborated by Bayer and Timmins (2005; 2007).  
Assume a random utility model that consists of a number of heterogeneous 
households 𝐼 , move from 𝐽  current neighborhoods to 𝐾  destination 
neighborhoods. Households who had lived in the same current neighborhoods 
are assumed to have social interactions with their current neighbors, and social 
interactions enhance their utility if they still stay with them in the destination 
neighborhoods. If a household 𝑖 from the current neighborhood 𝑗 moves to the 
destination neighborhood 𝑘, its utility is 
 𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 = 𝐹(𝑆𝑗,𝑘, 𝑋𝑘|𝑌𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,                                                                     (6.1) 
where 𝑆𝑗,𝑘 denotes the strength of social interactions of a household 𝑖 with its 
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neighbors in the current neighborhood 𝑗 who move to the same destination 
neighborhood 𝑘; 𝑋𝑘  is a vector of characteristics of neighborhood 𝑘; 𝑌𝑖  is a 
vector of characteristics of household 𝑖 ; and 𝜖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘  denotes the individual 
idiosyncratic preferences. The utility of the household is a function of the 
characteristics of the destination neighborhood and its social interactions with 
the households from the current neighborhood who move to the same 
destination neighborhood. Intuitively, if there is strong neighborhood social 
interactions among the current neighbors, there should be more of them 
moving to the same destination neighborhoods. Thus, I assume the social 
interactions of households from current neighborhood 𝑗  to destination 




,                                                                                                     (6.2) 
where 𝑁𝑗  is the total number of households who move out from current 
neighborhood 𝑗; and 𝑃𝑗,𝑘 is the total number of households who move in the 
destination neighborhood 𝑘 from the current neighborhood 𝑗. 
Assume 𝜖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 follows the Type I Extreme Value distribution, the probability 






.                                                                         (6.3) 
The probability of household 𝑖 to choose neighborhood 𝑘 is a function with 
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arguments: the characteristics of households 𝑌𝑖 , the characteristics of 
neighborhoods  𝑋, and the behaviors of households’ current neighbors, which 
is considered in term of social interactions 𝑆 . Note that the selection of 
household 𝑖 is related to the collective behavior of other households living in 
the same current neighborhood representing as  𝑆 in the model. 
If there is a state 𝜎, households distribute among 𝐾 destination neighborhoods, 
which gives the social interactions of households from the current 
neighborhood 𝑗 in each destination neighborhood as a vector of 𝑆(𝜎). 𝑆𝑗,𝑝 (or 
𝑆𝑗,𝑘) is the elements of vector 𝑆(𝜎). In this state, equation (6.3) can be written 
as 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 = 𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑘(𝑆(𝜎), 𝑋, 𝑌𝑖),                                                                            (6.4) 
where 𝑔 is a function to predict the probability of the household 𝑖  chooses 
certain neighborhood 𝑘 as shown in equation (6.3). In equilibrium, given a 
state 𝜎, the predicted probability 𝜋 should satisfy the proportion of households 
in certain destination neighborhood. 
𝑆𝑗,𝑘(𝜎) = ∑ 𝑔𝑞,𝑗,𝑘(𝑆(𝜎), 𝑋, 𝑌𝑞)
𝑁𝑗
𝑞=1                                                                (6.5) 
The left side of equation (6.5) is the proportion of households from the current 
neighborhood 𝑗 to the destination neighborhood 𝑘 as defined in equation (6.2); 
the right side is the sum of the probability of all households from current 
neighborhood 𝑗 choosing destination neighborhood 𝑘. 
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Bayer and Timmins (2005) provide a formal proof on the existence of the 
fixed point in this system. In terms of estimation, the parameters of the above 
sorting model can be estimated using the likelihood function of observing the 
individual household location decision in the data conditional on the 
exogenous characteristics and the location population shares (Bayer and 
Timmins, 2007; Fu and Liao, 2013). 
6.2.2 Econometric Implementation 
To estimate this collective neighborhood choice model, I firstly linearize the 
indirect value function as denoted in equation (6.1). And the coefficients on 
the value function are estimated by the maximum likelihood function. 
Meanwhile, my model also tries to include the three types of social 
interactions5. The indirect value function of household 𝑖 choosing to live in 
neighborhood 𝑘 is 
𝑉𝑖,𝑘 = 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑗,𝑘 + 𝛾𝑖𝑀𝑘 + 𝛼𝑖𝑋𝑘 + 𝜎𝑖𝑑𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜏𝑖𝑑𝑘,𝑤                                           (6.6) 
𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽𝑌𝑖;  𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑌𝑖;  𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼𝑌𝑖;  𝜎𝑖 = 𝜎𝑌𝑖; 𝜏𝑖 = 𝜏𝑌𝑖,                                      (6.7) 
where 𝑉𝑖,𝑘is the indirect value function which is the specification of equation 
(6.1); 𝑀𝑘  is the unobservable amenity in neighborhood 𝑘 ; 𝑋𝑘  is the other 
                                                 
5
 They are endogenous interactions, exogenous or contextual interactions and 
correlated interactions. The endogenous interactions refer to the propensity of an 
individual to behave in some way varies with the behaviour of the reference group; 
the contextual interactions refer to the propensity of an individual to behave in some 
way varies with exogenous characteristics of the group members; and the correlated 
interactions refer to individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because 
they have similar but unobservable characteristics or face similar unobservable 
institutional environments (Manski, 1993). 
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observable characteristics of neighborhood 𝑘; 𝑑𝑗,𝑘 is the distance between the 
current neighborhood 𝑗 and the destination neighborhood 𝑘; and 𝑑𝑘,𝑤  is the 
distance between the destination neighborhood 𝑘 and the work place of the 
household. 
The social interactions are not directly measurable, and all the measures in the 
previous research are proxies. For example, there are experimental data of the 
social ties in group interactions (Goette, Huffman and Meier, 2012), the 
survey questions (Kan, 2007), and memberships, etc. (Glaeser, Laibson and 
Sacerdote, 2002). In this study, the social interactions 𝑆𝑗,𝑘  is proxied as the 
weight of households in destination neighborhoods 𝑘 who have moved from 
the same current neighborhood 𝑗  as household 𝑖 , in the total number of 
households who have moved out from neighborhood 𝑗 as shown in equation 
(6.2). This term of social interactions is used to capture the endogenous 
interactions, i.e., households’ decision is affected by their neighbors’ choice. 
The coefficients 𝛽𝑖 on the social interaction term are expected to be positive, 
according to the findings in neighborhood effect literature (Ioannides and 
Zabel, 2008). 
Bayer and his co-authors (Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 2009; Bayer and 
Timmins, 2007) address the characteristics of households as the driving force 
of sorting. It is the exogenous or contextual interactions driving the 
households to move to the same neighborhood. Thus, in my estimation model, 
I also allow different households to have different taste and preference to 
capture the contextual interactions, by setting the coefficients in the value 
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function to be related to the characteristics of households, which is shown in 
equation (6.7). In equation (6.7), 𝑌𝑖 is a series of dummy variables to indicate 
the characteristics of households. The coefficients on these variables show the 
variation of preference on neighborhood choice among different households. 
The unobservable amenity 𝑀𝑘 of different neighborhoods is used to capture 
the neighborhood fixed effect. Households’ choice is not only affected by 
endogenous interactions and exogenous or contextual interactions, but also the 
correlated interactions (Manski, 1993). That is, households choose the same 
neighborhood might because of some amenities of the neighborhood, which is 
observable to them but unobservable to researchers. The unobservable amenity 
𝑀𝑘 of different neighborhoods is discovered from a hedonic model:  
𝐻𝑃𝑖 = 𝜇𝑆𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜌𝑋𝑘 + 𝜂𝑍𝑖 + 𝜆𝑑𝑘,𝑤 + 𝑀 × 𝐷 + 𝜀                                        (6.8) 
where 𝐻𝑃𝑖 is the price of the housing unit chosen by household 𝑖; and 𝑍𝑖 is the 
characteristics of the housing unit. 𝐷  is a vector of dummy variables to 
indicate neighborhood 𝑘 , and 𝐷𝑘  is the element in the vector 𝐷 . 𝑀𝑘 is the 
coefficient on 𝐷𝑘. 𝑀𝑘 is the elements of vector 𝑀, which is used to capture the 
unobservable amenity of different neighborhoods. 
The probability of household 𝑖 choosing destination neighborhood 𝑘 based on 
the indirect value function is shown in equation (6.3). The estimation is 
divided into 3 steps.  In the first step, I calculate 𝑆𝑗,𝑘 based on equation (6.2); 
and then run an OLS regression based on equation (6.8) to get the 
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unobservable amenity 𝑀𝑘of the neighborhood. The second step is to run a 
conditional logit model based on equation (6.3), (6.6), and (6.7). Conditional 
logit model is used to help to solve a problem that there is no information 
about which neighborhoods households considered before they choose to 
locate where I observe them, because it can be estimated by generating a 
random sample of alternatives from the full choice set. In the third step, the 
result of conditional logit model is used to predict 𝑆𝑗,?̂?  based on equation (6.3) 
and (6.6), which is then fed into the next round of estimation repeating 
hedonic model and conditional logit model. With the predicted 𝑆𝑗,?̂?, I firstly 
repeat step one. The destination neighborhoods’ amenity 𝑀𝑘 is estimated with 
the new social interaction term 𝑆𝑗,?̂?. And secondly I update 𝑆𝑗,?̂? and 𝑀𝑘 in the 
conditional logit model. The iteration continues until the system converges to 
the fixed point, at which the final round of estimation predicts a 𝑆𝑗,?̂? identical 
to the prediction one round earlier. Thus equation (6.5) holds, and equilibrium 
is reached. 
6.3 Data 
My research data in this chapter is also from Tianjin China as described in 
Chapter 3. China urban housing market has established since the housing 
reform in the early 1990s. After the housing reform, households move to the 
new neighborhoods to upgrade their living standard. Before the housing 
reform, urban housing is provided by the SOE (state-owned enterprise) 
employers of households. Households stayed in the same neighborhood 
usually worked in the same company and knew each other. It implies that 
households have strong social interactions with their neighbors and they also 
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want to bring these interactions to their destination neighborhoods, when they 
choose a new neighborhood. This kind of data provides the natural test bed to 
study the neighborhood social interactions on the next residential location 
choice behavior. 
In this chapter, I identify and measure the impact of social interactions on 
individual residential location choice. Social interactions are normally 
unobservable to researchers, which add difficulties to identify an objective 
measurement. Survey data have been used in the previous research to proxy 
social context (Kan, 2007). In the housing transaction data from Tianjin China, 
the strong interactions among households in their SOE neighborhoods provide 
the possibility to measure the social interactions objectively in their actual 
housing choice behaviors. Before they bought a commercial housing unit in 
2007, the home buyers in the sample were likely to live in an apartment 
supplied by their or their parents’ employers (typically, a stated-owned 
enterprise or a public organization where they are employed). In the dataset, 
there is recording of birth place and current housing address. Because of the 
SOE housing system, if households’ current housing address is the same as 
their birth places, they are most likely never moved before. There are 87.72% 
households having the same birth place and current housing address. That is, 
most of the households had never moved before they made the transaction in 
2007. Thus, households in each SOE neighborhood have strong interactions 
with each other. However, all these housing units are sub-standard. Most of the 
households start to move out to new neighborhoods after the commercial 
housing market was developed in 1998. The detailed description can be found 
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in Chapter 3. 
In this study, I focus on the social interactions between households within the 
same neighborhood. Firstly, I define the neighborhood based on the 
geographic information. Generally, the neighborhood is organized by the same 
block or real estate project. Figure 6-1, Figure 6-2, Figure 6-3, and Figure 6-4 
show the maps of two neighborhoods in my sample, in which Figure 6-2 and 
Figure 6-4 are the satellite maps of both neighborhoods from Google. 
Generally, the sizes of neighborhoods are between 0.3 and 3 km2. 
 
 





Figure 6-2 Satellite Map of a Neighborhood. 
 
 







Figure 6-4 Satellite Map of a Neighborhood. 
 
 
I consider the households who moved in 2007 from the current neighborhood 
in the central districts, because most of the population is in the central districts 
in Tianjin. For the need of regression with the term of social interactions 
embedded, neighborhoods where at least 100 households move out are 
considered. After cleaning up the data, there are 18,891 households from 60 
current neighborhoods in the central districts moving into 227 destination 
neighborhoods in my sample. The number of destination neighborhoods is 
larger than that of the current neighborhoods, which might because of the 
urban expansion and more neighborhoods could be available to choose. Table 
6-1 presents the definition of variables used in this chapter. They are basically 
the characteristics of the destination neighborhood and the characteristics of 
the households. Table 6-2 presents the statistics of destination neighborhoods’ 
characteristics. There is a variation of households to choose the destination 
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neighborhoods. It shows that, at maximum, 682 households have chosen to 
move to one of the 227 neighborhoods; and the minimum number of 
household moving to certain destination neighborhood is 1. 
Four geographic factors are used to show the difference among the destination 
neighborhoods. They are number of shops, schools, hospitals and subway 
stations within 2 kilometers. Households consider these factors of the 
destination neighborhood to make decision. In my neighborhood choice 
model, the distances to current neighborhood and to the workplace are also 
added to show the geographic location relative to each household. The 










Table 6-1 List of Variables. 
Variable Definition 
Characteristics of the destination neighborhood 
Neighborhood Social 
Interactions 
the ratio of the number of households who move from 
the current neighborhood to the same destination 
neighborhood to the total number of households who 
move out from the current neighborhood 
Amenity the unobservable characteristics or amenity of the 
destination neighborhood from the hedonic regression of 
equation (6.8) by controlling the observable amenity of 
the neighborhood and the attributes of the housing unit 
Shop the number of shops whose distance to the neighborhood 
is less than 2 kilometre 
School the number of schools whose distance to the 
neighborhood is less than 2 kilometre 
Hospital the number of hospitals whose distance to the 
neighborhood is less than 2 kilometre 
Subway the number of subway stations whose distance to the 
neighborhood is less than 2 kilometre 
Distance to Workplace the distance between the destination neighborhood and 
the workplace 
Distance to Current 
Neighborhood 
the distance between the current neighborhood and the 
destination neighborhood 
Characteristics of Households 
Age the head's age of the household 
Income the monthly income of the household (RMB Yuan per 
month) 
Education the education level of the head of the household is 
graduate degree or above, university degree, polytechnic, 
high school, or below high school. 
 
Table 6-2 Descriptive Statistics of Destination Neighborhoods. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Households 227 83.22 128.58 1 682 
Shop 227 0.40 0.83 0 5 
School 227 0.75 1.33 0 7 
Hospital 227 1.40 1.99 0 10 
Subway 227 0.59 1.05 0 5 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 6-1; (2) The dataset is 
provided by Tianjin Academy of Social Science in China, and this study 
considers 18,891 households from 60 current neighborhoods in the central 




To see the pattern of households in each current neighborhood choosing the 
destination neighborhood, I list the statistics of households from the same 
current neighborhood in Table 6-3. Firstly, a large weight of households in 
each current neighborhood moves into the same destination neighborhood in 
my sample. For example, there are 349 households moving out from current 
neighborhood 1 into 71 destination neighborhoods. Among them, at 
maximum, 84 households move to the same destination neighborhood, which 
means around 24.07% out of 349 households. The statistics summary shows 
that average 13.86% of households from one current neighborhood choose the 
same destination neighborhoods even though there are more than 200 
alternative options in my sample. It reflects an interesting phenomenon that 
households from the same current neighborhood show the tendency to move to 
the same destination neighborhood. 
To further illustrate this phenomenon of concentration of households when 
they move out from the same current neighborhood, the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index6 (HHI index) (Herfindahl, 1950; Hirschman, 1945) for each 
current neighborhood can be calculated to indicate the concentration degree of 
households within the destination neighborhood. In this study, the HHI index 
for each current neighborhood is defined as the sum of squared ratio of 
households in each destination neighborhood. 
                                                 
6
 The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, also known as the Herfindahl index, is a 
statistical measure of concentration. The HHI can be used to measure concentration in 
a variety of contexts. It can range from 0 to 1. In this study, if households are 
uniformly distributed among an infinity number of neighborhood, HHI=0. The bigger 
the HHI, the higher the level of concentration is. 
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𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ (
𝑃𝑗,𝑘
𝑁𝑗
)2𝐾𝑘=1                                                                                      (6.9) 
where 𝑁𝑗  is the total number of households who move out from current 
neighborhood 𝑗; and 𝑃𝑗,𝑘 is the total number of households who move in the 




denotes the ratio of households from neighborhood 𝑗  in each destination 
neighborhood. 
As shown in Table 6-3 Column (5), the HHI index is higher than 0.02 and 
lower than 0.1 in my sample. Given the total 227 destination neighborhoods (it 
implies that HHI is 0.004 with a uniform distribution of households), the HHI 
shows a high concentration of households during their migration. And the high 
concentration of households in the destination neighborhood implies that 
households from the same current neighborhood prefer to living near each 
other by choosing the same destination neighborhood. Especially, current 
neighborhood with ID 12 has the maximum HHI index of 0.093. It is a 
neighborhood in Nankai district near Nankai University, Tianjin University, 
and many other colleges. Households who live there could probably be staff in 
these universities and colleges. The high HHI index could probably due to the 





Table 6-3 Descriptive Statistics of Households Mobility. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












1 349 71 24.07% 0.081 
2 258 62 20.54% 0.066 
3 115 45 10.43% 0.047 
4 303 73 18.48% 0.076 
5 372 76 15.59% 0.057 
6 254 65 16.14% 0.065 
7 136 49 14.71% 0.062 
8 144 45 12.50% 0.050 
9 124 52 12.90% 0.044 
10 402 75 14.18% 0.047 
11 156 49 18.59% 0.061 
12 214 62 25.23% 0.093 
13 391 87 15.35% 0.054 
14 428 92 9.58% 0.033 
15 420 92 13.10% 0.038 
16 263 77 17.11% 0.048 
17 273 84 20.15% 0.055 
18 374 77 14.71% 0.049 
19 532 92 7.89% 0.035 
20 392 83 7.14% 0.031 
21 655 96 13.28% 0.038 
22 574 105 7.67% 0.026 
23 557 95 10.41% 0.030 
24 285 78 10.53% 0.035 
25 387 83 23.26% 0.072 
26 150 52 14.00% 0.057 
27 373 69 10.72% 0.053 
28 557 86 16.88% 0.057 
29 471 86 12.74% 0.044 
30 613 107 7.50% 0.025 
31 257 81 5.84% 0.023 
32 360 92 12.78% 0.035 
33 406 82 17.98% 0.059 
34 356 84 9.27% 0.038 
35 195 54 13.33% 0.063 
36 293 74 12.29% 0.056 
37 418 84 19.62% 0.066 
38 260 60 17.31% 0.063 
39 155 56 18.06% 0.054 
40 259 73 12.74% 0.040 
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41 366 83 14.21% 0.041 
42 353 85 14.45% 0.045 
43 206 65 12.14% 0.045 
44 327 71 14.68% 0.056 
45 221 54 20.81% 0.070 
46 192 65 13.54% 0.048 
47 161 56 6.83% 0.035 
48 295 77 9.15% 0.038 
49 506 97 10.47% 0.041 
50 574 91 15.68% 0.054 
51 395 82 10.13% 0.040 
52 131 52 10.69% 0.038 
53 177 47 14.69% 0.051 
54 443 79 13.32% 0.052 
55 261 62 8.81% 0.038 
56 127 57 8.66% 0.032 
57 118 49 10.17% 0.041 
58 201 75 15.42% 0.043 
59 106 34 18.87% 0.080 
60 250 63 14.00% 0.053 
     Mean 314.85 72.48 13.86% 0.050 
Std. Dev. 141.81 16.69 4.39% 0.015 
Notes: (1) The dataset is provided by Tianjin Academy of Social Science in 
China, and this study considers 18,891 households from 60 current 
neighborhoods in the central region moving into 227 destination 
neighborhoods; (2) Column (1) is the ID of the current neighborhood. Column 
(2) is the total number of households who move out from the corresponding 
current neighborhood. Column (3) is the number of destination neighborhoods 
where those households in Column (2) choose.  Column (4) is the maximum 
ratio of the number of households who move to the same destination 
neighborhood to the total number of households who move out from the same 
corresponding current neighborhood. Column (5) is the HHI index. 
 
This study tries to understand this incomplete sorting phenomenon from the 
angle of neighborhood social interactions in the current neighborhood. On one 
hand, households from the same current neighborhood tend to move to the 
same destination neighborhood, because of the endogenous interactions, i.e., 
their behavior is affected by their neighbors’ choice. On the other hand, 
according to Bayer and his co-authors (Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 2009; 
137 
 
Bayer and Timmins, 2007), the driving force of sorting is the characteristics of 
households (e.g., age, income, and etc.). In other words, it is the exogenous or 
contextual interactions driving the households to move to the same 
neighborhood. Thus, I also include the characteristics of households in my 
estimation to capture it. 
The characteristics of households considered in my model include three sets of 
dummies, i.e., age, income, and education. Table 6-4 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the households’ characteristics. It reports the mean value of age is 
36.17, and median value is 35 years old. The mean value of income is 
5,996.41 RMB Yuan per month, and the median value is 5,000 RMB Yuan per 
month. It also reports the standard deviation, minimum, 33% percentile, 66% 
percentile and the maximum value of age and income in this sample. Number 
of households with different education level is also reported in Table 6-4. 
To test households’ different preference over neighborhood attributes, they are 
divided into different groups based on their age, income, and education level. 
The whole sample is adopted to investigate the variance by interacting each 
group with all the variables. The old household group is defined as households 
whose head is older than 35, which is the median age in my sample; the 
household whose head has finished university or above is recognized as high 
educated; and high income is defined based on whether the monthly income is 
higher than 5,000 RMB Yuan per month, which is the median monthly income 
in this sample. Table 6-5 shows the statistics summary of these group 
dummies. Specifically, there are 52.36% households in the young household 
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group, and 47.64% households in the old household group. Within the young 
household group, 35.63% households are young with high education, and 
16.74% households are young with low education. Within the young and high 
education household group, 14.62% households are with high income, and 
21.01% households are with relatively low income. The other percentages in 
Table 6-5 can be explained similarly. Overall, there are 8 household groups. 
The young with high education and high income households take 14.62% in 
the sample. The young with high education and low income households take 
21.01%. The young with low education and high income households take 
3.82%. The young with low education and low income households take 
12.92%. The old with high education and high income households take 
15.80%. The old with high education and low income households take 6.97%. 
The old with low education and high income households take 11.16%. The old 
with low education and low income households take 13.71%. Generally, each 
group of households has certain weight of observations; thus my model can 
safely predict the sorting pattern based on these dummies. 
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Table 6-4 Descriptive Statistics of Households’ Characteristics. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Percentile 33% Median Percentile 66% Max 
Age 36.17 9.03 20 30 35 40 60 
Income 5996.41 3588.47 1123 4000 5000 6000 30000 
    Count  Frequency (%)  
Education High Educated Graduate degree or above 1,980  10.48  
  University degree 9,050  47.91  
 Low Educated Polytechnic 4,661  24.67  
  High school 2,643  13.99  
  Others below 557  2.95  
Total Obs.   18,891 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 6-1; (2) The dataset is provided by Tianjin Academy of Social Science in China, and this study 




Table 6-5 Percentages of Households in Each Group. 


































Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 6-1; (2) The dataset is 
provided by Tianjin Academy of Social Science in China, and this study 
considers 18,891 households from 60 current neighborhoods in the central 
region moving into 227 destination neighborhoods. 
 
When I estimate the unobservable amenity based on equation (6.8) in the first 
step of the three steps of regression, the attributes of housing units are used as 
control variables. They are housing unit size, the structure of buildings, and 
the type of housing transaction. Equation (6.8) is a hedonic model with the 
hedonic factors: the natural log of the housing unit size, the structure of 
buildings, the type of housing transaction, social interactions, the natural log 
of the distance to workplace, and number of shops, schools, hospitals, and 
subway stations with 2 kilometers, as well as the destination neighborhood 
dummies. The dependent variable is the natural log of housing price. The 
coefficients on the neighborhood dummies are used to capture the 
unobservable amenity of each destination neighborhood. It is then used to 




6.4 Empirical Results 
With the three-step iterated c-logit model as shown in Section 6.2, I estimate 
equation (6.3), (6.6), (6.7), and (6.8) at a fixed point where the predicted social 
interactions is equal to the real value. The coefficients in equation (6.6) are 
reported in Table 6-6. All the coefficients are significant at 1% level, and thus 
the asterisk mark is not indicated. For comparison purpose, I also follow the 
traditional single c-logit model to estimate the probability equation (equation 
6.3). It also includes the three steps as shown in Section 6.2, but without the 
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Distance to Current 






















  Number of Households 18,891 
      Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the destination neighborhood that household chooses. All the variables are interacted with each group of household; (2) Standard 
errors are in parentheses; (3) all coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
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Distance to Current 




















  Number of Households 18,891 
     Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the destination neighborhood that household chooses. All the variables are interacted with each group of household; (2) Standard 
errors are in parentheses; (3) all coefficients are significant at 1% level except those with ^; (4) the coefficients with ^ are not significant within 10%. 
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Firstly, the results in Table 6-6 show that all coefficients on Social Interactions 
are positive and significant, which implies that households do value social 
interactions among their current neighbors when they choose their destination 
neighborhood, and they tend to move to the same destination neighborhood. It 
reflects the endogenous interactions among households in the same current 
neighborhood, i.e., households’ decision is positively affected by their 
neighbors’ decision in general. 
Secondly, the coefficients on Social Interactions for different groups of 
households reveal interesting patterns of variation across age, income and 
education, which imply different households have different preferences over 
social interactions. Generally, the coefficients on Social Interactions are 
relatively higher for the old household group than those of the young 
household group. It indicates that older households prefer more social 
interactions than the younger, which means the older households are affected 
more by their current neighborhoods’ choice. The results also show relatively 
larger coefficients on Social Interactions for the high educated and high 
income households groups than their counterparts, respectively. That is, high 
educated households are more likely to choose neighborhoods with more 
social interactions; and rich households are more willing to stay in the 
neighborhood with more social interactions. The possible reason could rely on 
the budget constraint, when households choose the destination neighborhood. 
The budget constraints of old, high educated and rich households are usually 
less tight. Thus they will spend resource on finding neighborhood with more 
social interactions to satisfy their social needs. 
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Thirdly, the estimation results also discover the preferences of households 
over the other factors of neighborhoods. The coefficients on Amenity are 
significantly positive for households with high income; and turn to be negative 
for households with the relatively low income. Higher income households tend 
to stay at better neighborhoods and pay the higher premium; but lower income 
households might not afford it. Among high income households, old and high 
educated households have the biggest coefficient, which implies that they are 
more interested in amenity, since they usually have more budgets on buying a 
housing unit. 
The coefficients on the measurements of accessibility in Table 6-6 also reveal 
patterns of variation across age, income and education. The coefficients on 
Shop, School and Subway are significantly negative for the high income 
households, but significantly positive for the low income households. The 
results show that high income households do not like to stay in the 
neighborhood close to shops, schools and subway stations. These households 
usually have their own cars, so they are not reliable on public transportations. 
But the coefficients on Hospital are significantly positive for the high income 
households, but significantly negative for the low income households. This 
finding shows that rich households pay special attention on their health. An 
ideal neighborhood for them should be close to hospitals. The low income 
households in my sample show a clear opposite pattern from the high income 
households. The low income households prefer neighborhoods close to shops, 




As shown in Table 6-6, the coefficients on Distance to Workplace and 
Distance to Current Neighborhood are significantly negative for all 
households. These empirical findings clearly show that households do not 
want to move too far away from their current neighborhoods due to the social 
capital with the current place, which is consistent with the results in Kan 
(2007). This type of location bonding is highly valued by households with low 
income and low education. All the households like the neighborhoods which 
are close to their workplaces to save commuting cost or time. But rich, high 
educated and old households have relatively less desire to commute a short 
distance to work in my results. The possible reason might be due to their travel 
method too. They usually drive to work instead of relying on the public 
transportation. 
For comparison purpose, Table 6-7 shows the results of the traditional single 
c-logit model without iterating procedure. Though most of the signs of the 
coefficients are the same as the results of the iterated c-logit model, the 
coefficients on Social Interactions are much higher than the results in Table 
6-6. This is because of the endogeneity problem with the traditional single c-
logit model without iterating procedure. The neighborhood choice is a 
collective process, in which a household’s destination neighborhood choice is 
affected by its neighbors who choose the same destination neighborhood, and 
meanwhile their neighbors’ choice is also affected by the other neighbors’ 
choice including this household. As compared to the outcome of the single c-
logit regression, the iterated regression at a fixed point improves notably by 
overcome the endogeneity problem. 
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To further analyze what kind of households can be influenced more by their 
current neighbors in their destination neighborhood choice, I interact age, 
income, and education separately with the neighborhood characteristics for 
equation (6.7), and run the three-step iterated c-logit model. The results are 
shown in Table 6-8. 
According to age, households are divided into three quantiles. For Tertile 1 
(young), age is from 20 to 30. For Tertile 2 (middle), age is from 31to 40. For 
Tertile 3 (old), age is from 41 to 60. The significantly positive coefficients on 
Social Interactions show an increasing trend with the increase in age. It 
implies that old households value more social interactions, and they can be 
influenced more by their current neighbors in their destination neighborhood 
choice. Based on monthly income (RMB Yuan per month), households are 
grouped into three quantiles. For Tertile 1 (low), income is from 1,123 to 
4,000. For Tertile 2 (middle), income is from 4,000 to 6,000. For Tertile 3 
(high), income is from 6,000 to 30,000. The results show that all the 
households value social interactions, as the coefficients are all significantly 
positive. Among them, the high income households like social interactions the 
most. The households in the high education group have a university degree or 
above, and the households in the low education group have a polytechnic 
diploma or below. The results also show that high educated households value 
social interactions more when they choose their destination neighborhoods. 
Overall, the results on social interactions are consistent with the results in 
Table 6-6. The old households with high income and high education tend to be 
influenced more by their current neighbors in their destination neighborhood 
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choice. They show the maximum desire to keep up with their neighbors. The 
coefficients on the other variables show the same signs and patterns as those in 
Table 6-6. This indicates that my regression is robust and stable. 
Overall, this neighborhood choice model implies that the social interactions 
are important in the neighborhood choice of households. During this collective 
process, households are willing to stay together with their current neighbors. 
And the preferences of households are distinguished among different types of 







               Table 6-8 Regression Results of the Iterated c-logit Model with Different Age, Income, and Education Household Groups. 





Neighborhood Variables Tertile 1 Tertile 2 Tertile 3 
 




Interactions  5.056 6.445 6.701 
 




(0.299) (0.356) (0.395) 
 
(0.312) (0.323) (0.433) 
 
(0.278) (0.271) 
Amenity -0.719 0.633 0.122^ 
 




(0.067) (0.109) (0.102) 
 
(0.037) (0.102) (0.112) 
 
(0.076) (0.077) 
Shop 5.872 -5.164 -1.080^ 
 




(0.558) (0.905) (0.843) 
 
(0.310) (0.847) (0.926) 
 
(0.630) (0.634) 
School 0.175 -0.016^ 0.0424* 
 




(0.017) (0.024) (0.023) 
 
(0.013) (0.023) (0.025) 
 
(0.017) (0.018) 
Hospital -6.178 5.307 0.967^ 
 




(0.570) (0.925) (0.861) 
 
(0.317) (0.866) (0.947) 
 
(0.644) (0.648) 
Subway 12.032 -10.602 -2.144^ 
 




(1.129) (1.831) (1.705) 
 
(0.628) (1.715) (1.874) 
 
(1.275) (1.284) 
Distance to Workplace -7.011 -5.152 -5.175 
 




(0.226) (0.265) (0.272) 
 
(0.233) (0.270) (0.254) 
 
(0.180) (0.233) 
Distance to Current 
Neighborhood -12.860 -11.599 -13.007 
 
-14.251 -13.928 -8.754 
 
-10.282 -15.595 
  (0.249) (0.285) (0.299) 
 
(0.262) (0.292) (0.270) 
 
(0.197) (0.256) 





Number of Neighborhoods 227 
Number of Households 18,891 
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the destination neighborhood that household chooses. All the variables are interacted with each group; (2) Standard errors are in 
parentheses; (3) all coefficients are significant at 1% level except those with ^, * and **; (4) the coefficients with ^ are not significant within 10%; (5) ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
(6) For age: Tertile 1: 20≤Age≤30, Tertile 2: 31≤Age≤40, Tertile 3: 41≤Age≤60; (7) For monthly income (RMB Yuan per month): Tertile 1: 1123≤Income≤4000, Tertile 2: 




In this chapter, I discover the neighborhood social interactions on households’ 
neighborhood choice. With the data from Tianjin China, I study the social 
interactions among current neighbors and their impacts on households’ 
destination neighborhood choice. I observe the current neighbors’ actual 
choice of their destination neighborhoods, and estimate this collective choice 
decision making process based on a three-step iterated c-logit methodology at 
an equilibrium structure and show a significant impact of social interactions 
on the destination neighborhood choices. The different characteristics of 
households are included in the model, thus different preferences of different 
households are allowed. The results report significant different patterns of 
different households’ taste and preference over both social interactions and 
other neighborhood attributes. Specifically, old, high educated and rich 
households value social interactions relatively more when they choose their 
destination neighborhoods. 
These findings contribute to the growing literature that aims at identifying and 
measuring the impact of social context on the individual economic behavior. 
First, the results serve to fill in the literature gap on neighborhood choice with 
social interactions. The previous literature focus on the contextual interactions 
among those who make the same neighborhood choice, however, the impact of 
the current neighbors is out of consideration (Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 
2009; Bayer and Timmins, 2007; Ioannides and Zabel, 2008). My study 
further identifies another interaction factor among their current neighbors 
when households choose their destination neighborhoods. From this 
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perspective, this research can refresh the existing knowledge of relationship 
between choice behavior and social interactions. According to Bayer and his 
co-authors (Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 2009; Bayer and Timmins, 2007), 
the driving force of sorting is the characteristics of households (e.g., age, 
income, and etc.). In this sense, my research contributes another driving force 
of sorting. 
Second, this study observes the actual mobility of households from their 
current neighborhoods to the destination neighborhoods. With an objective 
measure of social interactions, which considers the ratio of households who 
move to the same destination neighborhood to those moving out from the 
same current neighborhood, this study provides the direct evidence to the 
literature of neighborhood effect (Brock and Durlauf, 2001, 2002, 2007; 
Ioannides and Zabel, 2003), by showing that neighborhood effect influences 
households’ actual residential location choice behavior. 
Third, this study also sheds some light on the study of residential mobility 
with social capital. My empirical findings show that social interactions in the 
current neighborhood significantly impact the destination neighborhood 
choice of households. It echoes the previous research on social capital and 
mobility (Kan, 2007). The social interactions used in my research are defined 
based on the current neighbors, and households would like to move to the 
same destination neighborhood with their current neighbors. That is, if 
households have to move, they tend to bring the social capital with their 
current neighbors to the destination neighborhood. Furthermore, my study 
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fully considers the social interactions determined by a collective behavior. It is 
different from the common multinomial logit model used in Kan (2007) where 
social factors are exogenous in the location choice. 
Fourth, previous literature on choice behaviors with social interactions also try 
to identify the different sources of social influence, which are endogenous 
effect, contextual effect and correlation effect (Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 
2009; Ioannides and Zabel, 2008; Manski, 1993). My research can also 
contribute to this area. When households choose the destination 
neighborhoods, they are affected by their current neighbors’ choice behaviors. 
This can capture the endogenous effect. I also address the endogeneity issue 
that arises when some neighborhoods amenity is observable to households but 
not the researchers by the three step regression. In this sense, the correlated 
interaction is reflected in the model. However, my research can only show 
some weak evidence on the contextual effect, because the sample in this 
research is not full sample. I don’t have the information of the average 
income, age, and etc. of the population in each destination neighborhood. The 
contextual interaction can only be observed indirectly from the results that 
high income (or education, age) households have the different preferences 
over neighborhood attributes with the low income (or education, age) 
households. 
Last but not least, my study also discovers a sorting pattern of households on 
location choice in China housing market. Age, education and income are the 
major factors which affect the preferences of households. The results show 
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that households have different taste on social interactions. The findings in this 
chapter are also helpful to enhance the understanding on China housing 
market. Social factor plays an important role in China housing market as 
known as guanxi. However, little research brings the social connection of 
households into housing market. Current housing studies still put more efforts 
on the living amenity and institution transition (For example, Fu, Tse and 
Zhou, 2000; Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2012; Zhen, Fu and Liu, 2006). My 





Chapter 7 Conclusion 
Based on the housing market features, this dissertation investigates the 
housing choice behavior from the aspects of information level, households’ 
characteristics and neighborhood social interactions. In this chapter, I briefly 
review the research, highlight the contributions, and list the limitations and 
possible future work. 
7.1 Review of the Research 
Due to the housing market properties of imperfect information, high search 
cost, search frictions, information level, heterogeneous housing units, 
heterogeneous households, and neighborhood social interactions, the housing 
choice behavior is a complicated process still without fully understand. 
Following the three strands of literature which considers the social factors of 
information level and search cost, heterogeneous households’ characteristics, 
and neighborhood social interactions in the housing choice behavior, this 
dissertation tries to further understand the housing choice behavior from these 
three aspects. It tries to meet the following three major objectives. 
(1) to scrutinize a household’s housing choice behavior from its housing 
search process with the consideration of location-dependent information; 
(2) to quantify the impacts of a household’s characteristics on the performance 
of its housing search; 
(3) to estimate the influence of neighborhood social interactions on a 
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household’s housing location choice. 
In Chapter 4, to achieve the first objective, I analyze the role of information in 
housing choice theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, a housing search 
model is built, which can explain the housing choice behavior regarding to 
search cost and location-dependent information level. It predicts that 
households with strong information level have a high probability to secure a 
good deal. With the housing transaction data from Tianjin, China, I use 
traditional hedonic model to conduct an empirical analysis on information 
level and housing choice performance. I assume that information level of 
housing market is accumulated by a household living in a location, and have 
five different measures of information level. The results show that the home 
buyers at information disadvantage need to pay 1%-2.3% more than the better 
informed home buyers. Specifically, households emigrated from outside or 
were born outside of the central region pay more for their housing units; and 
households, who buy housing units in their current neighborhoods or close to 
their previous housing units, pay less for their housing units. I also find the 
premium from the information decays with the distance to the current living 
place, because housing information decays, which is consistent with my 
prediction in the model. Furthermore, the decay speed of information has an 
impact on the housing price and the locations homebuyers choose. 
In Chapter 5, I try to achieve the second objective, by considering the 
households’ heterogeneous characteristics into housing choice behavior, and 
quantify the impact of households’ characteristics on the search performance 
156 
 
of home buyers in choosing a housing unit. The search efficiency is defined as 
the probability of securing a good deal to measure home buyers’ performance 
in housing search. With the housing transaction data from Tianjin, China, I use 
a modified stochastic frontier model to conduct an empirical analysis on how 
the characteristics of households impact their search efficiency in the housing 
market. Following the previous study, my research also highlights information 
level and bargaining power as two determinants of search efficiency. I assume 
that information level of housing market is accumulated by a household’s 
living history in a location. The empirical results show that households 
perform more efficient in their familiar neighborhoods; and they have high 
probability to secure a good deal. I also show that the opportunity cost and 
bargaining power of households influence the efficiency of housing search. 
Households who are young, less educated with low income and low level 
occupation are willing to spend more time and bargain more aggressively on 
housing market due to low opportunity cost. They are more likely to find a 
housing unit with relatively low price. The probability to secure a good deal 
corresponding to each characteristic of households is also calculated. For 
example, comparing to their counterparts, households can enjoy around 4%-
30% higher probability in securing a housing unit with the price equal to or 
lower than 90% of the maximum price. 
In Chapter 6, to estimate the influence of neighborhood social interactions on 
the housing location choice, I propose a collective location choice model with 
different tastes of households to show that the destination neighborhood 
choice of households is impacted by their current neighbors. With the data 
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from Tianjin China, I estimate this collective choice decision making process 
based on a three-step iterated c-logit method at a fixed point, which takes 
account the endogeneity problem and households’ heterogeneous 
characteristics. The estimation results show that social interactions among the 
current neighbors significantly impact households’ destination neighborhood 
choice. The results also report a significant different taste of different 
households over both social interactions and other neighborhood attributes. 
Specifically, old, high educated and rich households relatively value social 
interactions among the current neighbors more when they choose the 
destination neighborhood.  
In general, by providing the analysis from the three aspects of the housing 
choice behavior, the three objectives of this dissertation are achieved. In the 
next section, I highlight the contributions of this research. 
7.2 Contributions 
This research enriches the existing literature, and sheds light on the practical 
implications to the housing market in China, since the analysis is based on 
China housing market. 
Firstly, the research in Chapter 4 contributes to the housing search literature 
from two aspects. First, the housing search model in this research highlights a 
housing search structure under imperfect housing market. It extends Turnbull 
and Sirmans’ (1993) housing search model with a location-dependent 
information level of different households. The influence of this factor of 
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location-dependent information difference is supported by my empirical 
findings. The findings show that the premium from the information level 
decays with the distance to the current living place, because housing 
information decays. Second, with a large sample and more measures of 
information level, the empirical findings in this research provide supportive 
evidence to the argument that better informed households can secure a good 
deal, which is consistent with the theoretical literature. 
Secondly, the research in Chapter 5 contributes to the housing search 
performance literature from at least three aspects. First, search efficiency, 
defined as the probability of securing a good deal, is proposed to measure 
home buyers’ performance in housing search. Second, it builds on the 
stochastic frontier approach and generalizes it to allow the efficiency term to 
depend on households’ heterogeneous characteristics. It shows how the 
households’ characteristics affect the efficiency of housing choice through the 
channel of information level and bargaining power. By adding the households’ 
characteristics in the standard deviation of a random component of a stochastic 
frontier approach, it overcomes the omitted variable bias problem in the 
standard hedonic model. Third, the search efficiency is captured by the varied 
random component in the stochastic frontier model. It reflects the stochastic 
nature of housing search process, and the probability to secure a good deal for 
different households can be calculated. The households’ characteristics are 
included in the random component of the stochastic frontier model. Thus, it 
also allows different households to have heterogeneous price premiums. In 
this sense, this research also contributes to the literature of housing search by 
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adding the heterogeneity of households into the efficiency of housing choice. 
It also provides evidence to the bargaining power literature that households’ 
characteristics do have significant influence on the housing price. 
Thirdly, the research in Chapter 6, in the context of residential location choice 
literature, emphasizing the role of social interactions, adds some new 
understanding on residential housing choice behavior. Most of the previous 
literature focuses on the contextual interactions among those who make the 
same neighborhood choice. My study highlights the endogenous interactions 
among the current neighbors when households choose their destination 
neighborhoods. From this perspective, this research points out another driving 
force of sorting in terms of “friend sorting”, i.e., households have the 
propensity to move in a neighborhood where their friends have moved in. In 
addition, this study also contributes to the neighborhood effect literature by 
providing evidence of neighborhood effect which influences households’ 
actual residential location choice behavior (Brock and Durlauf, 2001, 2002, 
2007; Ioannides and Zabel, 2003). Third, it also sheds some light on the study 
of residential mobility with social capital. My empirical findings show that 
social interactions in the current neighborhood significantly impact the 
destination neighborhood choice of households. It echoes the previous 
research on social capital and mobility (Kan, 2007). The social interactions 
used in my research are defined based on the current neighbors, and 
households would like to move to the same destination neighborhood with 
their current neighbors. That is, if households have to move, they tend to bring 
the social capital with their current neighbors to the destination neighborhood. 
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Furthermore, my study fully considers the social interactions determined by a 
collective behavior. It is different from the common multinomial logit model 
used in Kan (2007) where social factors are exogenous in the location choice. 
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset from the fast transformed China 
housing market. After the urban housing privatization reform in 1980s, 
commercial housing market has been gradually established in Chinese cities. 
The findings in this research have important policy implications. First, this 
research considers a housing search structure under imperfect housing market; 
and the different efficiency in housing choice arises from the information level 
and households’ characteristics. Understanding this choice decision making 
process is helpful to market institution design. Obviously, market with less 
friction can assist households to approach optimized utility more closely. That 
means high social welfare. Second, my findings also suggest that 
characteristics of households should be added to the housing price index 
model and correct the bias raised from the heterogeneity of housing buyers. 
Third, the results of this research imply that criterion of residential location 
choice is distinct among different social groups. This fact should not be 
ignored when making policy fairly effective for all households, or be 
strategically implemented for regulating a specific group. Last but not least, 
during the urban redevelopment, the human factors should be considered by 
the city planning policy makers. Because, once a household moves into a 
neighborhood, it is not only a home for him, but also a community where 
neighbors influence each other. 
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7.3 Limitations and Future Work 
The present research studies on the international topic of the impacts of 
information level, characteristics of households, and social interactions on 
housing choice. The transaction data in Tianjin is used to empirically test these 
impacts. Because of the socio-economic condition prevailing in China housing 
market, the results obtained in this dissertation are suggestive, but not 
conclusive. Especially, the empirical results are specific to Tianjin China of 
this period. 
China housing market is different from the mature housing market of western 
countries. It is a fast transforming housing market, in which the new 
commercial housing of high quality is replacing the old sub-standard housing 
provided by SOE (state-owned enterprise) housing supply system. During this 
housing privatization reform, a large scale intra-urban migration occurs when 
households upgrade their housing units. China also experiences a fast 
urbanization, which induces a large scale rural-urban migration. The 
phenomenon of large scale migration is rarely observed in the mature housing 
market. These differences limit me to generalize the empirical results in 
different housing markets. Specifically, there are a few limitations of the data, 
without which, I may be able to count for the difference of market conditions. 
First, there is no information on type of housing in this sample. Ideally, data 
on the number of stories, density, and proximity of housing units would help 
to tell the difference of housing market, since these have significance on 
information decay speed, social interactions and location choice. For example, 
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single family housing in the western housing market and high-rise apartment 
units in Chinese housing market could have different impacts on the decay 
speed of information, as well as the interactions among neighbors. Without 
this information, the empirical result could not manage to capture this type of 
difference of the housing market. 
Second, my study focuses on the searching process in housing market in the 
theoretical model. But in the empirical estimation, I don’t have the detailed 
information of housing search process for each household. Ideally, the effort 
home buyers put in housing search should be controlled. But the search times, 
i.e. the number of housing units that households visit or duration before they 
make the decision are not available. 
Third, the classification of jobs and education level is limited in the sample. 
The characteristics of households are majorly based on the head of 
households. Actually, the other members of households are also important and 
their characteristics should impact the housing choice. For example, whether 
there is a school-age kid should vary the preference to school. Unfortunately, 
such information is not recorded in the dataset. 
Fourth, the sellers’ information is also not available in the data. The second 
part of the research considers information level and bargaining power as two 
important channels through which households’ characteristics impact on the 
search efficiency. If sellers’ characteristics are available, I can further analyze 
their bargaining power, which is also critical on whether buyers can find a 
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good deal.  
Fifth, in the study of housing choice with social interactions, the sample used 
is not full sample. Which means, demographic characteristics of each 
neighborhood, such as the population, the average income, and the average 
education level, and etc. in each neighborhood, are not available. Thus, it is 
difficult to directly include the contextual social influence of the neighbors in 
the destination neighborhood. 
Sixth, the challenge of studying on social interactions is that it is not 
observable to researchers. All the measures are proxies, because whether 
households really know each other or discuss with each other before they 
make the housing choice decision is normally not recorded. This research 
assumes households know each other because most of the households in the 
sample are possibly lived in housing units provided by SOEs before they 
move. But whether the original neighborhoods are the fang gai fang 
neighborhoods or real estate development complexes are not available. The 
current results might overestimate the neighborhood effect, since there might 
exist some unobserved attributes that attract employees of the same working 
unit to the same neighborhood (e.g., group buying of the same working unit). I 
have included the distance between the destination neighborhood and the 
working place, Distance to Workplace, as the control for it. Ideally, working 




Last but not least, there are all kinds of social interactions occurring during the 
complicated housing choice decision making process. Some households find 
their housing units through housing agents, but some may find their housing 
units via their friends. This kind of social factors is more important because it 
is directly related to the housing choice. A fully understanding of the housing 
choice behavior requires data with more information on social factors. But 
normally this kind of information is not recorded. In the future, I will work in 
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Appendix I List of Notations 
Table A-1 List of Notations 
Notation Definition 
Notations Used in Chapter 4 
𝑥𝑖 a vector of the attributes of the housing unit 𝑖 
𝑝𝑖 the price of the housing unit 𝑖 
𝑖 the housing unit 𝑖 
𝑣𝑖 the indirect utility function (i.e. the surplus value)  of a home 
buyer for the housing unit 𝑖  
𝑢(∙) the utility function of a home buyer staying in a housing unit 
𝐺 the distribution of the surplus value of the housing units 
𝑔(𝑣) the density function of 𝐺 
𝑚 the location or neighborhood 𝑚, which is assumed to be 
continuously from 0 to 𝐷. 𝑚 = 0 is the current location of a 
household, thus 𝑚 can also be understood as the distance to 
the current location 
𝑠(𝑚) the information level in location 𝑚 
𝑎 the information level of a buyer at his current location 
𝑏 the slope indicating how fast the information level decays 
with the distance to the current location 
𝑓(𝑣) the distribution of housing units for home buyers with the 
information level 𝑠(𝑚) 
𝑐 search cost for one search 
𝑣∗ home buyer’s reservation value 
𝑃𝑚 the probability of the home buyer to choose a housing unit in 
location 𝑚 
  
Notations Used in Chapter 5 
𝑃𝑖
∗ the maximum housing price (Pareto) frontier 
𝑉(𝑋𝑖) the maximum housing price as a function of characteristics 
of housing unit 𝑖 
𝑋𝑖 a bunch of characteristics of housing unit𝑖 
𝑖 the housing unit 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1.  .  . 𝑛) 
𝑒−𝑢𝑖 an inefficient component 
𝑢𝑖 a nonnegative random variable with positive half-normal 
distribution 𝑢𝑖~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢,𝑖
2 ). 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝑉(𝑋𝑖) − 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖, which 
provides the measure of efficiency of the household 
𝜎𝑢,𝑖 standard deviation of 𝑢𝑖, 𝜎𝑢,𝑖 = 𝑢(𝑌𝑗), which is a function of 
the households’ characteristics 
𝑃𝑖 the observed transaction housing price 
𝑌𝑗 a vector of household’s characteristics for household 𝑗 
𝑣𝑖 a random variable with normal distribution 𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2 ) 
𝛽0, 𝛽 constant and coefficients on attributes of housing unit 




Notations Used in Chapter 6 
𝑖 household 𝑖,( 𝑖 = 1.  .  . 𝐼) 
𝐼 the total number of households 
𝑗 the current neighborhood 𝑗,( 𝑗 = 1.  .  . 𝐽) 
𝐽 the total number of current neighborhoods 
𝑘, (𝑜𝑟 𝑝) the destination neighborhood 𝑘 (𝑜𝑟 𝑝),(𝑘(or 𝑝) = 1.  .  . 𝐾) 
𝐾 the total number of destination neighborhoods 
𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 the utility of household 𝑖 from the current neighborhood 𝑗 
moves to the destination neighborhood 𝑘 
𝑆𝑗,𝑘 the strength of social interactions of a household 𝑖 with its 
neighbors in the current neighborhood 𝑗 who move to the 
same destination neighborhood 𝑘 
𝑋𝑘 a vector of characteristics of neighborhood 𝑘 
𝑌𝑖 a vector of characteristics of household 𝑖 
𝜖𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 error term indicating the individual idiosyncratic preferences 
𝑁𝑗 the total number of households who move out from current 
neighborhood 𝑗 
𝑃𝑗,𝑘 the total number of households who move in the destination 
neighborhood 𝑘 from the current neighborhood 𝑗 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 the probability of household 𝑖 from the current 
neighborhood 𝑗 to choose neighborhood 𝑘 
𝜎 a state of the system in which households distribute among  
𝐾 destination neighborhoods 
𝑆(𝜎) A vector of social interactions terms corresponding to the 
state 𝜎, and 𝑆𝑗,𝑝 (or 𝑆𝑗,𝑘) is the elements of vector 𝑆(𝜎) 
𝑔 a function to predict the probability of the household 𝑖 
chooses neighborhood 𝑘 
𝑞 household 𝑞 who moves out from the current neighborhood 
𝑗,( 𝑞 = 1.  .  . 𝑁𝑗) 
𝑉𝑖,𝑘 the indirect value function, which is the specification of  
𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 
𝑀𝑘 the unobservable amenity in neighborhood 𝑘 
𝑑𝑗,𝑘 the distance between the current neighborhood 𝑗 and the 
destination neighborhood 𝑘 
𝑑𝑘,𝑤 the distance between the destination neighborhood 𝑘 and the 
work place of the household 
𝛽𝑖, 𝛾𝑖, 𝛼𝑖, 𝜎𝑖, 𝜏𝑖 household’s characteristic-dependent coefficients 𝛽𝑖 =
𝛽𝑌𝑖;  𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑌𝑖;  𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼𝑌𝑖;  𝜎𝑖 = 𝜎𝑌𝑖; 𝜏𝑖 = 𝜏𝑌𝑖               
𝐻𝑃𝑖 the price of the housing unit chosen by household 𝑖 
𝑍𝑖 the characteristics of the housing unit chosen by household 𝑖 
𝐷 a vector of dummy variables to indicate neighborhood 𝑘,  
𝐷𝑘 the element in the vector 𝐷 
𝑀 a vector to capture the unobservable amenity of different 
neighborhoods, and 𝑀𝑘 is the elements of vector 𝑀, where 





Appendix II  Hedonic Regressions for Subsamples 
Table A-2 Hedonic Model with Market Information Premium with 
Subsample of High Education Group. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOG_AREA 0.905*** 0.905*** 0.906*** 0.905*** 0.907*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
LOG_CBD -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SHOP 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SCHOOL 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HOSPITAL -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SALE1 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
RESALE -0.210*** -0.211*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.209*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
B_TYPE1 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
B_TYPE2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
RURAL_IMM 0.006 
    
 
(0.005) 
    RURAL_BIRTH 
 
0.002 
   
  
(0.006) 




   
(0.003) 
  MOVE_1 
   
-0.014*** -0.019*** 
    
(0.004) (0.004) 
MOVE_12 
    
-0.016*** 
     
(0.004) 
CONSTANT 9.206*** 9.209*** 9.210*** 9.209*** 9.208*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
      Obs. 9,455 9,455 9,455 9,455 9,455 
R-squared 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 
Notes: (1) This group of households is with high education level, which is 
university or above. All the variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) The 
dependent variable is LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** 




Table A-3 Hedonic Model with Market Information Premium with 
Subsample of Low Education Group. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOG_AREA 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.962*** 0.963*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
LOG_CBD -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SHOP 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SCHOOL 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HOSPITAL -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SALE1 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
RESALE -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.180*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
B_TYPE1 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
B_TYPE2 0.044** 0.044** 0.041** 0.042** 0.042** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
RURAL_IMM 0.015** 
    
 
(0.006) 
    RURAL_BIRTH 
 
0.022*** 
   
  
(0.007) 




   
(0.004) 
  MOVE_1 
   
-0.017*** -0.022*** 
    
(0.005) (0.005) 
MOVE_12 
    
-0.016*** 
     
(0.005) 
CONSTANT 8.868*** 8.865*** 8.880*** 8.877*** 8.879*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
      Obs. 7,012 7,012 7,012 7,012 7,012 
R-squared 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.880 
Notes: (1) This group of households is with low education level, which is 
polytechnic or below. All the variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) The 
dependent variable is LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** 




Table A-4 Hedonic Model with Market Information Premium with 
Subsample of Resale Group. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LOG_AREA 0.990*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 0.990*** 0.990*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
LOG_CBD -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SHOP 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SCHOOL 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HOSPITAL 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
B_TYPE1 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
B-TYPE2 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 




    
  
(0.005) 
    RURAL_BIRTH 
  
0.010* 
   
   
(0.006) 
   PRE_STAY 
   
-0.016*** 
  
    
(0.003) 
  MOVE_1 
    
-0.014*** -0.018*** 
     
(0.004) (0.004) 
MOVE_12 
     
-0.013*** 
      
(0.004) 
CONSTANT 8.591*** 8.588*** 8.587*** 8.599*** 8.595*** 8.597*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
       Obs. 8,742 8,742 8,742 8,742 8,742 8,742 
R-squared 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) The dependent 
variable is LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, 





Table A-5 Hedonic Model with Market Information Premium with 
Subsample of New Sale Group. 
  LOG_HP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LOG_AREA 0.871*** 0.873*** 0.873*** 0.874*** 0.872*** 0.874*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
LOG_CBD -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.063*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
SHOP 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SCHOOL 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HOSPITAL -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SUBWAY 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SALE1 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
B_TYPE1 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
B-TYPE2 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 
 




    
  
(0.006) 
    RURAL_BIRTH 
  
0.012* 
   
   
(0.007) 
   PRE_STAY 
   
-0.016*** 
  
    
(0.004) 
  MOVE_1 
    
-0.018*** -0.024*** 
     
(0.005) (0.006) 
MOVE_12 
     
-0.021*** 
      
(0.005) 
CONSTANT 9.303*** 9.293*** 9.293*** 9.300*** 9.301*** 9.297*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
       Obs. 7,725 7,725 7,725 7,725 7,725 7,725 
R-squared 0.726 0.726 0.726 0.726 0.726 0.727 
Notes: (1) All the variables are defined in Table 4-1; (2) The dependent 
variable is LOG_HP; (3) Standard errors are in parentheses; (4) *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
